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Thesis Summary 
 
 
This study examines the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration and the 
financial performance and corporate governance arrangements of the UK and Spanish listed 
firms. These countries’ corporate governance framework has been shaped by differences in 
legal origin, culture and backgrounds. For example, the UK legal arrangements can be 
defined as to be constituted in common-law, whereas for Spanish firms, the legal 
arrangement is based on civil law.  
We estimate both static and dynamic regression models to test our hypotheses and we 
estimate our regression using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM).  
Estimated results for both countries show that directors’ remuneration levels are positively 
related with measures of firm value and financial performance. This means that remuneration 
levels do not lead to a point whereby firm value is reduced due to excessive remuneration. 
These results hold for our long-run estimates. That is, estimates based on panel cointegration 
and panel error correction. Measures of corporate governance also impacts on the level of 
executive pay. Our results have important implications for existing corporate governance 
arrangements and how the interests of stakeholders are protected. For example, long-run 
results suggest that directors’ remuneration adjusts in a way to capture variation in financial 
performance. 
 
 
Key words: agency theory; dynamic setting; directors’ compensation; panel cointegration; 
panel error-correction models (ECMs). 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The level of executive directors’ remuneration has been an issue much debated in many 
countries. CEOs and other executive directors were blamed for paying themselves excessive 
compensation thus reducing shareholders’ wealth which was fuelled by increased risk taking. 
This increased risk taking has been considered to be one of the main causes of the financial 
crisis in 2008 (Dong, 2014). Directors were considered to receive large amounts of money 
long before the crisis and these issues have been addressed in various research papers. 
However, recent corporate scandals, instability of the financial systems, loss of confidence 
and following changes in corporate governance regulations have caused a particular rise in 
the interest for this topic.  
It was generally accepted by the public, regulators, academic researchers, social media, etc. 
that weak corporate governance was one of the major aspects contributing to the crisis. 
Failures in corporate governance arrangements have not provided protection against 
excessive risk taking (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Main aspects which are believed to have failed are 
risk management system, transparency and disclosure, board practices and remuneration 
system (Kumar and Singh, 2013). Some argue that the structure of remuneration itself has 
caused major problems (Bhagat and Bolton, 2014); others also highlight that remuneration 
systems were not linked to long-term objectives of firms and their strategies (Kirkpatrick, 
2009).  
These problems suggested that there was a need to develop new strategies and corporate 
governance reforms. This led many researchers, practitioners and regulators contributing to 
literature by providing some insights as to how these problems could potentially be avoided in 
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the future taking into account lessons learnt (Kumar and Singh, 2013). Despite the vast 
amount of literature on corporate governance, the issue of remuneration of executives still 
remains one of the most controversial issues much debated in many countries.  
The research debate which takes place in academia in this area is the concept of 
remuneration. The main challenge is to determine whether remuneration causes problems as 
directors extract large amounts of compensation for themselves (Blanchard et al., 1994); or 
whether this can serve as a mechanism to motivate executives’ to act in the best interest of 
firms and thus shareholders if it is linked to performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a). 
Conflicting views and mixed evidence are often presented and it makes this topic extremely 
interesting for investigation. Heated debate after the financial crisis, global change in 
corporate governance regulations and an interest to investigate this complicated link between 
remuneration, firm performance and corporate governance has motivated this research.   
The main question most academics are trying answer is to what extent the interests of 
shareholders and directors can be aligned to resolve the agency problem. How do we make 
sure that executives act in the best interest of all stakeholders, especially shareholders? 
Being agents and acting on behalf of shareholders, executive directors are responsible for 
making the right choices to benefit shareholders. But how can this be achieved? As a result, 
boards of directors were examined in detail by researchers as the way these are structured 
has a direct effect on how firm is being monitored (Bryant and Davis, 2012) and this in turn 
influences firm performance and structure of directors’ pay, which is often used as an 
incentive to motivate directors (Guthrie et al., 2012; Essen et al., 2013).  
Some academics state that excessive CEO remuneration might not have been the main 
cause of the financial crisis as they report that since 2008 the way directors’ are being 
compensated has not changed significantly (Dong, 2014). This argument ignores the 
cumulative effects of excessive pay on firm performance. Another issue which was brought to 
11 
 
attention was outlined by Hubbard (2005) – how high is actually high? How do we as 
researchers define “excessive”? These issues have motivated the main question which will 
be answered in this study, do directors actually exploit firm’s resources and overpay 
themselves or does their compensation depend on good financial performance for which they 
are rewarded.  
The extent of corporate scandals also varied across different countries and it can be 
attributed to legal arrangements. La Porta et al. (1998) discuss the origin on the legal system 
influences the way corporate governance develops in countries. For example, if shareholders 
do not have opportunity to vote on corporate meetings, it is more likely that it would be easier 
for directors’ to set higher levels of compensation for themselves. This argument has 
motivated the examination of directors’ remuneration across two countries which have 
different corporate governance mechanisms, UK and Spain. 
Despite a large number of academic research and vast amount of literature in corporate 
governance area, knowledge gaps still exist. The next chapter of this thesis will analyse the 
relevant literature and talk about these gaps in more detail. Here, we will just provide a brief 
summary to outline main issues which require addressing. First of all, there are currently not 
that many academic papers which concentrate on the analysis of Spanish firms. Second, 
there is a limited amount of research which takes the dynamic context into consideration. 
These are the main gaps in the study which need to be addressed.  
Therefore, our research aims to contribute to existing literature by providing additional 
evidence for the Spanish companies. We also contribute to academia by using a new method 
in this area to test remuneration in the long-run, which could be applicable for future research 
and investigation. It is also important to consider the implications for regulators and 
practitioners and these will be covered in the last sections of our empirical chapters.  
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1.2 Research Objectives 
This study investigates the relationship between executive directors’ remuneration, firm 
performance and corporate governance for UK and Spanish listed firms. We set the main 
objectives as follows: 
• To examine whether executive directors’ remuneration is associated with the financial 
performance of firms. 
• Given the difference in legal origins of countries, to investigate the relationship 
between firm performance and board monitoring and remuneration for the two 
countries.  
• To test for the relation between executive compensation and corporate governance 
arrangements of both countries. 
• To examine the long-term relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance. This consideration allows us to test whether directors’ compensation 
have a long-run relation with the performance of firms. 
We estimate several models of executive remuneration using both ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and generalised methods of moments (GMM). Static and dynamic versions of our 
remuneration models are also examined in addition to the panel cointegration and panel 
error-correction. We provide justification for the chosen estimation method where appropriate. 
Some diagnostic tests will also be applied to test the validity of the estimates. 
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1.3 Summary of Results 
We find that our hypotheses are supported in several respects. The relationship between 
directors’ remuneration is positively related to firm performance and market value for both UK 
and Spanish firms. This suggests, perhaps controversially, that directors do not receive an 
“excessive” pay and that their remuneration isin line with the financial performance of the 
firms and acts as an incentive for executives.  
The relationship between corporate governance variables and directors’ remuneration is 
different in these two countries. We report that strong governance mechanisms contribute to 
a decrease in executives’ pay in UK firms implying that stronger monitoring as it is 
recommend by Combined Code provides greater investors’ protection. The presence of the 
Combined Code suggests that UK directors are less likely to expropriate from firms by setting 
themselves significantly high levels of compensation. This resultdoes not hold for Spanish 
firms, despite the increase in board control over time. This finding suggests that investor 
protection is less strong for Spanish investors. 
Even though we have not incorporated explanatory variables which measure legal 
arrangements in countries, we attribute differences in corporate governance mechanisms to 
differences in law origin as described by La Porta et al. (1998), implying that common-law 
countries (e.g. UK) have greater investor protection and thus better monitoring and corporate 
governance arrangements than countries originating from civil law (e.g. Spain). 
We also report positive cointegration relationship between remuneration and firm 
performance suggesting that in the long-run variables will be moving in the same direction 
despite economic or financial shocks in the short-run.  
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1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
An overview of the remaining chapters of the thesis is as follows: Chapter two reviews the 
relevant literature in an area. In particular, the chapter draws on the agency problem which 
underpins this study. We then move on to discuss what determines executive directors’ 
remuneration and how monitoring can be used to influence the managerial behaviour. We 
also look at legal arrangements of countries under which firms operate and that determines 
the quality of their corporate governance control. This will help us to develop hypotheses as 
well as explain why this area of study was chosen for the investigation. 
Chapter three outlines the adopted methodology to test our predicted hypotheses. We use 
OLS and GMM estimation methods to test for static and dynamic relations between 
remuneration, firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms. Panel cointegration 
and panel error-correction models are applied to test for the existence of long-run 
relationship. This chapter also presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients. 
Chapter four analyses the empirical results for UK listed firms. It is reported that executive 
directors’ remuneration increases as we observe positive changes in firm performance, firm 
size and market value. Strong corporate governance variables which measure increase in 
board control contribute towards decrease in directors’ pay. 
Chapter five reports the results for Spanish firms. We find the same evidence regarding firm 
performance and remuneration; however, corporate governance mechanisms found to have a 
different effect on executives’ compensation. Evidence shows that greater monitoring does 
not necessarily lead to a decrease in pay as it was predicted. We attribute that to the fact that 
differences in cultural background, the origin of law has an effect on how monitoring 
mechanisms are enforced in firms.  
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Both empirical chapters provide strong evidence to support that good financial performance 
and increased market value have a positive effect on executive directors’ remuneration in 
both countries. In other words, in contrast to what is being discussed in the world regarding 
excessive compensation packs, directors may not take advantage by expropriating funds 
from firms and their compensation moves in line with the firm value and other financial 
indicators. 
Chapter six examines long-term relationship between firm performance and remuneration. 
Our results for the panel cointegration and panel error correction models (ECMs) show that 
there is a positive cointegration between remuneration and firm performance. We find that in 
the long-run there is a co-movement between explanatory variables and remuneration, 
meaning that despite some financial economic shocks taking place, in the long-run the 
variables will adjust and will move in the same direction.  
Final chapter concludes the thesis by providing a summary of main findings, stating 
contributions to academia and discussing limitations of the research. The study also provides 
recommendations for future research. In general our results have important implications for 
research in corporate governance. By showing negative relationship between strong 
corporate governance mechanisms and directors’ remuneration in the UK, our study implies 
that it is extremely important for countries to develop Code of Good Practice containing 
recommendations for firms to have greater board control to resolve the agency issues and 
make sure that directors act in the best interests of shareholders. Our long-run relations imply 
that even if directors are overpaid in one year it is likely that their payment will adjust over 
time to match firm performance and market value. On average our results show that directors 
cannot be considered to receive “excessive” pay as it moves in line with firms’ financial 
indicators.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on corporate governance, firm performance and executive 
directors’ remuneration. This reviewing aims to support the empirical research that will be 
pursued in this thesis. The reason for conducting the review is that before starting any 
research process, all existing knowledge and findings in the subject area must be taken into 
account in order to be able to identify and make an actual contribution to a discipline. 
Literature review helps the researcher to develop a better understanding of the discipline as 
well as identifying the existing gap in prior studies.  
Corporate governance is an area which has undergone quite substantial changes in the past 
few decades, especially after the corporate scandals took place and 2008 financial crisis, 
thus it has attracted a lot of attention amongst researchers, social media, policy makers, 
investors and the public in general. It is believed that executives’ pay ishighly interconnected 
with this scandals and the failure of firms by pursuing their own personal interest which is 
detrimental for the firm they work for.  
Many empirical researches have addressed this problem before; however, there is still a large 
scope for investigation. We interconnect the issues associated with corporate governance 
and firm performance in order to determine how they relate to executive pay. 
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2.2 Corporate governance theories 
 
A growing body of literature on corporate governance is based on different theories widely 
discussed in academia. Agency theory is considered to be predominant base for many 
research questions in this field and is used as the main underpinning theory, especially when 
investigating links between the level of monitoring, incentives and firm performance (e.g. 
Misangyi and Acharya, 2014). Corporate governance arrangements are also seen as 
controlling and monitoring mechanisms.  
The theoretical ground on which our research is based is the agency theory; however, other 
theories have an important bearing on agency theory. As such, we also examine corporate 
governance theories after introducing agency theory, followed by the stewardship theory, 
stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory.  
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
 
The agency theory put forward by Jensen and Meckling (1976) forms the basis of our 
research question1. Elements of the agency theory originally developed in both the 
economics and management fields. It is considered to be a foundation theory in corporate 
governance and has been used extensively to underpin various research questions and 
problems(see Williamson, 1988; Lan and Heracleous, 2010; Dalton et al., 2003 and others). 
Many researchers (see e.g., Lan and Heracleous, 2010; Rutherford et al., 2007) highlight the 
importance of this theory and also state that the agency theory can be considered to be the 
cornerstone of the corporate governance literature and is used to analyse the relationship 
                                                          
1 Agency theory can be traced back to Adam Smith (Denis and McConnell, 2003), when he was describing 
specialisation and the division of labor in 1776. However, during the early 1970’s researchers investigated the risk-
sharing attitudes of different parties under information asymmetry. Risk sharing arises when cooperating parties’ 
attitudes towards risk differ (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
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between boards of directors, who should represent shareholders’ interests and shareholders 
who are owners of firms. This link is in particularly important when examining the financial 
performance of the firm, its ownership structure (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), and the 
monitoring and control of boards of directors (Hillman et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 1996) when 
seeking to assess how conflicts of interests between the board of directors and shareholders 
can be resolved (Coles et al., 2001). 
The agency theory is relevant for the activities associated with the relationship between the 
agent and the principal. In general terms it is defined as the conflict of interest between the 
agent and the principal and is most apparent when asymmetrical information exists, meaning 
that the agent has information that the principal does not have (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The level of the agency problem may decrease or increase, depending on the ownership 
structure of the firm and the amount of investor protection that exist both at a country level 
and the provisions in the articles of memorandum of the firm. Filatotchev et al. (2013), for 
example, highlight the importance of institutional structure on agency relationships in their 
recent study and suggest that cross-national comparison of corporate governance should 
take this into account. In other words from the corporate governance perspective, when 
different incentives are created and rules for monitoring are set, these are largely affected by 
the established set of values. 
The agency theory thus attempts to address and analyse conflicts of interests which arise as 
a result of divergence of interests. This theory also analyses the lack of alignment of owner 
and agent interests in terms of goal setting, actions, etc., which causes an increase in agency 
costs in a firm (Jensen, 1986; Nyberg et al., 2010). These agency costs, of course, vary 
across firms and largely depend on financing decisions, leverage levels and capital structure 
(Morellec et al., 2012). Managers have to make complicated decisions and expect to be 
remunerated for their efforts as they make decisions regarding risk taking. Thus agency 
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problem is central to the remuneration arrangements of firms. Good corporate governance 
seeks to provide a framework through which the interests of all parties are better aligned.  
The risk-sharing problem (also known as principal-agent problem) was later on extended by 
researchers and became known as the agency problem which arises when cooperating 
parties have different objectives for the firm and this creates conflicting interests (Eisenhardt, 
1989). This problem can be defined as “agency conflicts arising from a divergence between 
agents’ and principals’ utility functions, creating the potential for mischief”(Lan and 
Heracleous, 2010, p. 294). Sometimes this problem is described as a separation of 
ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  In academic literature the problem is 
known as principal-agent problem and it refers to a situation in which passive owners of the 
firm who do not take an active part in making decisions enjoy greater gains received from 
investments they made, whereas agents who act on behalf of shareholders enjoy smaller 
gains (Rutherford et al., 2007).  
In accordance with authors such as Kern (2006), the principal-agent problem can be 
described as a preliminary point in many analytical studies as most literature on corporate 
governance emphasises this problem. Two main considerations usually cause this problem to 
exist within a firm. First, the agency problem can arise from information asymmetry (Nyberg et 
al., 2010), meaning that it is difficult for principals to monitor the behavior of the agents as 
they have different information about the performance of the firm. The agency problem also 
arises when there is no alignment between their interests (Kern, 2006). The extent of the 
information asymmetry usually varies between firms as it is likely to depend on the amount of 
private information which is only available to managers. For example, if there is a firm which 
faces many investment opportunities, managers are likely to have an access to private 
information about the future value of the projects thus making it difficult for shareholders to 
monitor available opportunities and managerial behaviour until the information is revealed. In 
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this case information asymmetry is likely to be very high in comparison to, say, a firm in which 
managers do not make investment decisions and only supervise assets and projects which 
already have been undertaken (Gaver and Gaver, 1995).   
The agency conflict plays an important role in almost all aspects of the modern firm as all 
contracts created between any two parties can be traced to this problem (Lippert and Moore, 
1995). The conflict becomes even more prominent as the firm is more often seen as a set of 
various contracts between different factors of production rather than a classical model of an 
entrepreneur (Fama, 1980). That means that economic agents are driven by self-interest thus 
increasing competition. This self-interest can be seen in cases where firms undertake 
excessive risk when also executives stand to be rewarded with favorable outcomes but the 
principal carry the bulk of the loses. 
 
2.2.1.1 Moral hazard and adverse selection 
 
It is also essential to mention two main issues which arise from the principal-agent problem. 
The first aspect is known as moral hazard, meaning that an agent can act in his own interest 
to the detriment of the firm, which can take the form of different actions. Firstly, moral hazard 
arises when managers lack the knowledge and skills they attest to managers that they have. 
Secondly, once this information is revealed to managers they do not necessarily act in the 
best interest of shareholders (Stoughton, 1993). Another aspect is adverse selection, which 
refers to the inability of the principal to verify agents’ knowledge and skills before employment 
as they might falsely claim to have certain abilities that they do not have (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Both of these problems are believed to be a result of principals and agents having different 
goals set within a firm and also possessing unequal information, i.e. information asymmetry 
problem (Rutherford et al., 2007).  
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Information asymmetry is an essential concept in the logic of the agency problem and 
therefore also is a central cause of moral hazard and adverse selection problems, because if 
information is evenly spread between managers and principals there will be no place for the 
agency problem to arise (Rutherford et al., 2007).  
Wright et al. (2009, p. 353) sum up the negative effects of the agency problem as put forward 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) as follows: “…the separation of 
ownership from control and the dispersed ownership structure of the public corporation create 
agency costs that reduce shareholder wealth”.  
In general, the agency problem can be resolved through the monitoring of agents whether 
this entails the market for corporate control as in mergers and acquisitions, through good 
corporate governance and legal arrangements or through a creation of incentives contracts. 
However, such monitoring arrangements are unlikely to cover all eventualities. Incentives 
contracts are often incremental in relation to performance and shareholders are often unable 
to set their optimal levels. This means that incentives contracts can cause executive to take 
excessive risk. Thus, it can become extremely difficult and expensive to solve the agency 
problem and ensure that managers act in the best interests of the firm’s owners (Clarke and 
Conyon, 1998; Gaver and Gaver, 1995). The agency problem also gives rise to a demand for 
corporate disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
 
2.2.1.2 Criticism of the agency theory 
 
As any existing theory, the agency theory does not depict a panacea for all corporate ills. 
Traditional agency theory does not take into account trust and it is believed that managers 
always act in their self-interest (as previously discussed); it does not consider that not 
everyone will act in the same selfish way. Hendry (2002), for example, outlines that any 
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organisation cannot function effectively if there is no honesty or trust. If owners of the firm 
have to delegate main decision-making to managers, there have to be some form of loyalty. It 
is quite difficult to establish to what extent directors will exert opportunistic behaviour 
(Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012). Wiseman et al. (2012) also support this view and highlight 
that real life situations are more complex and the agency theory does not always depict more 
diverse social environment.  
Given the theory associated with the agency problem, an empiricist would also be interested 
in the nature of the evidence that supports the theory. It has been stated that the agency 
theory has a very important role in science. However, the question which rises here is to what 
extent the theory matches the reality, i.e. whether agents and principals act as it is expected 
according to the theory or not; therefore, certain criticism could be outlined if some empirical 
results are taken into account. One of the identified issues of the agency problem is risk-
shifting. Mao (2003) states that we would expect that if the leverage of the firm increases the 
agency cost of debt should increase monotonically as well. However, the investigation 
performed by the researcher shows that this is not always the case meaning that increased 
debt of the firm does not imply that shareholders’ attitude towards risk will be reduced. Even 
though this empirical study has its own limitations, such as data limitation, control of certain 
explanatory variables as it is outlined by Mao (2003), it is still a very good example which 
shows that theory does not always depict real life situations. 
 
2.2.2 Stewardship Theory 
 
Even though the agency theory is considered to be the dominant paradigm in corporate 
governance, other theories are suggested which try to overcome limitations of the agency 
theory which were previously discussed. For example, one of them is that agency theory 
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does not take trust and honesty into account and does not assume that people may behave 
in an altruistic way. In this section we will talk about stewardship theory, which also focuses 
on the relationship between shareholders and directors but using a completely different 
perspective. The similarity between these two theories is that both of them concentrate on the 
description of the role of directors when achieving firms’ set objectives and goals (Tosi et al., 
2003).The main difference, however, is what motivates directors to act in the best interest of 
the firm. Stewardship theory, as opposed to agency theory which assumes opportunistic 
behaviour, suggests that managers’ interests are aligned to those of shareholders, in other 
words directors are determined to be good stewards of the firm they work for and there is no 
conflict of interest (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
In contrast to agency theory which is based on economic paradigm, stewardship theory 
stems from sociology and psychology (Hernandez, 2012). Stewardship can be defined as 
“the extent to which an individual willingly subjugates his or her personal interests to act in 
protection of others’ long-term welfare” (Hernandez, 2012, p.174). As opposed to the agency 
theory, the stewardship theory does not assume that directors will exhibit opportunistic 
behaviour and start exploiting firm resources for their own benefit (Davis et al., 1997). As it 
was mentioned before, the agency theory does not take trust into account; however, 
according to the stewardship theory it is believed that directors can be trusted (Davis et al., 
1997). 
The theory suggests that top managers are driven to make large profits for the company as 
their goals are congruent with that of the owners and they get satisfaction from contributing 
towards the success of the firm and aim to achieve good firm performance (Pande and 
Ansari, 2014). Directors are also behaving in a way to maximize, add to firm’s value and 
maximise shareholders’ returns (Davis et al., 1997).  
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The logical question arising in this context is what could motivate directors to have an 
incentive to serve the company. Donaldson (2008) explains that the ultimate driver is 
responsibility, feeling of autonomy and satisfaction from completing an interesting work. That 
implies that control mechanisms as suggested by the agency theory are not required. This 
can be supported by Tosi et al. (2003) who states that required monitoring proposed by 
agency theory can actually inhibit motivation and may case negative effects.  
Davis et al. (2010) states that the stewardship theory can be widely applied to family-run 
business as they found that family members tend to have greater commitment and trust. 
Bubolz (2001) also supports this view by describing stewardship theory as being “ideal” to 
use in the family business context.  Linking this back to the agency theory, if we consider 
family-run businesses, according to this view there should not be any agency costs involved 
and managers won’t seek to high levels of remuneration just to benefit themselves only. As 
our research focuses on large corporations, all directors are not expected to behave in an 
altruistic way. Bearing in mind an argument that stewardship theory is more applicable for 
family business, this research will be based on the agency theory. 
 
2.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
 
Stakeholder theory was originally developed by Ed Freeman in the 1980s. This theory 
suggests that firms create value for a broad group of different stakeholders (Harrison and 
Wicks, 2013).  
The main assumption of the theory is that by creating value it will help firms bringing core 
stakeholders together. By concentrating on this aspect it becomes clear what managers’ 
responsibilities are in terms of delivering on stakeholders’ needs and articulating what types 
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of relationships should be formed between managers and main stakeholders (Freeman et al., 
2004).  
According to Freeman (1994), directors’ responsibility should be extended by taking into 
account different stakeholders and this is based on the idea of fairness and moral rights of all 
people involved. The concept of solidarity is recognised as people should be free to enter 
mutual agreements and increase their value. It is also important to note that different 
stakeholders sometimes have conflicting expectations. Most Anglo-Saxon firms are 
concentrating on increasing shareholders’ value. However, in other countries in may not be 
the first objective. For  
example, in Japan firms focus on long-term growth rather than dividend payouts and in 
Germany, it is important to have employee’s representation on the board (Jackson and 
Moerke, 2005). Therefore, different expectations considering a larger group of stakeholders 
will determine the objectives of firms. 
The main criticism, however, is that it is not quite clear what it is meant by “value” and how 
this can be measured (Harrison and Wicks, 2013). When we consider economic point of view, 
this of course involves monetary value and imply that more legitimate stakeholders should get 
a larger share. This brings us back to our research question and remuneration. Linking this 
theory to the question of excessive remuneration, it can be explained that executives extract 
the larger stake for themselves; this implies that they are either the most legitimate 
stakeholders or they do not consider other stakeholders. If this is the case, then value is not 
created for all key stakeholders in the firm and again this theory won’t be applicable for our 
research.  
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2.2.4 Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Resource dependence theory can be used in corporate governance to explain the behaviour 
of directors within the firm. The theory postulates that the way organisations behave is largely 
influenced by the level of dependence on various types of resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). According to this theory, firms will always attempt to reduce dependency on some 
resources while trying to achieve independence over other resources; and this can be 
achieved via diversification (Pfeffer, 1972).   
The theory can be traced back to 1949, when Selznick (1949) carried out an investigation on 
the Tennessee Valley Authority and reported that when faced with strong opposition, the firm 
would include some of those representatives on their board thus exercising some level of 
control. This was the first example when firms started to attempt reducing their dependency 
and taking advantage of an environment in which it operates.  
Taking into account this perspective, boards of directors can be viewed as the body working 
to provide essential resources and to reduce firms’ dependence on certain types of resources 
by bringing knowledge, relevant information, etc. which results in adding power to a firm as 
well as reducing transaction costs at the same time (Bryant and Davis, 2012). In this case 
directors can be described as being a link between the firm and the external environment 
(Hillman et al., 2000). It is also believed that the structure of boards of directors itself is 
heavily influenced by the firms’ external resource dependencies (Bryant and Davis, 2012). 
For example, Pfeffer (1972) has found that firms with greater resource dependencies will 
create a board of directors consisting of a larger number of outside directors.  Therefore, it 
can be seen how this theory is related to corporate governance and in particular to the 
composition of the board.  
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As any other theory, it is always subject to certain criticism. The theory does not explore what 
strategies firms will adopt to manage constraints when acquiring resources and whether the 
use of these strategies varies over time; it also fails to recognise other environmental factors 
which affect firms (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Our research, however, won’t be considering the external strategy of firms, what we are 
interested to see is how remuneration is linked to performance and monitoring itself. In this 
sense, this theory cannot be applied to our research questions.  
 
2.3 Managing the Agency Problem 
It is difficult to achieve goal congruence and convergence of interests between shareholders 
and directors. However, some scholars outline an assumption that if a problem is managed, 
i.e. the goal congruence is achieved at least to some extent it is likely that firms will operate 
more efficiently and firms will improve their financial performance (Filatotchev and Allcock, 
2010).  
Following Crawford et al. (1995, p. 231) “…the conflicts of interest that emerge between 
CEOs and the shareholders they represent are a classical example of the principal-agent 
problem”. It is believed that there are two possible solutions to the agency problem and these 
are monitoring of directors and incentives (creating remuneration contracts in a way that it 
motivates directors to act in the interests of a firm), which can act either as substitutes or as 
compliments (Rutherford et al.,2007). 
One of the two solutions to the agency problem advocated by Rutherford et al.(2007) is to 
enhance executive directors’ monitoring in a firm, i.e. this will attempt to reduce the 
information asymmetry and influence managers to put investors’ interest above their own and 
thus greater alliance will be created. It was proposed by Holmstrom (1979, p. 74) that “a 
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natural remedy to the problem is to invest resources into monitoring of actions and use this 
information in the contract”. However, in some simple situations all the necessary information 
is available thus making it easier to monitor meaning it will create a perfect solution for the 
agency problem, whereas in most cases complete monitoring is not possible or very costly 
due to expenses involved in gathering all the necessary information. In such cases where 
direct observation is neither possible or easy, imperfect monitoring comes into place and 
principals have to control agents using different forms of accounting, supervision, etc., i.e. 
means used to identify managerial effort (Holmstrom, 1979). Therefore it can be said that in 
order for principals to achieve goal congruence they have to look for efficient mechanisms to 
reduce information asymmetry.  
Moreover, it is also possible to reduce agency problem and align interests between parties by 
increasing the level of formalisation. The degree of formalisation includes the set of written 
rules within a firm thus reducing managerial opportunism to pursue their own interests 
(Rutherford et al., 2007). Miller (1987) confirms this point by conducting a survey including 97 
small and medium-sized firms and finding that there is a relationship between formalisation 
and the level of interaction between decision makers. A study shows that structural 
formalisation can be described to be a very valuable tool indicating that more attention should 
be drawn to it in companies. 
Michael and Pearce (2004) even refer to formalisation as a third solution to the agency 
problem, describing it to serve as constraints. Researchers outline in their paper that 
incentives and monitoring being standard mechanisms for the agency problem solving are 
subject to duration; i.e. long-term decisions needs other mechanism to control them. 
Therefore, constraints such as written policies can have a great effect and make managers 
adhere to the set rules within a firm thus limiting the agency problem and making other tools 
even more effective if they are applied together.  
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Shareholders monitor the behavior of directors in both, direct and indirect ways. Direct 
monitoring is usually undertaken in the form of equal voting, cumulative voting, and 
confidential voting. Other forms of direct monitoring include private and public disclosure 
through which directors communicate the firm’s performance to the outsiders (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Private disclosures take the form of private face-to-face conversations 
between the directors and the investee firm (Arnold and Moizer, 1984) but such meetings can 
be manipulated by directors because of asymmetric information (Holland, 1998a, b; Solomon 
et al., 2013). Indirect monitoring is directly observable but can be gauged by the level of 
directors’ independence (Lippert and Moore, 1995).  
Clarke and Conyon (1998), for example, contend that in order to align diverging interests of 
the two parties, directors of firms should be offered explicit incentives, which is a second tool 
to control the agency problem. This usually takes the form of compensation contract also 
referred to as optimal contract (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The terms in compensation 
contracts can explicitly state the manner that the agent can perform his/her duties. This will 
facilitate an alignment of the interests of the agent and the principal and can be done via two 
mechanisms: financial alignment and alignment of actions (Nyberg et al., 2010). Even so, 
these arrangements are affected by the level moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Compensation contracts are also seen to be more effective in case where institutional 
investors hold shares in a large number of firms, unable to effectively monitor the behaviour 
of managers thus contracts act as a bonding mechanism to align interests between directors 
and investors and reduce agency problem (David et al., 1998).  
Thus the creation of suitable compensation contracts can help reduce the agency problem 
(Lippert and Moore, 1995). However, compensation contracts cannot cover all eventualities 
and indeed they do not give the agent a free hand to do as he/she wishes. This is quite 
evident in nature of the decisions that are voted on during shareholder’s meetings. One 
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useful mechanism for aligning the interest of the principal and the agent is to also make the 
agent shareholders of the firm.   
In the following sections I am going to look at these two mechanisms for controlling the 
agency problem in more detail, providing some empirical examples. 
 
2.4 Public and Private Information to Increase Monitoring 
As it was discussed information is needed to monitor managerial behavior. The nature and 
quality of information should be taken into account as it will have different relevance; the 
board has to acquire proactive information thus it will have a greater impact on the decision-
making process. Proactive information includes not only data provided by managers but also 
additional information which could not have been misinterpreted by managers who might 
have pursued their own interests; therefore, having an access to such information may result 
in reducing information asymmetry (Rutherford et al., 2007). 
Corporate disclosure is of great importance for shareholders as well as for outside investors 
as it serves as a mean to gather information about firm performance and “is critical for the 
functioning of an efficient capital market” (Healy and Palepu, 2001, p.406). Having acquired 
all the necessary information the level of monitoring may be improved and thus agency 
problem can be reduced to a certain extent (Rutherford et al., 2007).  
Disclosure can be either public (provided financial reports, statements, and other analyses) or 
private (voluntary communication with the firm’s management) (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The 
quality of disclosure impacts on remuneration levels as executives can over-state their 
performance levels and it may be difficult for the principal to verify their level of performance. 
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2.4.1 Mandatory Disclosure 
Mandatory disclosure which has been introduced in many firms has decreased the problem of 
information asymmetry. However, increase in assets such as knowledge and innovation on 
which it is hard to place a corporate value has made it difficult to disclose the value of such 
intangibles in financial annual reports (Holland, 1998a). 
Public financial reports are usually used for the purpose of creating true business information 
about a firm affecting the share price which should reflect the reality of market conditions in 
which firms operate rather than being driven by perception (Holland, 1998a). Many firms seek 
to broaden the disclosure content by releasing private information and improving 
communications with financial institutions. This can be done via formal and informal way. The 
former includes releasing some private information and explaining in greater detail some 
parameters included in public reports such as debt and dividend policy, gearing, etc.; the 
latter involves collecting qualitative information concerning different variables, such as 
environment for innovation, human intangible assets, and quality of management. This 
information is believed to help evaluating corporate performance in a better way (Holland, 
1998a).  
 
2.4.2 Private Disclosure 
Various studies (e.g. Arnold and Moizer (1984); Chugh and Meador (1984); Diamond (1985)) 
have explored the importance of private disclosure by firms being in particular relevant for 
financial institutions which constitute a large part of shareholders (Holland, 1998a). The main 
aim of voluntary disclosure is to encourage a dialogue between shareholders and managers. 
Many researchers (e.g. Chugh and Meador, 1984) outline in their study that one-to-one 
meetings and interactions with management improve understanding of the firm value thus 
leading to better allocation of resources. Rutherford et al. (2007) support this argument in 
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their paper confirming that frequent meetings of shareholders with the board of directors tend 
to enhance monitoring, decreasing information asymmetry and thus help to solve the agency 
problem to a degree. In this scenario agents are less likely to act in an opportunistic way and 
remunerate themselves with exorbitant pay packages. 
 
2.5 Directors’ Remuneration 
Directors’ compensation has been defined as “…money provided by the members of a 
company to remunerate the agents elected by the owners of the company, to provide safe 
and profitable stewardship over the assets of the principals” (Gilshan, 2009, p.6). Directors’ 
remuneration consists of different elements of rewards such as base salary, bonus, stock 
options, restricted share plans, accrued pension and benefits (Samuels and Piper, 1998). 
Remuneration package may also largely depend on the level of growth of the firm. For 
example compensation pack for managers of high growth firms usually consists of long-term 
incentives, such as stock option grants, performance awards, etc. However, directors of non-
growth firms tend to receive payment in the form of a fixed (base) salary (Gaver and Gaver, 
1995). Pay packages also change over time depending on firm performance and strategy 
directors choose; usually every year contracts can be renegotiated and adjusted to reflect 
changes in the firm (Dow and Raposo, 2005).  
Many academic studies (see e.g. Tosi et al., 2000; Core et al., 1999) put a great emphasis on 
this aspect of corporate governance, exploring in a greater detail what factors (especially 
those which measure firm value and financial performance) affect remuneration, how these 
rewards differ between industries, etc. That is why there is a large scope for investigation as 
many aspects have an effect on the level of compensation.  
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Since 1980’s the level of director’s remuneration has increased dramatically and this question 
has attracted a lot of attention. For example compensation of US chief executives increased 
by 6.1% from 1991 to 1992 (Lippert and Moore, 1995). These huge remuneration packs 
CEOs received at the end of last century from stock options has generated a lot of concern of 
interested parties, especially national governments, regulators, investors and pension funds 
(Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Muckley, 1984).   
Unrepresentative levels of compensation automatically give rise to a conflict of interest 
increasing the agency problem. High remuneration packages are also criticised from moral 
and social perspective as the income gap between top directors and lowest paid workers in 
firms continues to rise (Rost and Weibel, 2013). Economists would always criticise an unfair 
distribution of income as it leads to many social problems. 
Without an effective mechanism for corporate governance and board control, it is also the 
case that entrenched directors can influence their own compensation package (Fahlenbrach, 
2009). As a result many countries sought to establish appropriate mechanisms to determine 
the compensation plans of executives in line with good principles of corporate governance 
(Thompson, 2005). 
 
2.5.1 Remuneration and Current Economic Environment 
Director’s remuneration is a very important issue especially if we take into account current 
business environment. Firms which were affected by recent financial crisis were forced to cut 
salaries for many employees and also change executives’ compensation packages in 
response to economic downturn. Since the way directors are remunerated became monitored 
in more detail; the level of compensation has changed for nonexecutive directors as well 
(Tovar et al., 2009).  
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Even if director’s base pay decreased during the financial crisis, there is a suggestion that the 
total level of compensation continues to rise (and that can be attributed mainly to bonuses 
and other benefits directors keep receiving). For example, Tovar et al. (2009, p.1) indicates 
that “…overall total remuneration for directors increased in the most recent year, although at 
a much lower rate than in the preceding years”. 
Earlier mentioned concerns in relation to “high” directors’ payments must also not be avoided. 
Too much emphasis was put on the actual managerial compensation. However, it is believed 
that we have to shift our attention to the way directors are being compensated rather that 
looking at an absolute value. As public awareness and pressure caused firms to cut down 
directors’ salaries that led to decrease in rewards for outstanding performance for some of 
them. This has artificially decreased competition among managers, i.e. better rewarded 
talented managers would have replaced weaker directors in the future thus causing greater 
increase in efficiency of the firm (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). 
 
2.5.2 Remuneration Contract Used as a Mean to Align Interests 
Many academic studies also focus on the debate as to whether the design of directors’ 
remuneration contracts aligns the interests of shareholders and managers thus reducing the 
conflict or whether they might enhance the problem, meaning that directors unduly influence 
their compensation contracts benefiting only themselves (Fahlenbrach, 2009). That is the 
debate on which we are going to concentrate in this section of the review. There is a belief 
that if these contracts are designed in an effective way, it is likely that the agency problem will 
be mitigated to a certain extent (Crawford et al., 1995, Rutherford et al., 2007). This argument 
can also be supported by views advocated by Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) who believe that incentives are helping to align interests between principals 
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and agents. The following section evaluates both of these possible scenarios drawing on 
some empirical investigations. 
However, there is also a contrasting view which states that remuneration not only does not 
resolve the agency problem, but actually increases the agency costs (Blanchard et al., 1994).  
 
2.5.3 Compensation Policy 
What are the mechanisms to control directors’ compensation packages? This section will 
describe what factors firms consider when designing an effective remuneration contract for 
executive directors. 
This alignment between managers’ performance and agents’ interests described earlier and 
known as “bonding” also believed to be dependent on the availability of investment 
opportunities for the firm (Lippert and Moore, 1995). This point can be supported by the 
following conclusion “firms with abundant investment opportunities pay higher levels of total 
compensation to their executives” (Gaver and Gaver, 1995, p.20).As firms have an option of 
investment opportunities and thus a high potential to grow greater information asymmetry 
tends to exist between shareholders and managers leading a firm creating compensation 
packs with a greater emphasis on long-term incentives rather than fixed salary for the 
purpose of reducing agency costs (Gaver and Gaver, 1995). 
Gaver and Gaver (1995) indicate that firms that have large investment opportunities are more 
likely to pay higher levels of compensation to their directors. The lower the profit of the firm, 
the greater the risk borne by directors who hold all their wealth in the firm and therefore are 
unable to diversify their wealth like shareholders. Similarly, since less profitable firms are 
more risky, directors will demand relatively more compensation to work for relatively more 
risky firms. This leads to involvement of high level of inside information and specialised 
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knowledge to which shareholders do not have access to thus making it difficult to monitor 
directors’ behavior and approve projects. In order to align their interests shareholders choose 
to rely on a high proportion of incentive contracts in a remuneration pack meaning that 
managers will act in their interest and will attempt to explore new opportunities and choose 
most profitable projects for the future (Gaver and Gaver, 1995). 
Jensen and Murphy (1990a) suggest that an effective way to control directors’ actions and 
the level of their compensation is to link their rewards to shareholders wealth. Once a suitable 
contract is designed containing payments related to the firm performance the conflict is 
believed to be reduced to a certain extent. Using pay-performance sensitivity measures, i.e. 
the dollar change in the CEO wealth associated with a dollar change in shareholders’ wealth 
is widely discussed in academic literature. Crawford et al. (1995), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Jensen and Murphy (1990a) find that the higher the pay-performance sensitivity 
measure, the more aligned the interests of managers and shareholders are. Later the study 
by Conyon and Peck (1998) also add to prior analyses by finding a strong relationship 
between directors’ pay and firm performance.  
This does not imply that the agency problem is necessarily resolved over the entire period of 
the evaluation. The effectiveness largely depends on the ability of managers to make go sub-
optimal activities before such activities are revealed. A fundamental weakness of this 
framework is that it makes no allowance for short-termism in the actions of directors before 
the disclosure of performance. 
Being a highly debatable topic, contrasting evidence that firm performance is linked to 
remuneration also exists in academia. Some researchers found this relation to be weak or 
even insignificant in some cases (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990a and Kerr and Bettis, 1987). 
Taking into account compensation and performance alignment in some of the US 
corporations, we do not observe similar results, i.e. pay-performance relation tends to 
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decrease. This trend is observed by some researchers since 1930s and they give an 
explanation based on two main reasons: public complaint with regard to high managers’ 
payment which they consider to be too high and political forces which are believed to put 
certain legal constraints on the way compensation contract between managers and 
shareholders is designed thus limiting high compensation for outstanding managerial 
performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a).  
Fama (1980) also stated that in certain firms the relationship between compensation and firm 
performance is not observable and the extent of the agency problem is so large that in some 
cases compensation fails to be a mechanism to control managers. In contrast to previous 
studies (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), Kerr and Bettis (1987) 
measured firm performance in terms of returns to shareholders adjusted for the market 
movements. The rationale behind choosing this indicator was that this variable will clearly 
show contribution to shareholder’s wealth which should be aimed to be maximised by 
directors. Researchers have investigated pay-performance relationship in 500 firms. Their 
results oppose earlier investigations which found a strong relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance; this analysis in turn shows that remuneration tends to 
increase regardless of firm’s performance.  
However, more recent studies found stronger evidence to support the view that compensation 
is sensitive to firm performance. For example, Matolcsy and Wright (2010) report that firms 
where CEO remuneration structure is linked to firm performance tend to be more profitable.  
Moreover, some studies also highlight the link between market value and remuneration. 
Gabaix and Landier (2008) propose that increasing compensation is more to do with increase 
in firm value rather than the agency issues. Not that many studies have investigated this link; 
therefore, this indicates that this area requires closer examination.  
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Previous studies mainly investigated only CEO compensation levels in relation to firm 
performance. Zalewska (2014), however, highlights that not much attention was paid to 
remuneration at board levels, i.e. other executives’ pay. As this measure was avoided in 
previous studies, we are going to draw our attention to it and include remuneration for all 
executive directors’ to check for relation between firm performance and compensation.  
 
2.6 Relationship between Monitoring and Remuneration 
Now we are going to shift our attention to corporate governance mechanisms and review 
literature which looks at association between monitoring (board control) and remuneration. 
Academic studies (see Lippert and Moore, 1995; Rutherford et al., 2007; Tosi et al., 1997; 
Dalton et al., 1998) looked at the relationship between monitoring and incentives and tried to 
investigate whether these act as substitutes or complements.  
A study by Zajac and Westphal (1994) conducted a survey including 400 large corporations in 
the US and they found a negative correlation between remuneration and monitoring, i.e. 
concluding that these two mechanisms for reducing the agency problem act as substitutes. 
However, more studies confirm that these are more likely to have complementary effects. 
Tosi et al. (1997) in their study find positive relationship between these two factors, explaining 
it by a number of reasons: for example all information could be subject to a certain degree of 
uncertainty; therefore just applying monitoring may not be enough; it may also be the case 
that if managerial compensation is related to firm performance (i.e. indicators which have a 
great importance for shareholders), agents may interfere with methods of showing 
information to principals in order to favour themselves. These points prove that even if both of 
these methods are considered to be effective there are still certain limitations meaning that if 
two mechanisms are applied together, the effect will be more powerful. 
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Rutherford et al. (2007) also examined the relationship between two proposed solutions, 
monitoring and incentive contracts. However, researchers shifted their attention slightly and 
concentrated in more detail on how information is being gathered, i.e. information collection 
behavior was placed in the centre of this study. The strength of this research is that survey 
was conducted among three different industries as various environments should be taken into 
account due to the fact that depending on the industry within which a firm is operating the 
governance mechanisms could be applied in a different way. This study confirmed prior 
research by Tosi et al. (1997)and concluded that information and incentives act as 
compliments rather than substitutes (Rutherford et al., 2007).  
However, even though monitoring and incentives are described as being two main solutions 
to the agency problem due to the fact that governance relations turn out to be complicated in 
practice and are often described as being ambiguous making boards and CEOs work in an 
uncertain environment thus it should be noted that monitoring and incentives cannot be 
sufficient when applied on their own (Rutherford et al., 2007). 
The key to improve monitoring and corporate governance is to have independent boards of 
directors (Guthrie et al., 2012), implying that excessive compensation will be controlled. 
Recommendations for that are usually provided in Codes of Good practice which we will 
discuss later in this chapter. 
It is also supported by an argument that if CEOs exert more power than the board, it 
becomes more difficult to monitor remuneration and contracts become less optimal (Ryan 
and Wiggins, 2004). Therefore, corporate governance variables which characterise board 
control will have an effect on remuneration.  
Coles et al. (2001) highlight in their study that despite the fact that many academics 
investigated the relationship between board control and remuneration, most studies 
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examined one or two variables at a time; however, firms may use different mechanisms to 
control managerial behaviour and meaning that some variables may be effective for one firm 
and help them creating an effective environment whereas other firms will rely on other 
mechanisms to determine their structure of the firm. Therefore, more attention in academia 
should be drawn to incorporating as many corporate governance variables as possible when 
testing this relation.  
 
2.7 Other Factors Affecting the Monitoring of the Agency Problem 
2.7.1 Ownership structure 
The strength of directors’ monitoring largely depends on the ownership structure of the firm 
and thus it has an influence on the CEOs compensation (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; 
Davis et al., 1998).  
The concentration of ownership tends to increase, i.e. the amount of large shareholders 
increases. In the study by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) it was mentioned that in a survey of the 
Fortune 500 firms, 354 firms out of 456 had shareholders owning 5% of the firm or more. 
Nowadays, it is more often the case that firms are owned by institutions. The “traditional” 
structure of owners in firms continues to change as there are less individual shareholders and 
more often firms are owned by large institutional block holders (Daily et al., 2003).Banks, 
pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, etc. are organizations which refer to 
institutional investors and their ownership increases dramatically. One of their duties as being 
owners of the firm and representing shareholders’ interests is taking an active part in 
governing the firm and thus controlling managers which make important decisions on their 
behalf. Even if a single institution owns a small amount of shares, the mutual power exercised 
on managers by all institutions together has a greater effect. With the absence of this power, 
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managers are likely to take advantage of that and therefore influence their level of 
compensation (David et al., 1998).In extreme cases directors might even lose their positions 
within a firm. It has been reported as institutional investors tend to intervene, there were 
cases when some CEO’s were removed as it was believed that they did not act in the best 
interests of the firm (Kahn and Winton, 1998).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), however, outline that if a firm owned by a large number of small 
shareholders, a firm may not pay each of them for the purpose of monitoring managers. It is 
often the case that large shareholders will be interested to monitor management as they gain 
greater benefits from it. That is, small shareholders do not have a big enough stake in the firm 
to absorb the costs of watching the management” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 p. 462). This 
implies that large shareholders improve their own welfare as they have an interest to 
maximise their own wealth and thus have an incentive to monitor managers increasing the 
value of the firm at the same time thus benefiting all shareholders as a whole. However, it 
also might be the case that large shareholders oppress smaller one by pursuing objectives 
which are only beneficial for themselves (Miller and Sardais, 2011).  
David et al. (1998) also examined the relationship between institutional investors and 
managers’ compensation. The results indicate that institutional shareholders have an effect 
on remuneration; however, the extent of it depends on what kind of relationship exists 
between shareholders and a firm. Researchers distinguish institutional investors between 
being “pressure-resistant” and “pressure-sensitive", concluding that “pressure-resistant” 
shareholders do not fully rely on investing in a particular firm for their business thus they have 
more power to make the level of compensation more appropriate, whereas more “pressure-
sensitive” investors who completely depend on the firm they choose to invest in may be 
threatened by managers’ statements to terminate business with them; therefore, these 
owners will vote for higher CEOs compensation packs in terms of base salary.  A study 
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carried out by Brickley et al. (1988) also reports that institutions such as banks, insurance 
companies and trusts which largely depend on firms they invest in are more likely to oppose 
managers than mutual or pension funds which are less dependent. Not much differentiation 
was reported in relation to long-term incentives which depend on the firm performance (David 
et al., 1998). This study was beneficial in terms of extending research on institutional 
investors as many previous studies concentrated on size of the owners in their research, 
whereas David et al. (1998) shifted their attention to the nature of this relationship, proving 
that it has a great importance. 
As Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest, if the number of directors who own shares 
increases, that should lead to greater convergence of interests. That implies that directors 
should exert greater monitoring if they are owners of the firm and set compensation levels 
which are not excessive.  
 
2.7.2 Investors’ protection 
The legal system within which the principal and agent operate also provides framework to 
monitor and control the agency problem. Following La Porta et al. (2000), the law system 
provides an effective means by which the agency problem can be managed and also the way 
corporate governance is structured. The threat of legal action by the principal is very 
important as it may have an effect on choices managers make, i.e. projects they choose to 
invest in on behalf of the firm they work for. The reason for that apart from taking into account 
potential growth of the firm, investors also consider corporate risk and return when they make 
a decision (Giannetti and Simonov, 2006). Investors will always be willing to invest 
somewhere where their rights are protected by law as they want to ensure that their 
investment will return to them in form of an interest or dividends rather than being 
expropriated (see La Porta et al., 2002). 
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Another important point which must be taken into account is the concentration of ownership, 
issue which is debated a lot by researchers. Some studies (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et 
al., 1999) show that in both developed and developing countries there is a large 
concentration of ownership and analyse how shareholders may exercise their power and 
control. La Porta et al. (1999) study ownership structure in 27 richest economies in the world 
demonstrates very interesting results. Researchers detect the principal agent problem; 
however, not in its simplest form but they observe that in these firms it is very often the case 
that controlling shareholders manage the firm thus expropriating minority shareholders.  La 
Porta et al. (1999) also state that the concentration of ownership emerges in a situation 
where the minority of shareholders is not legally protected, implying that the agency problem 
in this context can be resolved by improving the legal environment within which the firm 
functions, that can take the form of voting power, quality of accounting systems, level of 
corruption, etc. Taking into account this study and previous arguments which suggest 
potential solutions to the agency problem, it can be said that it is often the case that a 
combination of remedies should be applied in order to solve the problem.  
Brenner and Schwalbach’s (2009) also showed that the legal environment is of great 
importance. Thus as rule of law becomes stronger, the total level compensation decreases. 
This implies that firms operating in countries where investors have higher protection and legal 
rights are likely to set lower compensation levels.   
Both the origins of the legal system and variation in the legal system across countries can 
lead to differences in the degree of protection available to investors. Indeed La Porta et al. 
(1998) findings based on 49 countries show that countries with common-law (e.g. England 
and British colonies) have the strongest protection of shareholders, whereas civil-law 
countries (e.g. Spain, France) have the weakest. Lower ownership concentration is also 
associated with good quality investor’s protection (La Porta et al., 1998). This argument can 
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also be extended further and it is also important to consider the cultural framework of the 
country which influences the formulation of the social norms not only the legal system on its 
own. For example Bae et al. (2012) argue that nation’s culture plays an important role in 
formulating principal-agent relationship, information asymmetry and agency costs.  
Overall it can be said that it is essential to increase the efficiency of corporate governance 
controls as well as the legal system of the country to improve the performance of companies. 
This point can be supported by Parisi et al, (2009, p. 5) argument, which states that “good 
corporate governance and a good institutional framework are essential to creating value for 
firms in a sustainable manner”. 
Based on the argument that legal environment is important and also on the fact that when 
previous empirical research looked at the relationship between financial performance, 
corporate governance control mechanisms, they have taken into account one particular 
country and usually these were UK and US. We intend to carry out a study to see how firm 
performance and board control have different effects on remuneration in countries which 
have completely different legal arrangements and cultural background. For that purpose we 
have selected UK and Spain. Methodology chapter will cover in more details reasons for this 
selection. 
 
2.7.3 Payout to Shareholders 
Many researchers (e.g. Kerr and Bettis, 1987) suggest that one of the main objectives of the 
firm is shareholders’ wealth maximisation, i.e. directors have to make the right choices which 
will bring more money for its owners (Jones and Felps, 2013). Shareholders’ wealth can be 
maximised by increases in dividend payout and/or increases in the share price (Jensen, 
1986).  
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Thus many managers choose an option to pay out high dividends in order to minimise the 
potential conflict between them and investors; some also believe that if dividends are high 
that causes share prices of firms to increase (Easterbrook, 1984). 
If the amount of cash payments to shareholders is relatively large, it may be the case that the 
firm will have to obtain more capital outside the firm which is likely to be available at very high 
prices (Jensen, 1986). It is often the case that shareholders receive the payment in the form 
of dividends; and payout and acquirement of new capital happen at the same time commonly; 
therefore, once shareholders received cash, it is essential for managers to raise new capital 
(Easterbrook, 1984). That means these conflicts are often more severe in firms where large 
amounts of free cash flows are generated.  
 
2.7.3.1 Dividends 
Dividend payments are directly related to the agency problem as it demonstrates the 
relationship between insiders and outsiders. When the degree of conflict of interest is severe, 
shareholders would prefer to receive dividends rather than for the firm to retain the earnings 
for reinvestment purposes, which could potentially lead to misuse by managers (La Porta et 
al., 2000). Researchers identify two main models which relate to dividends and the legal 
protection of investors. The “outcome model” predicts that high dividend payouts are usually 
a result of good investors’ and creditors’ protection rights as they can use their power to 
extract cash(Byrne and O’Connor, 2012). High growth firms should have lower dividend 
payouts as they retain some earnings for future investment. It is also the case that successful 
firms do not pay substantial dividends as it is cheaper for them to access internal financing for 
future growth (Easterbrook, 1984). Easterbrook (1984) argues that investors would prefer 
lower dividends if there is an opportunity for the firm to grow, i.e. firms with lower dividend 
payouts tend to do better than other, meaning that high dividends could be a signal for 
46 
 
disinvesting firms. This point leads us to the explanation of the second model. The “substitute 
model” states that firms with weaker potential to grow tend to pay higher dividends in order to 
retain a reputation for fair treatment of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). These 
are two conflicting views on how dividend policies are designed in companies.  
Easterbrook (1984) indicates that no matter what policy each firm chooses to adopt, its main 
aim should be an alignment of the interests of shareholders and managers.  
 
2.7.3.2 Tax Issues 
Some economists suggest that tax issues may have an impact on dividend payouts (Poterba 
and Summers, 1984).By investigating the relation between stock price movements and 
dividends payouts under different tax reforms in Britain the authors managed to find 
conclusive evidence that if dividends are taxed investors’ valuation of the firm decreases. 
However, many authors disagree with this statement and provide objective evidence. 
Auerbach (1979) demonstrates that taxes do not affect dividend payouts and the tax rate of 
dividends does not affect directly the cost of capital. La Porta et al. (2000) have also not 
found definite evidence on the importance of the taxation on paying out dividends. 
Differences in the tax profile of investors will affect their preference for dividend or capital 
growth (Easterbrook, 1984). 
Having taken into account all important issues which affect the dividend payouts, it can be 
seen why in economic literature so much attention was drawn to identify the firms’ behaviour 
to choose the dividend policy they follow. The main point which should be considered is 
outlined by Easterbrook (1984) who argues that as long as investment policy and financing 
policy remains unaffected within a firm, it does not really matter what dividend policy is 
chosen as long as shareholders are satisfied. 
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2.8 Governance Mechanisms and Take-Overs 
Another aspect which is worth mentioning is what happens if financial performance does not 
improve and governance mechanisms remain weak. Failure in the internal governance 
controls of firms can lead to the risk of take-over such that the target firm becomes better 
managed by a firm with better corporate control (Weir, 1997). What is implied here is that if a 
firm demonstrates poor performance, which might be enhanced by weak corporate control, 
investors will be looking to sell their shares and a firm is likely to be taken over. This, 
however, does not always work in such a way; the chance of being acquired depends on the 
following assumptions; if we assume that there is perfect information in the market, a high 
degree of liquidity allowing investors to diversify easily, absence of insider trading and low 
degree of ownership concentration then there is a greater chance for a firm being taken over 
(Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). 
If internal governance controls are ineffective and agency costs are high, the market for 
corporate control can be used as a monitoring mechanism. However, Fama (1980) argues 
that the market for corporate control should be used as a last resort because of the high costs 
of takeover battles. Although there are different types of governance mechanisms which 
could be used in order to enhance performance, it is argued that “...even in advanced market 
economies, there is a great deal of disagreements on how good or bad the existing 
governance mechanisms are” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.737). 
Indeed, Weir’s (1997) results show that poor performing firms are usually associated with 
weak governance structures. Thus to reduce the threat of take-overs, it is essential that firms 
improve their governance structures in order to improve performance.  
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2.9 Dynamic Setting 
Issues regarding the relationship between firm performance, corporate governance and 
remuneration is mostly analysed in academia using static models. Doucouliagos et al. 
(2012a) highlight that if dynamics are ignored, findings on remuneration and performance can 
be considered to be understated. Edmans et al. (2012) also criticise static setting as if 
directors’ compensation depends on single-period firm performance, then directors will focus 
on short-term achievements and that implies increasing current stock prices rather than 
concentrating on long-term firm value. It makes more sense to remunerate directors for their 
current performance in the future. 
It is also important to capture dynamics as some components of directors’ compensation may 
have an effect in longer-term (i.e. benefits) (Doucouliaos et al., 2007). Some previous studies, 
however, looked at lagged remuneration variables. For example Main et al. (1996) who 
construct a broader measure of executives’ pay include lagged remuneration as their 
explanatory variable and justify this by stating that there are always lags in pay 
administration. These studies add some insights to academia in terms of exploring dynamic 
setting. However, this also clearly shows that there is a gap in the study in terms of 
investigating long-run relationship.  
Therefore, we are going extend the static setting and also take our research to the next level 
by introducing dynamic context.  
 
2.10 Corporate Governance and Codes of Best Practice 
Up until now we were concentrating on empirical results and discussions regarding what 
factors will influence directors to make the right choices for the firm, the main one being 
setting the right level of remuneration which is often linked to firm performance and good 
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board monitoring. It can be seen that all these issues are quite complex and interlinked as 
good governance will improve monitoring and firm performance and firm performance in turn 
can influence the level of compensation which could be linked back again to board control. 
This makes corporate governance an extremely interesting discipline as this field of study 
incorporates different aspects of subjects such as economics, finance, law, management and 
politics (Rwegasira, 2000).  
The question which will be discussed in this section is how firms can actually achieve good 
corporate governance mechanisms, what recommendations and guidance they can refer to. 
As nowadays the importance of corporate governance and concepts associated with it 
continues to increase, many countries attempted to regulate the way firms are monitored and 
how their performance is improved by providing their recommendations in the Codes of Best 
Practice. 
 
2.10.1 Codes of Good Governance 
A lot of developed countries have produced Codes of Corporate Governance where they 
provide a set of best practice recommendations for firms to be employed for the purpose of 
achieving better financial performance. Even though the first code of good corporate 
governance was issued in the USA in 1978 and then in Hong Kong in 1989, the issues of 
codes started to speed up after the published Cadbury Report in the UK in 1992 (Aguilera 
and Cuevo-Cazurra, 2009). Thus the UK is considered to be the leader in a production of 
such recommendations that is why the following section will concentrate on the development 
of the Code of Best Practice in the UK. These Anglo-Saxon principles (also known as Anglo-
American model or market-based system, initially adopted in English speaking countries) 
served as an example for many other countries in the world. Some countries developed their 
codes relying on internationally-based system (sometimes referred to as bank-based system) 
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example of which served countries such as Germany and Japan (Krambia-Kapardis and 
Psaros, 2006). The main difference between these two models is that in a market-based 
system dispersed shareholders are the owners of the firm, whereas in an internationally-
based system banks provide the largest source of finance (Rwegasira, 2000).  
For many developing countries, for example, the introduction of the Codes of Best Practice is 
only considered to be effective if it is supported by other factors, such as low concentration of 
ownership, transparency, legislative support, etc., i.e. an environment in which 
recommendations can have a positive effect if the firm follows them (Krambia-Kapardis and 
Psaros, 2006). The main explanation as to why most of less developed countries took Anglo-
Saxon model as an example (incorporating some differences) is that in order to develop 
successful legislation and become internationally competitive economies it is essential to 
accept model which incorporates common and worldwide accepted standards (Solomon et 
al., 2002). 
There are a lot of different variations of corporate governance systems evolving around the 
world. It is often the case that these systems are very conflicting. Even though there are two 
main systems of corporate governance codes which have been identified earlier, the 
development of these practices will largely depend on the legal system of the country within 
which it operates its other economic, social and financial aspects (Rwegasira, 2000).   It has 
been suggested by Solomon et al. (2002, p. 29) “the eventual outcome should be a global 
framework of CG rather than a collection of differing, competing and often conflicting 
systems”,i.e. countries should seek to harmonise systems around the world in order to 
increase benefits from these regulations. However, it is still far away from reality and even 
though the process of internationalisation takes place, corporate governance systems do not 
yet tend to converge (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
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Corporate governance practices vary not only between developed and developing 
economies, but there are also a lot of variations among advanced economies. The proposed 
theoretical model which attempts to explain these differences suggests that corporate 
stakeholders and their interests determine these variations depending on institutions and 
social relations (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). The authors have identified three key players 
(capital, labor and management) and determined factors affecting their interests. The main 
conclusion of this research paper confirms that the development of institutions, e.g. property 
rights, etc. play an important role as financial systems largely depend on it; researchers also 
explain that even though the process of internationalisation takes place, this may lead to 
certain convergence among institutions; however, this process could be overweighed by long-
established national institutions and we may actually observe slow divergence. This paper is 
of great importance as it sheds some light on explanations as to why the expected 
convergence does not take place even though some countries transferred the already 
existing corporate governance model to their economy and the result was not the same. It 
also shows that there is a large scope for future investigation not only for financial and 
economic researchers but also for social academics as there are a lot of different aspects 
affecting the behaviour of stakeholders.  
The same view was confirmed by McCarthy and Puffer (2008) who also extend their 
conclusion by explaining that it is extremely difficult to achieve such convergence as moral 
values and norms differ among countries and therefore norms of the agency theory may not 
fall within ethics of other countries meaning that relationship between say board and 
shareholders in some countries may be considered to be unethical in other economies as 
these are countries with market-orientated standards. 
This provides another reason for our selection of two different countries. Having completely 
different culture, background which formed the legal system and the way Codes of Practice 
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were designed, it would be interesting to see how that will affect remuneration, monitoring 
and financial performance.  
 
2.10.2 Remuneration Committees 
Remuneration (also known as compensation) committees play an extremely important role in 
the governance of large corporations; the main objective of such committees is to propose 
the appropriate level and mix of managers’ compensation packs which have to be approved 
by the board. The committee has to include a certain number of independent directors 
(depending on rules and practices adopted within a particular firm and country) in order to 
make sure that suggested level of compensation is not biased and inside directors could not 
have influenced that decision for their own benefit (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). The 
agency theory which promotes the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 
1983) supports an idea of establishing compensation committees. 
It has been discussed earlier that the nature of the relationship between investors and 
managers may have an effect on the level of compensation. However, a study by Daily et al. 
(1998, p. 209) provides a more detailed confirmation, stating that “it may be the nature of the 
compensation committee, not the board as a whole, that is an issue”. The researchers 
suggest the same results as in the study by David et al. (1998); however, they relate the level 
of compensation to the composition of remuneration committee only, concluding that more 
favorable pay packages will be proposed if committee members are somehow dependent on 
the managers, i.e. rely on the firm performance themselves, etc. High levels of remuneration 
which may not be appropriate may attract attention from outside; however, as compensation 
pack consists of many different elements, the committee may still create a contract in such a 
way that less attention will be drawn (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
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The results described in this section support earlier findings which suggest that pay-
performance sensitivity is quite high. If we assume that this is always the case then it is 
possible to conclude that remuneration committees have a large power to resolve the agency 
problem at least to some extent as they have the ability to influence compensation. It is 
evident that solely relying on the remuneration committee to align diverged interests is not 
sufficient due to complication in relations between the board and managers. That is why we 
can conclude here once again that the combination of different mechanisms which were 
analysed earlier is of great importance. 
The way in which remuneration committees are formed in firms are usually described in their 
Codes of Best Practice; therefore, as it has been stated earlier as UK is considered to be the 
pioneer in terms of producing governance guidance in the Cadbury Report, remuneration 
committees became very common in the UK (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Now I am 
going to shift the attention to the Code of Best Practice in the UK as it gives a brief picture as 
to how the development of governance took place which served as an example for many 
other countries.  
It is also important to review other corporate governance variables analysed in previous 
studies which play an essential role in determining the monitoring and structure of boards of 
directors.  
 
2.10.3 Audit Committees 
 
Established audit committees are considered to be an important governance mechanism. It 
was highlighted by Arthur Levitt (the chairman of SEC) in his speech that “qualified, 
committed, independent, and tough-minded audit committees represent the most reliable 
guardians of the public interest” (Levitt, 1998). Recommendations regarding structure, 
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establishment and role of audit committees are provided in the Combined Code. Guidance on 
audit committee (FRC, 2012) recommends that main responsibilities of audit committees 
include the review of firm’s internal financial controls; therefore, the effectiveness of the audit 
committee largely depends on the financial and accounting expertise of its members 
(Ionescu, 2014).  
Some previous findings suggest that directors tend to manipulate earnings (and it is usually 
done via financial reports) with the primary intention of achieving higher incentive 
remuneration plans (Holthausen et al., 1995). It does not necessarily mean that these 
activities are illegal, usually it is done via different means (for example, how assets are being 
depreciated), meaning that these actions raise concerns regarding the ethics amongst 
accountants as managers clearly exploit the opportunities (Huang et al., 2008; Kaplan, 2001).     
It is directly linked to corporate governance as effective internal controls, including an 
effective audit committee, tend to supervise managerial activities better (Dechow et al., 
2010). This brings us back to the origin of the agency theory, which we discussed earlier in 
this chapter and to the problem of the separation of ownership and control. As it was 
previously discussed, greater monitoring tends to alleviate these problems and align interests 
of directors and shareholders. For example, Ionescu (2014) reports that having established 
audit committees, Spanish listed firms have become more effective; it was also reported that 
the number of times committee meets affects quality of financial information. He and Yang 
(2014) also provide evidence to support these arguments and report that effective audit 
committee has a positive effect on the quality of financial reporting.  
Audit committee effectiveness is also related to audit fees and non-audit service fees. Zaman 
et al. (2011) outline in their study that effective audit committees will undertake more 
monitoring within the firm and this will results in higher audit fees (as they require more 
detailed auditing process). The effectiveness of audit committee can be measured using the 
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level of expertise of directors who sit on the board and compliance with provided 
recommendations. Therefore, in a better monitored firm we would expect audit fees to be 
higher.  
Therefore, presence of audit committee is an important factor and this variable will be 
considered in our analysis.  
 
2.10.4 Combined Roles of CEO and Chairman 
 
Roles of CEO and Chairman and their importance are also highlighted in Combined Code. It 
is recommended that “the roles of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by 
the same individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive 
should be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board” (FRC, 2014, p.8).  
CEO duality (i.e. role of the Chairman is exercised by the CEO) is believed to decrease the 
efficiency of the board and thus affect firm performance. The explanation for that is that roles 
are not separated between decision-management and decision-control (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). This implies that the board is becoming less effective in monitoring (Iyengar and 
Zampelli, 2009). Many regulators and activists were influencing firms to have separate roles 
for the CEO and Chairman; however, previous findings provide mixed evidence regarding the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (Yang and Zhao, 2014).  
Having examined 141 US corporations over a period of 6 years, Rechner and Dalton (1991) 
report a positive association between separate titles and firm performance. Firm performance 
was measured using accounting returns in their study; however, shareholders’ returns were 
not taken into account. Boyd (1995) outlines the importance of industry conditions affecting 
the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance.  
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Some studies have reported controversial results. For example Iyengar and Zampelli (2009) 
did not find significant impact of CEO duality on firm performance measured using Tobin’s q 
and return on assets; provided justification for these results is that when firm appoint one 
person to perform both duties, they have other objectives apart from just improving 
performance. Another explanation for these findings is that CEO-chair is likely to have greater 
knowledge of the firm, its environment and the industry (Boyd, 1995). Phenomenal results are 
presented by Yang and Zhao (2014) who report positive effect of CEO duality on firm 
performance. These findings contradict many previous studies, but authors highlight that 
future work needs to be done to understand actual incentives of chairmen.  
 
2.10.5 Composition of the Board, Independent and Non-Independent Non-Executive 
Directors 
 
Since numerous combined codes of conduct and best practice were introduced, the structure 
of boards of directors and its composition attracted a lot of attention too as from the agency 
theory point of view board of directors are considered to act as an instrument of control of 
managerial behaviour (Stiles and Taylor, 2001).  
One of the main provisions outlined in the Combined Code concerns composition of the 
board. It is recommended that “the board and its committees should have the appropriate 
balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company to enable them 
to discharge their respective duties and responsibilities effectively”, (FRC, 2014, p. 10). 
Further supporting principles indicate that the board should include an appropriate 
combination of executive and independent non-executive directors so that each group of 
individual does not put pressure in terms of decision making. Westphal (1999) also highlights 
that good relationship between non-executive and executive directors can facilitate greater 
communication on the boardroom which will positively affect decision making process by 
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increasing advisory interactions. Non-executive directors may also have an incentive to 
maximise firm’s value if they have developed ties with a particular firm as they have been 
serving on the board for some time.  
Some studies (e.g. Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1992) outline the importance of having non-
executive directors on the board, but the direct effect on firm performance is not examined. 
Hsu and Wu (2014) report interesting findings on the effect of the presence of “grey” directors 
on the board. They describe “grey” directors as being non-executive directors but who have 
personal and economic ties with the firm. This study reports that firms with a higher 
proportion of “grey” directors on the board in relation to executive directors and independent 
non-executive directors have lower probability to fail. Authors provide justification for these 
results and believe that corporate governance reforms might have overemphasized the 
important role of independent non-executive directors.  
 
2.10.6 Female Directors on the Board 
 
Combined Code does not provide any recommendations regarding gender diversity on the 
board. Number of women employed is continuously increasing and this consequently has an 
effect on the structure of board of directors; therefore, some studies have concentrated on 
investigating the relationship between number of female directors on the board and firm 
performance. 
Despite the fact that proportion of women in workforce continues to increase in relation to 
white men, there is evidence to suggest that they are still largely underrepresented in 
executive positions (which may cause ethical implications) and there is also lack of research 
investigating the effect of number of female directors on the board in relation to male 
managers on firm performance (Dreher et al., 2011). 
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Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) have investigated the effect of gender diversity (i.e. 
proportion of female directors on the board) on firm performance in Spain and found that 
having more female directors on the board improves the quality of monitoring and thus has a 
positive effect on firm value (measured using Tobin’s q). Perrault (2015) contribute to existing 
literature on gender diversity by providing arguments that having more female directors on 
the board will increase moral legitimacy and improve trustworthiness which can bring more 
economic gains for the firm.  
Most findings regarding board diversity are relatively recent. Geiger and Marlin (2012) 
highlight, that little research has concentrated on gender diversity of the board in large 
corporations. Dreher et al. (2011) supports this view and stresses the importance of 
addressing this deficiency in the literature. Erhardt et al. (2003) also points out that a large 
number of studies investigating the link between gender diversity and firm performance take 
into account diversity in workforce rather than on the board level. Combining this evidence 
with the fact that previous findings reported positive association between number of female 
directors on the board and good financial performance, number of women on the board can 
be seen as one of the most important factors in corporate governance when considering 
board composition.  
 
2.10.7 Board Meetings 
 
One of the code provisions is that “the board should meet sufficiently regularly to discharge 
its duties effectively” (FRC, 2014, p. 7). Number of meetings boards hold during a year is 
directly linked to monitoring. It is essential for firms to review the effectiveness of boards and 
meetings are held in order to achieve this objective as quality of boards is an important factor 
for investors (Conger et al., 1998).  
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Vafeas (1999) presents interesting findings regarding number of board meetings being 
negatively related to firm value. It is suggested that number of meetings start to increasing 
following decline in the share price. However, following this increase there are usually 
improvements in firm performance being observed suggesting that greater monitoring has a 
positive effect on the firm.  
Jensen (1993) offers an opposing view by suggesting that meeting themselves are not 
carried out in the most efficient way thus limiting opportunities for external directors to 
exercise any form of control. Jensen (1993) suggests that boards should be only active in the 
presence of problems when actions are required to resolve them; apart from that boards 
should be relatively inactive.  
 
2.10.8 Director Ownership 
 
Director ownership is also largely discussed in the literature. It is an important factor as some 
authors refer to it as a mean through which ownership and control can be combined to an 
extent. The idea behind it is that if directors hold stock ownership they are more likely to take 
more active part and increase management monitoring and control (Bhagat et al., 1999). 
Equity ownership should motivate directors to be more vigilant over company’s resources and 
as their stakes increase managers are more likely to take of corporate wealth (Morck et al., 
1988).   
Previous studies have highlighted that complex relationships exist between director 
ownership, firm performance and directors’ pay. Despite the fact that many studies have 
considered the effect of ownership in various scenarios, there is a limited research regarding 
direct analysis between director ownership and remuneration and that is one of the links 
which will be address in this thesis.  
60 
 
Many studies have focused on the relationship between director ownership and firm 
performance or firm value. Morck et al. (1988) analysed the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value (expressed as Tobin’s Q). Their study reports quite interesting 
results and suggests that the nature of the relationship changes depending on the percentage 
of ownership. Authors report that if directors hold up to 5% equity the relationship between 
ownership and firm value is positive. However, if it is between 5% - 20%, this association 
becomes negative; above 20% it is positive again.  
 
2.11 Code of Best Practice in the UK 
 
Corporate governance started gaining greater worldwide importance in 1990’s when many 
countries started developing recommendations for the best practice for their firms (Krambia-
Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). Initial recommendations of good practice were provided in 
Cadbury Report, published in 1992 by Cadbury Committee in the UK, which became a 
pioneer in this field. The Committee itself was formed in May 1991 as a result of recognition 
of the need to improve performances of many companies. Therefore, the initial intention of 
the Committee was to meet the requirements of the users of firm reports which complained 
about the lack of effectiveness within companies. The Code was supposed to meet three 
main principles: openness, integrity and accountability; and provided recommendations in the 
report for firms to follow in order to achieve better performance (Cadbury Report, 1992). 
Later on the Hampel Committee Report was produced in June 1998. After the publication of 
the Report firms were required to disclose information about how they employed the 
recommended principles and complied with them (Clarke and Conyon, 1998). 
The Combined Code was published in 2008 by Financial Reporting Council and contains 
more recommendations. The aim of the Code is often described as the code of “best 
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practice”, which provides statements for directors in order to improve accountability of the firm 
and control for the purpose of achieving high performance standards (Clarke and Conyon, 
1998). The main principle highlighted in the Code is “comply or explain” standard, i.e. firms 
are expected to engage with recommendations; otherwise an explanation must be provided 
(Combined Code, 2008). 
That is a brief history of development of the Code of Best Practice in the UK. Many countries 
followed the example of the UK and also produced their own Codes of Corporate Governance 
in which certain recommendations are provided, whereas some countries, for example the 
USA, have adopted more legal approach and have incorporated these practices into law with 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (Aguilera and Cuevo-Cazurra, 2009).  
The role of boards has in particular been discussed more in the last few years. The financial 
crisis and a number of corporate scandals have indicated the importance of having an 
effective board of directors, especially the way it is monitored in order to improve the 
governance structure of firms (Zalewska, 2014).  
Apart from being a leader in developing Combined Code, legal aspects of common law 
influence regulation and enforcement of recommendations. For example, as it is stated by 
Martin and Jones (2012), disclosures to shareholders, detailed scrutiny of boards of directors 
and control of contracts influence firms to promote effective corporate governance. This is 
also influenced by cultural background and UK firms can be considered to create more 
effective contracts linking remuneration to performance in comparison to other countries. 
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2.11.1 Combined Code and Remuneration 
As UK is believed to be the pioneer in terms of Codes of “best practice”, it will be briefly 
outlined what has been recommended in terms of remuneration in order to achieve better 
performance of the firm. Firstly, when Cadbury Report (1992) was produced it recommended 
that that remuneration committee should be appointed within a firm for the purpose of taking 
part in decision about directors’ pay and it is also recommended that detailed information 
about executive’s remuneration should be disclosed (Cadbury Report, 1992).  
Later on these provided recommendations were assessed and improved and the current 
Combined Code of the UK states that “levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, 
retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a 
company should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose” (Combined Code, 
2008, p.13). As there were developments in terms of recommendations for the best practice 
Hampel Committee Report contains more exact description how compensation levels can be 
set: “Remuneration levels are often set with help of comparisons with other companies, 
including remuneration surveys” (Hampel Report, 1998, p. 33). 
This shows that firms have a choice to comply with provided recommendations which should 
increase board control and also align interests between shareholders and directors via a 
creation of an effective compensation package, which remuneration directors for their efforts 
but not overpay them at the same time.  
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2.12 Code of Practice in Spain 
 
The development of Spanish corporate governance practices have also been affected by a 
number of recent financial scandals (Castresaoa, 2003). Following examples of other 
European Union countries which were also adopting strategies to improve their corporate 
governance (e.g. The Vienot Report in France, The Peters Report in Netherlands) as well as 
receiving requests from the professionals and the market, Spain also produced the Unified 
Corporate Governance Code to make its corporate governance more international in a 
globalised economic framework (Fernandez-Fernandez, 1999). 
Corporate governance in Spain started to develop later than in the UK. In 1997 The National 
Commission of the Spanish Stock Exchange has requested a group of experts to develop a 
report to improve the governance of the firms. It became known as the “Olivencia report” and 
it provided recommendations for companies; it in particular concentrated on the role of 
independent non-executive directors and the vice president also acting as the code of ethics 
for companies (Lozano, 2000). Following the example of Cadbury report, the Olivencia report 
was not enforced by law, but only provided recommendations for companies to improve their 
governance. In 2003, the Aldama report was drawn up, which was similar to the Olivencia 
report in terms of its recommendations (Vives, 2000).  
In May 2006, Spain has adopted its final Unified Corporate Governance Code, making it 
compulsory for listed firms (IBEX-35) to reference it in corporate governance section of their 
annual reports starting from year 2007 (Vives, 2007). It also follows “comply or explain” 
principle, similar approach as in the UK. Despite the fact that some authors have highlighted 
the importance of the Cadbury report in influencing Spanish corporate governance 
(Fernandez-Fernandez, 1999), Gutierrez and Surroca (2014) outline in their study that 
corporate governance practices in Spain are still relatively weak; the Anglo-Saxon practices 
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are not incorporated as much, in particular referring to information transparency, board 
independence and executive directors’ variable remuneration packages. Garcia-Sanchez 
(2010) also emphasises the fact that corporate governance in Spain can be characterised by 
weaker control mechanisms in comparison to countries which originate from common law.  
As we have previously discussed, the legal origin of countries also has an impact on how 
corporate governance develops and is enforced. Spain originates from civil law and has 
statute based legal system. It is stated by Nukada and Paredes (2015) that Spanish 
corporate governance is subject to soft rule. Similar to UK companies, firms have to provide 
explanation if they do not follow recommendations.  
The main difference which can be captured between common and civil law countries is how 
rules are enforced. For example, La Porta et al. (1998) highlight that aspects such as quality 
of accounting systems, the level of corruption, the efficiency of the judicial systems will all 
have an impact on corporate governance. These tend to be weaker for civil law countries. 
Thus, it can be implied that it is easier for executives in civil law countries to capture an 
excessive power and extract higher levels of remuneration. However, before making such 
conclusions it is important to refer to empirical studies which will be done later in this chapter 
for each particular country as academia presents mixed evidence regarding relationship 
between remuneration, firm performance and corporate governance.  
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2.12.1 Unified Corporate Governance Code and Remuneration 
 
Following examples of other countries, executive directors’ also receive their remuneration 
through stocks and stock options in Spain (Castresaoa, 2003).  
The Unified Code adopted in 2006 has addressed the aspect of remuneration. Attention has 
been drawn to transparency of remuneration; the code has specified that remuneration report 
should be submitted for consultation to the Shareholders’ Meeting and individual level of 
remuneration should be included in an annual report too (Vives, 2007).  
Remuneration levels for executive directors’ should also be set at the right level, meaning that 
pay should motivate directors to create value for the firm and aligning interests of directors 
and shareholders in the long run (Mendez et al., 2011). The Unified Code on Good Corporate 
Governance in Spain recommends that “remuneration shall sufficiently compensate them for 
the commitment, qualifications and responsibility that the post entails, but should not be so 
high as to jeopardise their independence” (Unified Code, 2006, p. 21).  
 
2.13 Review of the Empirical Studies 
 
Previous sections of our literature review have generally concentrated on corporate 
governance issues and aspects, covering theoretical considerations and general practices. 
As our study mainly concentrates on two countries and aims to investigate links between firm 
performance, remuneration and corporate governance, it is also important to review previous 
findings in academia for UK and Spain in order to help to develop our hypotheses. 
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2.13.1 Empirical Studies for the UK 
 
A large number of studies concentrated on the analysis of UK firms and interesting, often 
contradicting results are reported. First of all, we are going to concentrate on the relationship 
between remuneration and performance of firms. Some studies on large UK companies show 
strong positive link between directors’ remuneration and firm performance. Conyon (1997) 
finds a positive association and also stresses the importance of the relative pay. The author 
also indicates that firm size plays an important role in shaping executives’ pay. In contrast, 
Eichholts et al. (2008) find weak pay-performance association.  
A comparative study between UK and Us was performed by Conyon and Murphy (2000). 
After controlling for size and sector, it was reported that CEOs in US receive 45% higher cash 
compensation and 190% higher total compensation than CEOs in the UK. The criticism of this 
study is that results are documented only for one year – 1997.  
More recent study by Ozkan (2007a) analysed 414 large UK companies. The study looked at 
the relationship between compensation and corporate governance mechanisms. It was 
reported that larger board size and higher number of non-executive directors contributes to 
increases in pay, which suggests that non-executive directors are ineffective in monitoring 
contradicting suggestions in the Combined Code. Author also reported a negative association 
between ownership and remuneration.  
Earlier papers (e.g. Conyon, 1997) also started devoting their attention to corporate 
governance practices and how these affect directors’ pay. Conyon (1997) in his study reports 
that companies which introduced remuneration committees experienced lower rate of 
increase in top directors’ remuneration. In contrast, a study on 220 large British companies by 
Main and Johnson (1993) reports that the presence of remuneration committees was 
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associated with higher levels of pay and remuneration does not act as an incentive for 
directors.  
Thompson (2005) looked at impacts of corporate governance mechanisms in more detail. His 
study analysed the impact of corporate governance reforms themselves on the levels of 
remuneration and mixed evidence is also reported. The author reports that reforms have had 
a positive impact on executive tenure, but they were not as effective in terms of linking pay to 
performance.  
The main criticism of earlier studies is that there is a lack of studies which look at dynamic 
context. Taking this into account one of the main contributions or our study will be that we 
won’t only consider dynamic setting, but also will analyse the long-run relationship between 
remuneration and firm performance.  
 
2.13.2 Empirical Studies for Spain 
 
As we have earlier noted, the amount of published work on other European countries 
covering the topic of remuneration, firm performance and corporate governance is quite 
limited. However, there are a few studies which provide analysis for Spanish companies.  
Similar to results reported for UK listed firms, Crespi-Cladera and Gispert (2003) report 
positive relationship between remuneration and performance. Authors also highlight that it is 
interesting to observe these results considering that Spanish companies’ context differs from 
the “Anglo-Saxon” model. The criticism of this study, however, is that time period covers 
1990-1995, meaning that these results might be slightly out of date and authors also state 
that missing data for these companies has led to a very small sample size (only 113). Another 
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similarity with findings for UK companies reported by Conyon (1997) is that Crespi-Cladera 
(2003) also report that size of the firm positively affects directors’ pay.  
A recent study by Lucas-Perez et al. (2015) investigates an interesting relationship between 
gender diversity, firm performance and remuneration. Authors reports that board diversity 
increases firm performance and it also affects functioning of the board by influencing a more 
effective design of incentive contracts. This study has a direct link with our research, but our 
study will investigate a direct link between governance mechanisms and levels of 
remuneration.  
Mendez et al. (2011) report positive significant relationship between size of the board and 
remuneration. This can be explained by the fact that large boards cannot exercise the same 
level of control thus directors tend to have high levels of compensation. They also find 
contradicting results regarding the number of independent directors on the board. Their study 
confirms that increased number of independent directors does not seem to moderate the 
level of pay. Considering what has previously been discussed regarding Combined Codes 
and board controls we would have expected to find the opposite result. This can be probably 
be explained by the argument how board control is actually enforced in different countries. 
This review indicates that taking into account all these findings, we can draw a conclusion 
that relationship between remuneration, firm performance and corporate governance is a 
complex phenomenon. Based on these earlier mixed results, it can be concluded that there is 
no definite evidence to suggest whether remuneration is considered to act more as an 
incentive for directors and align their interests with the ones expressed by shareholders or 
whether having high levels of pay will contribute towards more agency issues. Linking this 
back to our study, this reinforces the importance of investigating these relationships. Lack of 
previous studies on other European countries also highlights the need to draw our attention to 
this aspect. Our results will be unique as we will consider a certain time period and it will be 
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interesting to investigate what evidence we will find for our particular datasets in terms of links 
between remuneration, form performance and corporate governance for UK and Spanish 
firms.  
 
2.14 Conclusion 
 
We have highlighted main issues which are discussed in academia regarding corporate 
governance, firm performance and remuneration. All these issues are complex and are 
interlinked with each other as large number of empirical research suggests. Agency theory 
supports research in this area as it tries to find solutions for principal-agent problems caused 
by differences in interests. Having outlined the importance of Codes of Good practice, it can 
be seen that firms have recommendations which they can follow to achieve better 
performance via governance mechanisms and partly resolve their agency issues associated 
with directors and shareholders. However, even though clear recommendations are provided, 
the question still remains whether compensation packages are “excessive” or not and 
whether directors use firm’s resources for their own advantage. Therefore, this study will 
address this question by looking whether remuneration in firms is linked to financial 
performance and good governance mechanisms. 
Most studies concentrated on the analysis of one country – and mostly the UK or US, we will 
look at two countries originating from different legal backgrounds – UK and Spain. Next 
chapter will provide more detail for this particular selection. Therefore, this thesis will provide 
a comparative study.  
Despite a large number of studies in this area, most researchers looked at pay-performance 
relation concentrating on static single-period models only. We are also going to develop 
dynamic model to test this relationship. 
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Having identified what issues need to be addressed in this study, next chapter will look at 
methods selected also providing reasons for the chosen methodology.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology and Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes methodology which will be applied in the empirical chapters to 
investigate the relation between executive directors’ remuneration, financial performance and 
corporate governance variables for both UK and Spanish firms. We estimate both static and 
dynamic versions of the models using two different estimation methods – ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS) and generalised method of moments (GMM). Dynamic versions of 
the model are important since they accommodate variation is conditions that can affect the 
estimates. The GMM approach seeks to introduce consistency in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. Finally, to capture long-run conditions, we estimate the model using panel 
cointegration and error-correction models.  
We justify the choice of two countries which are examined and how the data was collected. 
This chapter also includes descriptive statistics for each variable used in the analysis and 
correlation estimates.  
 
3.2 Research Questions 
 
Our objectives have been outlined in the first chapter. Following on from the literature review, 
the thesis aims to answer the following research questions which are summarised as follows: 
• What is the relationship between firm performance and total executive directors’ 
remuneration? 
• What is the association between market value and executive directors’ 
compensation? 
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• How does the level of monitoring and board control affect directors’ pay? 
• What are the short- and long-term properties of the relations between executive 
remuneration and firm performance? 
This chapter considers the data sets and the methodologies that will be applied to seek 
answers for the above research questions. We start by developing research hypotheses 
which will be examined in this study. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
The choice of our corporate governance and financial variables is determined using an 
appropriate extensive available literature in the field, helping us to develop a set of 
hypotheses and leading to an employment of certain independent variables for the models. 
This section provides a description of variables adopted in our empirical analysis – both 
dependent and independent.  
Explanatory variables are selected according to hypotheses which are tested. Our first and 
second hypotheses are related to firm performance, market value and executive directors’ 
compensation. This has a direct link with the agency problem. Remuneration is a complex 
phenomenon and some academics view it as an incentive to reduce the agency problem 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990a). Linking remuneration to firm performance will help creating 
incentive contracts to motivate executives to increase firm value. This pay-performance 
relationship has been studied by various academics and positive relationship was reported 
(e.g. Conyon, 1997). Other, however, argue that if executives capture an excessive amount 
of power, it will increase the agency problem. For example, Blanchard et al. (1994) argue that 
remuneration increases the agency costs.  
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Our next two hypotheses view remuneration as an incentive. The main reason for that is that 
following changes in corporate governance after the financial crisis and greater monitoring 
regarding pay-performance contracts, we would expect remuneration to move in line with firm 
performance and firm value as most studies reports (e.g. Conyon, 1997; Ozkan, 2007a). 
 
H1: A positive relationship between firm performance measures and executive directors’ pay. 
Previous studies have incorporated different performance measures including return on 
capital employed, profit margins, etc. (Tosi et al., 2000; Daily et al., 2003).The choice of 
accounting ratios to express firm performance is mainly based on the explanation by Sloan 
(1993) who states that accounting measures are not affected by the fluctuations in the value 
of the firm when determining the level of remuneration meaning that they can be considered 
to protect executives from these market changes. The same methodology was followed by 
Zakaria (2012) who emphasised the importance of accounting measures when examining 
pay-performance relationship. All our financial variables are expressed as ratios. Some of 
these dependent variables (such as accounting ratios) are directly obtained from the 
database, whereas others are transformed given the financial information. We split our 
financial variables into the following broad categories for convenience when we will be 
analysing our estimated results: profitability, firm value, leverage, earnings and distribution 
and taxation cash flow.  
• Profitability: gross profit margin (GPM), natural logarithm of earnings before interest 
and taxes (LNEBIT), operating profit margin (OPM), remuneration over net income 
(REMUNNETINC), return on assets (ROA), return on capital employed (ROCE), 
return on equity (ROE). 
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• Firm Value: net cash flow over market value (NCFMV), Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) a 
measure of market value over total assets. 
• Leverage: total debt over market value (DEBTMV), liabilities over total assets 
(LIBASS), natural logarithm of short-term debt over long-term debt 
(LNSTDEBTLTDEBT), natural logarithm of total debt (LNTOTDEBT), long-term debt 
over market value (LTDEBTMV), long-term debt over total assets (LTDEBTTOTASS).  
• Earnings and Distribution: dividend yield (DY), earnings per share (EPS). 
• Taxation Cash Flow: natural logarithm of taxation cash flow (LNTAXCF). 
 
H2: Market value of a firm is positively related to executives’ remuneration.  
To measure market value we use natural logarithm of firm’s market value (LNMV).   
Our next hypothesis is linked to corporate governance measures. Having described recent 
changes in Codes of Practice, most firms tend to follow recommendations for best practice. 
Mixed evidence exists and some studies have reported that increased monitoring reduces the 
level of remuneration (Conyon, 1997) and that is attributed to the fact that directors are not 
able to pay themselves enormous salaries due to effective control. However, for example 
Ozkan (2007a) finds that increased number of non-executive directors is positively related to 
compensation.  Despite the fact that mixed evidence exists, we postulate the following 
hypothesis based on the argument that greater monitoring will result in adopting lower pay for 
directors. 
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H3: Compensation is inversely related to levels of board monitoring. 
This hypothesis can be supported by the argument presented by Core et al. (1999) who 
states that CEOs with weaker governance tend to receive greater compensation. The 
selection of corporate governance variables is based on the academic literature which 
identifies variables which measure monitoring and board independence; most variables take 
the form of dummy variables as we measure whether certain aspects of corporate 
governance of firms are complied with Codes of Good Practice or not. The selection of 
variables is supported by previous empirical research (Coles et al., 2001) in which different 
corporate governance mechanisms (such as board and ownership structure) were tested at 
the same time. 
• Audit committee compliance with recommendations (ACOMP). Dummy variable, 
which is one if the committee is complied with the Combined Code (2003) for UK firms 
and with the Unified Code for Spain. The Combined Code recommends at least three 
independent non-executive directors should serve on the audit committee board. The 
Unified Code outlines that the audit committee should consist of external directors 
only, the majority of which must be independent.  
• Role of CEO and Chairman (CEOCHAIR). This information is described in “Board 
Structure” part of reports for both UK and Spanish companies. It is one if roles are 
separate, 0 – combined, i.e. both duties performed by one person.  
• Compliance of the board of directors (COMP). Dummy variable, which takes the value 
of one if the board is compliant with regulations outlined in the Combined Code (2003) 
according to Manifest for UK companies. The board must consist of at least half of 
non-executive directors (excluding the Chairman), which are determined to be 
independent by the board. The composition of Spanish companies’ boards have to be 
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consistent with the Unified Code, which recommends that after the AGM the number 
of independent directors should represent at least one third of all board members. 
• Non-audit fees in relation to audit fees (FEES). This variable is expressed as a ratio 
and is also provided in Manifest corporate governance reports. 
• Ratio of female directors on the board (FEMALE). This includes both executive and 
non-executive directors. Board diversity and total number of directors is provided in 
reports, therefore we obtain this ratio by dividing the number of female directors by the 
total number of directors on the board.  
• Ratio of independent non-executive directors on the board (INDNEDS). Information is 
provided in “Board Overview” section of the report. 
• Number of meetings per director each year (MEETING). Total number of board 
meeting held during the year divided by the total number of directors.  
• Ratio of non-independent non-executive directors on the board (NONINEDS). Value is 
taken directly from reports.  
• Remuneration committee compliance with recommendations (RCOMP). It is 
recommended in the Combined Code (2003) that committee should have at least 
three independent non-executive directors, however, the Chairman is allowed to be a 
member, but not to serve as a Chairman of the remuneration committee. For Spanish 
firms it is recommended that committee should have external directors with the 
majority being independent.   
• Compliance of size of the board with recommendation (SIZE). This variable is 
available for Spanish firms only. As it is outlined in Manifest reports the size of the 
board after the AGM should comprise no fewer than 5 and no more than 15 members 
according to recommendations specified in the Unified Code for Spain. Therefore, one 
means that firms have between 5 and 15 members on their board, 0 – otherwise.  
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Once directors become owners, they have a greater interest in monitoring firm in a better, 
more efficient way thus making sure that remuneration is not excessive This association is a 
complex one, as for example considering findings by Morck et al. (1988) which report 
different relationship based on the level of ownership, it can be said that it is difficult to predict 
this association. Despite the mixed evidence in academic literature, bearing in mind recent 
corporate scandals we would expect owners (as their money is at stake) to vote for lower 
levels of remuneration. This can be supported by findings reported by Ozkan (2007a) who 
found a negative association between ownership and compensation for large UK firms.  
 
H4: A negative association between directors’ ownership and levels of compensation. 
We introduce the following variable to our models to test this relationship. 
• Percentage of firm’s shares owned by directors (DIROWN). Information is manually 
collected from Manifest reports (i.e. calculating total number of shares directors own) 
and then this number is divided by the total number of shares.  
Next two hypotheses are linked to the dynamic setting. As it was argued by Doucouliagos et 
al. (2012a), current levels of remuneration are positively linked to lagged pay and lagged firm 
performance. There is no mixed evidence in academia to oppose this view. Considering the 
fact that hard work is more likely to be recognised in the next period and it takes time to 
adjust pay based on previous performance, we predict the following two hypotheses.  
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H5: A positive association between current executive directors’ remuneration and lagged 
executive directors’ pay. 
We have previously highlighted the importance of including lagged dependent variables as 
explanatory variables in our dynamic setting in the literature review (see Main et al., 1996) as 
it takes time for remuneration to adjust; therefore, we introduce two lags on the following 
variables: LNTOTREM, REMGP and REMMV. Doucouliagos et al. (2012a) used one lag, we 
introduce two in order to capture the effect if adjustment takes longer than one period.  
 
H6: Lagged financial performance is positively related to current executive directors’ 
compensation. 
To test this hypothesis we introduce lags on all financial variables: LNTOTASSETS, GPM, 
LNEBIT, OPM, REMUNNETINC, ROA, ROCE, ROE, DEBTMV, LNMV, LTDEBTMV, 
NCFMV, TOBINQ, LIBASS, LNSTDEBTLTDEBT, LNTOTDEBT, LTDEBTTOTASS, DY, EPS 
and LNTAXCF. 
We include all variables in OLS and GMM regression models to test all predicted hypotheses. 
All explanatory variables are grouped into the following broad categories for convenience 
when results are analysed and presented in our empirical chapters: profitability, firm value, 
leverage, earnings and distribution, taxation cash flow, corporate governance and year 
effects. We will often be referring to these themes when discussing our estimated results.  
Appendix A contains full description of financial and corporate governance variables used to 
test our models for both countries and their abbreviations to which we will be referring for 
simplicity reasons in this and next chapters.  
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3.3.1 The Dependent Variables 
As all hypotheses are structured in a way to test the effect of different factors on total 
executive directors’ level of remuneration, our dependent variables are going to be the same 
for all hypotheses. The empirical analysis is based on the measurement of total executive 
directors’ compensation.  
For our study total remuneration variable was collected for each firm and year if was available 
and disclosed in Manifest reports; and included the following components: basic pay, bonus, 
benefits in kind and pension, if reported, following similar method offer by Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1989). In our study these components are jointly determined; however, it is 
important to note that salary and bonus play different roles in relation to the agency theory. In 
the previous study by Banker et al. (2013) where they have also jointly calculated 
remuneration components, it is discussed that if bonuses are paid out based on firm’s 
performance, they tend to increase managerial effort and therefore help to solve the agency 
problem if present in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection. This implies that 
directors with better abilities will receive higher rewards and together with fixed salary will 
generate higher total pay as well. On the other hand, directors who perform better receive 
lower fixed pay in relation to total cash compensation they receive (Banker et al., 2013). 
Despite the fact that these two components have their own distinctive links with the agency 
theory, we are interested in examining the effect of total cash received by directors, following 
similar method used in previous studies (Gigliotti, 2013; Stroh et al., 1996; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1989).  
Total executive compensation was calculated for each company for each year for all 
executive directors on the board summing up all components. There is, however, no 
consistency as to how these data are presented. Some reports do not provide a breakdown 
of remuneration components but only include total remuneration received by each executive 
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director. This is mainly the case for Spanish listed companies. In order to be consistent, total 
compensation executive directors received was calculated and used in this study. 
We use three dependent variables in our models based on total executive compensation 
value. Many empirical studies(such as Haynes et al., 2007; Ghosh and Sirmans, 2005) have 
expressed the total directors’ pay as a natural logarithm therefore we adopt similar technique 
in our case and one of the dependent variables takes the form of natural logarithm of total 
remuneration (LNTOTREM). Using logarithmic transformation descales that data and to some 
extent reduce non-normality (Pathak et al., 2014; Banker et al., 2013).  
Other two dependent variables used in our regressions are expressed as ratios: total 
remuneration over gross profit (REMGP) and total remuneration over market value (REMMV). 
Both of these variables show the proportion of total pay in relation to gross profit and market 
value respectively. The justification for using these ratios is that we capture relative pay rather 
which is as important as total pay. Total remuneration has been adjusted by gross profit and 
market value respectively.  
 
3.4 Data Selection 
As it is a quantitative research, our data collection only relies on the secondary panel data. 
The sample for this empirical research consists of a large number of firms operating in 
different industries in two countries, excluding banks and insurance firms because of the 
differences in corporate governance regimes. 
The panel data was obtained from two databases: Manifest and Datastream. All publicly 
available financial key indicators of the firm were retrieved from the Datastream. Manifest is 
considered to be an extensive resource for corporate governance variables and contains all 
variables needed for our research. Corporate governance data collected from reports arethen 
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matched with other financial variables for each year to have a complete dataset for each 
country. We also include year effects in all our regressions.  
One of the limitations using Manifest when collecting corporate governance data is that many 
Spanish firms have a few years of missing data as annual reports contain incomplete 
information, meaning there will be more missing observations for Spanish firms in our final 
dataset which will affect the number of observations in our final models. If there were some 
missing variables present for a certain year, the average was found for the financial variables.  
Sample period is 2005-2011. There are two reasons for the choice of this particular sampling 
period. Most financial academic research papers when analysing this topic choose sampling 
period between 3-7 years and we follow the same examples (see e.g. Core et al., 1999; 
Perez-de-Toledo et al., 2013). The availability of Manifest reports also supports our selected 
time period as corporate governance reports are only available from year 2005 and onwards 
for Spain.  
Our sampling period also covers the year 2008, when the financial crises took place. The 
global crisis attracted many researchers investigating it from corporate governance point of 
view, mainly attributing the cause of the crisis to the failure of corporate governance 
regulations (Kumar, 2013). It is important to study a period during which financial crisis took 
place as it will help us to provide insight as to whether directors are overpaying themselves 
given the current economic environment. Therefore, the main question we will address in our 
research is that whether executive remuneration which is considered to be extremely high 
can be attributed to the agency issues or whether compensation is in line with an increasing 
market value of firms and directors’ remuneration is based on firm performance.  
The empirical study will focus on generating estimates for our remuneration model for both 
the UK and Spain. As stated earlier, these two countries are different in terms of legal 
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arrangements, culture, origin and the quality of law enforcement (meaning that investors may 
seek an effective help from courts if directors are believed to act only in their own 
interests).The UK has been chosen for our analysis as an example of country’s law being 
originated from the common law and also a country which has developed Combined Code 
which serves as an example for many other countries in the world. Spain represents French 
origin (originally derived from Roman civil law), which is considered to be the weakest in 
terms of legal protection and implies that it is easier for directors’ to expropriate profits and 
set higher levels of remuneration for themselves. These two countries were chosen based on 
La Porta et al. (1998) indices – shareholder rights, protection of creditor rights and rule of law. 
Comparing indices on cross-country level, we have chosen two countries with the highest 
indices from two legal groups – common law and civil law.  
Even though this study does not analyse the effect of legal aspects on directors’ 
remuneration, meaning that we do not include variables in our regressions which measure 
shareholders’ rights, rule of law, etc. as our research questions and objectives concentrate on 
the effect of firm performance and corporate governance measures on executives’ 
remuneration specifically; it is still important to understand these legal differences as they 
largely impact accounting standards and development of corporate governance. That is why 
this study considers differences of the development of law in these two countries. 
 
3.5 Final Sample Size 
 
All dependent and explanatory variables for both countries were collected from two 
databases and the availability of data had an effect on our final sample size. Our final sample 
size has largely been affected by the number of corporate governance reports available on 
Manifest, in particular Spanish firms did not report remuneration of executive directors. 
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Similar issue was reported in the study carried out by Gigliotti (2013), where a number of 
firms considered for the examination were reduced from 331 to 145 due to incomplete 
historical data regarding executive compensation.  
Table 3.1 and 3.2 show total number of firms for UK and Spain respectively considered for 
this analysis. As the data was collected for 2005-2011, we would expect the final sample to 
be 1,666 observations (238 times 7) for the UK and 217 observations (31 times 7) for Spain. 
However, as some reports for certain years were missing our final sample is 1525 
observations for UK and 114 for Spain. Therefore, unavailability of data (either not having 
reports for certain years at all or missing remuneration value) on Manifest had a great impact 
on our final sample size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
Table3.1: The composition of the firms in the sample by industry (UK) 
  
Industry No. % 
Basic Materials 17 7.14 
Consumer Goods 26 10.92 
Consumer Services 52 21.85 
Financials 37 15.55 
Industrials 55 23.11 
Health Care 8 3.36 
Oil and gas 14 5.88 
Technology 15 6.30 
Telecommunications 7 2.94 
Utilities 7 2.94 
Total 238 100.00 
 
 
Table 3.2: The composition of the firms in the sample by industry (Spain) 
  
Industry No. % 
Basic Materials 1 3.23 
Consumer Goods 1 3.23 
Consumer Services 4 12.90 
Financials 4 12.90 
Industrials 9 29.03 
Health Care 2 6.45 
Oil and gas 1 3.23 
Technology 2 6.45 
Telecommunications 1 3.23 
Utilities 6 19.35 
Total 31 100.00 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
3.6 Empirical Methodology 
This section will describe how our models are estimated. All the estimates are obtained from 
EViews.  
3.6.1 Modelling static 
The general form of the static form of our remuneration model is as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                     (3.1) 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                              (3.2) 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                             (3.3) 
 
Where𝛼 is a constant, 𝛽 stands for coefficient of the  𝑥′𝑠 of explanatory variables.  
We estimate our remuneration models using both the standard OLS and GMM estimation 
methods. Both methods are used for comparative purposes. The OLS traditional regression is 
used in many empirical studies to test for pay-performance relationship (e.g. Barros and 
Nunes, 2007; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). However, OLS estimation methods often 
lead to mis-specification and that could be caused by measurement errors in the variables, or 
because independent variables have autocorrelation in the residuals (Ghosh and Sirmans, 
2005; Core et al., 1999). As all corporate governance variables are manually extracted from 
corporate governance reports, we might expect to have some errors in the dataset, even 
though it has been carefully checked.      
Therefore, there are alternative approaches (Barros and Nunes, 2007) which can be chosen 
to resolve problems such as autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity and we chose the use of 
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generalised method of moments estimation method (GMM model), based on the reasons 
outlined below. 
The GMM method is an instrumental variables approach. Our instruments are all variables 
used in the estimation (and previously in OLS regression). One of the main advantages of 
this method is that it is used to avoid the problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
which often plague the standard OLS method and in turn affects estimation efficiency (Baum 
et al., 2003). Another main advantage of the GMM method is that it provides a unified 
framework when analysing results of other common estimation method such as OLS and IV 
(instrumental variables approach) (Kennedy, 2008). GMM estimator can be identified by 
including the exact number of instruments as the number of independent variables. The 
validity of this model specification can be checked by applying Sargan test which will be 
discussed in the Diagnostic Tests section in this chapter. 
We employ the general-to-specific methodology popular in the econometrics literature by 
specifying all our models in general terms. Then we use decision rule that allows us to 
sequentially remove each variable with an insignificant p-value from the model as long as the 
elimination minimises the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (which allows comparing models 
and accepting the next best estimated model) and reduces standard error (SER) of the 
regression. This approach is in line with Pagan’s (1987) recommendation regarding model 
selection using the general-to-specific approach. Our final estimates will be a reduced version 
of the equations (3.1) to (3.3). Full models as they were run for the first time will take the 
following form both for OLS and GMM. It is expected that we will end up with different 
reduced versions for both countries, but what we want to see is the effect of firm performance 
and monitoring on remuneration.  
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𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑃𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑃𝑀𝑡+ 𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑉𝑡+ 𝛽11𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑀𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑡+ 𝛽16𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐷𝐷𝑡+ 𝛽20𝐿𝑃𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽21𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽22𝐿𝑅𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽24𝑅𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑡+ 𝛽25𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽26𝐹𝐿𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽27𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽28𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑡+ 𝛽29𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽30𝐿𝑅𝐿𝑀𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽31𝐹𝐿𝑆𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽32𝐷2005𝑡 + 𝛽33𝐷2006𝑡+ 𝛽34𝐷2008𝑡 + 𝛽35𝐷2009𝑡 + 𝛽36𝐷2010𝑡 + 𝛽37𝐷2011𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
After certain variables will be removed from these models, we will end up with different 
“reduced” models for each country and each specification method.  
 
3.6.2 Modelling dynamics 
General models are estimated as follows: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥1(𝑡−1) + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑥𝑛𝑡+ 𝛽𝑥𝑛(𝑡−1)      + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                 (3.4) 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑅𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥1(𝑡−1) + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑥𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑛(𝑡−1)+ 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                          (3.5) 
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𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥1(𝑡−1) + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑥𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑛(𝑡−1)+ 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                         (3.6) 
 
Our next set of remuneration models allows for dynamic effects. Allowing for dynamic 
adjustments is important. Most academic literature only considers single time period (Tosi et 
al., 2007; Edmans et al., 2012) so that dynamics are ignored. Dynamic setting is important as 
it allows remuneration contracts to be designed in a way that executives are rewarded in the 
future for their efforts and that makes them concentrate on long-term value of the firm rather 
than focus on short-run which only makes firm’s stock price to go up at the expense of future 
increase in firm’s value (Edmans et al., 2012). Dittman et al. (2012) also highlight the 
importance of dynamics to be studied as it takes time for compensation contracts to be 
adjusted in a non-stationary environment. Some previous studies have incorporated the 
dynamic setting in their analysis and confirmed that capturing time effect provides better 
estimation of the relationship between compensation, firm performance and corporate 
governance (Noe and Rebello, 2012).Therefore, in order to have a comprehensive picture of 
the estimated results for these particular datasets and capture the reality, we estimate 
dynamic models.  
As such, we capture dynamic effect in directors’ pay by introducing a lagged directors’ 
remuneration in our models together with other financial variables (see also Murphy, 1999). 
Since current firm performance may reflect performance in the past and the associated 
compensation. This is because it is more likely to firm performance will be rewarded in the 
future. As before, we use the general-to-specific forms of our dynamic models. 
The coefficients are also estimated using OLS and GMM methods. GMM estimation method 
is justified and applied by many academic in dynamic setting for panel data (Arellano and 
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Bond, 1991; Haynes et al., 2007) as it helps to create instrumental variables free from 
second-order autocorrelation, which is often a problem once lagged variables are introduced 
into a model, especially in the presence of serial correlation in error terms (Nickell, 1981) as it 
is more efficient in constructing an instrument for lagged variables. Also lagged dependent 
variables can often be used as instruments too (Sargan, 1980), especially if models are 
expected to have autoregression in residuals.   
We apply similar decision rules as in section 3.4.1 to derive the final models, i.e. removing 
variables with highest probability as long as AIC and SER are minimised. Final estimates a 
reduced version of equations (3.4) to (3.6).  
 
3.6.3 Panel Cointegration and Error-correction Models 
A final aspect of our analysis is to test for a long-run relation between director remuneration 
and the performance of the firms. For example, it is likely that directors’ remuneration is in 
line with the value of the firm and therefore under/over payment of directors’ remuneration 
has a long-run cointegration with firm value. There are now econometric methods to test for 
long-run relation using panel data tests based on adaptation of the work for Engle and 
Granger (1987). Last empirical chapter of the thesis will be covering long-term performance; 
we will test whether there is a long-term cointegration between total executives’ remuneration 
and other independent variables. The main reason for testing it is to see whether equilibrium 
can be achieved in the long-run if there is any shock affecting variables because of certain 
economic and financial climate. Despite the considerable research carried out to test for 
dynamic effects, the area still requires furthering. Specifically, we add new insights into 
research by applying panel unit root tests and error-correction models to test for co-
movement between variables. The methodology for this chapter will consist of three main 
steps: In that case, we are able to econometrically test for panel unit root tests, panel co-
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integration and establish panel error-correction models (ECMs) to test the variables of 
interest. The set up for this approach are as follows. 
First of all panel unit root tests will be used to test for the stationarity of the variables and the 
order of integration of each variable. Three panel unit root tests will be employed to determine 
that: the LLC (Levine, Lin and Chu test), the IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin) and ADF-Fisher Chi-
square.  
The most commonly used panel unit root test is the LLC, which is based on the ADF 
(Augmented Dickey Fuller) test but is adapted for panel data. Previous empirical research 
employs this test (e.g. Ouedraogo, 2013) when panel data is used for the analysis. One of the 
main advantages of this method is that this test is best applied for panels of moderate size 
(Levin et al., 2002) which in turn makes it appropriate for our datasets. 
The panel unit root test for each variable can be stated as follows: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + �𝛽𝑖𝑛 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑁 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                   (3.7) 
where∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is the first-order difference operator, 𝛼 is a constant,   𝑡 = 1, … ,𝐿 time 
periods. The panel unit root statistics is the t-ratio of𝑦𝑖𝑡−1. All three estimation techniques will 
be applied to test for the unit root; however, the decision will be based on the LLC test results 
as this test is the most widely used one for the panel dataset (Ouedraogo, 2013). We will test 
for stationarity firstly at the level form. Insignificant coefficients imply that variables contain 
unit roots. The panel unit root test is then performed on the first difference of the variable as 
follows: 
∆∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + �𝛽𝑖𝑛 ∆∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑁 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (3.8) 
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Where∆∆𝑦𝑡 is the second-order difference of the variable. A small p-value for the t-ratio of 
∆𝑦𝑡−1confirms the level panel unit root result. The following hypothesis will be tested for panel 
unit root tests: 
H0=𝛽 = 0 (non-stationarity) 
H1=𝛽 < 0 (stationarity) 
Then we move on to perform the second step of our empirical analysis which is panel 
cointegration tests. This technique will help us to determine the long term relationship 
between total remuneration (measured as LNTOTREM) and each explanatory variable for 
which we want to identify this relationship. The main reason for that is to determine whether 
the system is in equilibrium in the long-run. The methodology adopted is based on Engle and 
Granger (1987) two-step methodology (see also Pedroni, 2004). Some previous studies (e.g. 
Apergis and Payne, 2012; Ouedraogo, 2013) used this approach so we will adopt similar 
technique. The Engle and Granger (1987) two-step methodology involves running the level 
variables in an OLS for the variables that contain a unit root and capturing the residuals to 
apply a panel unit root test. So to capture the residuals in the level regression, we regress 
LNTOTREM on each of the explanatory variable with a constant. Then we use the LLC, the 
IPS and ADF-Fisher Chi-square to test for a unit root. Specifically, the level regression takes 
the following form: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                   (3.9) 
where LNTOTREM is dependent variable, 𝛼 is a constant, 𝛽 is coefficient of variable 𝑥,. 
𝑥represents independent financial and corporate governance variables in each regression of 
LNTOTREM as the dependent variable. 𝜀 is a residual on which we will perform unit root tests 
as in equation (3.7), based on the information set at 𝑡.Some variables in this model will take 
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the form of first order difference and that will be determined by previous panel unit root test 
results. If variables are stationary at the level, then we will include this variable in the level 
form, however, if they are stationary at 1st difference we will use the following form: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                            (3.10) 
We will also apply the same equation for determining error correction terms in our final step, 
therefore: 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡                                                                    (3.11) 
∆𝐿𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝐿𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡−1                                                       (3.12) 
Once cointegration between variables has been established, we then complete third and final 
step of long-run analysis and set up an error-correction model (ECM) using the residuals in 
the level regression with a lag as the error-correction term. 
ECMs are used to examine whether disequilibrium caused by various shocks happening in an 
economy can be corrected in the next time period to restore previous equilibrium between 
variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). The relationship between cointegration and ECMs were 
first developed by Granger (1981). This idea was extended in Engle and Granger (1987). The 
basic Engle and Granger (1987)theorem states that if there is a cointegrating relation 
between two or more variables, then an ECM can be formulated to establish the short- and 
long-run adjustments to equilibrium assuming prior disequilibrium amongst the variables.  
The estimate of the ECM for each country will use both methods - OLS and GMM 
estimations. We will also perform diagnostic tests to check for autocorrelation in the residuals 
and heteroskedasticity. We use the general-to-specific methodology to set up the model as 
broadly as possible. Following Pagan’s (1987) recommendation, we eliminate the insignificant 
coefficients as long as this process minimises standard error and Akaike Information Criterion 
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(AIC). This allows us to obtain more parsimonious ECMs. The magnitude of the error-
correction term allows us to determine how quickly the variables adjust to reach equilibrium. 
For both, OLS and GMM estimation methods we will run two models – the first one capturing 
residual for the whole regression (when including all independent variables from the dataset 
in the model) and is expressed as ECTTOTAL (which will be computed by running a OLS 
regression on all independent variables with LNTOTREM being dependent variable and 
capturing the residual). It will be modeled in the following way: 
 
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡  = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝑥1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝑥2𝑖𝑡−2 + ⋯𝛽𝑖∆𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖𝐿𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 
                                      +𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                                                   (3.13) 
 
Where𝑥1𝑖𝑡 , 𝑥2𝑖𝑡, etc. are explanatory financial and corporate governance variables, ∆ is the 
difference operator and 𝑡 − 1 determines lag of the variable. For all ECMs we will use first 
difference for variables which are stationary in level and second difference if variables are 
stationary in first difference. Lags are also applied to all variables apart from dependent 
LNTOTREM.  
The second model will include residuals measured between individual pair-wise relationships 
between two variables (LNTOTREM and other variables measuring firm performance and/or 
corporate governance): 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑅𝐿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                     (3.14) 
This OLS regression will be applied for all selected individual pair-wise relationships to 
determine error terms. The error-correction model is specified as follows:  
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∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝑥1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖∆𝑥2𝑖𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛽1𝐿𝑅𝐿𝑥1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖𝐿𝑅𝐿𝑥2𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (3.15) 
 
Both ECMs regressions will be tested for Spanish and UK companies.  
 
3.6.4 Diagnostic Tests 
We also apply a battery of diagnostic tests to the parameters of our final OLS and GMM 
models for static, dynamic and error correction models. The results of these tests should help 
us to understand whether our estimations are reliable or not. Firstly, the second-order 
autocorrelation in the residuals will be checked using Q-statistics. We will also perform 
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation Lagrange multiplier tests using 2 and 4 lags. The null 
hypothesis states no autocorrelation, which is rejected if coefficients are significant.  
Second test will involve checking for the presence of heteroskedasticity. We will employ 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey and look at F-statistics coefficients, the probability of which will 
determine whether we reject or accept the null of no heteroskedasticity. Significant coefficient 
will reject the null. 
We are also going to perform the Sargan test helps to analyse the validity of instruments for 
GMM models. The Sargan test seeks to establish whether overidentifying instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error. Overidentification occurs when there are more instruments than 
the bare minimum of one per each troublesome variable. The probability of coefficients will 
determine whether we reject or accept the null hypothesis of no correlation. There is, 
however, a certain criticism of this test. If for example, the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between overidentifying instruments and errors is rejected, it does not tell us which one or 
whether there are a few of them (Kennedy, 2008).  
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3.7 Preliminary Analysis 
In this sub-section, we discuss the descriptive statistics for our variables as well as the results 
of our correlation tests. Both estimates are important as they provide evidence of the basic 
statistical patterns in the data and in turn provide guidance on the statistical methods that 
may be appropriate for multivariate analysis. 
 
3.7.1 Descriptive Statistics for the UK 
Table 3.3 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables. Our descriptive statistics are 
based on measures of central tendency (mean), standard deviation, median, skewness and 
kurtosis. Skewness and kurtosis provide evidence of deviation from central tendency and in 
turn a measure of the normality of the variables. 
Firstly, looking at the firm size measured expressed as a natural logarithm of total assets, we 
report that mean value is 14.23. A study by Li et al. (2015) also examines relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance for non-financial firms but in the US and 
they report mean value for LNTOTASSETS to be 9.1205. This difference could results from 
having larger firms in our samples size.   
Table 3.3 shows that accounting ratios on average are quite high (looking at mean values). 
For example, ROE is 42.23% which means firms are efficient at generating income on 
investment. ROA measures how profitable a firm is in relation to its total assets. Mean and 
median values are 8.56 and 8.79 respectively which are slightly lower compared to the prior 
literature (e.g. 10.65 and 10.587 by Core et al., 1999). However, standard deviation is higher 
(8.79) compared to the same study (7.101). These results suggest that on average return on 
assets is lower for this particular sample size; however, it is more spread out.  
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Descriptive statistics also shows that on average UK boards have 44% independent, whereas 
8% of UK boards include non-independent directors. The former results are consistent with 
prior work reporting the fraction of independent directors (Mayers et al., 1997; Schultz et al., 
2013). 96% of firms have separate role for the CEO and Chairman indicating better 
monitoring and compliance with recommendations provided in the Code of Good Practice. In 
contrast, Core et al. (1999) report that 75.6% firms have combined roles for the US 
companies. Schultz et al. (2013), examining pay-performance link for the Australian listed 
firms, also report descriptive statistics for a few corporate governance variables. They 
measured a board duality using a dummy variable too, however, in contrast to our study a 
dummy variable is equal to 1 if role are combined therefore we would expect mean value to 
be much lower than reported in this study and it is equal to 0.09. For example mean value for 
RCOMP in their study is 0.51, whereas value reported in Table 3.3 is 0.64.  
Table 3.3 shows that quite a few variables are far from being normally distributed as indicated 
by skewness and kurtosis. The Jarque-Bera test for non-normality was also performed which 
resulted in most coefficients being significant confirming non-normal distribution. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for the UK 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Med. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Dependent Variables 
       LNTOTREM 1343 7.76 0.69 4.80 7.74 10.03 0.12a 0.42a 
REMGP 1343 1.19 1.98 -18.13 0.70 34.80 6.39a 101.48a 
REMMV 1343 0.34 0.53 0.00 0.20 5.69 38.32a 1468.41a 
Independent Variables 
       FEES 1524 0.91 1.26 0.00 0.50 13.53 4.11a 23.66a 
LNTOTASSETS 1524 14.23 1.62 10.15 14.05 19.21 0.40a 0.09 
Panel A: Profitability 
       GPM 1231 37.93 21.83 -3.06 34.96 95.98 0.51a -0.35 
LNEBIT 1231 11.95 1.64 6.02 11.74 17.37 0.54a 0.73a 
OPM 1231 16.11 12.83 -93.24 12.78 71.06 
-
18.13a 611.64a 
REMUNNETINC 1231 0.04 0.32 -6.35 0.02 4.22 -5.32a 182.85a 
ROA 1231 8.56 8.79 -5.54 6.87 171.92 3.25a 47.83a 
ROCE 1231 16.98 15.58 -15.74 13.38 215.24 21.97a 688.45a 
ROE 1231 42.23 227.18 -76.53 19.31 7206.45 28.36a 946.22a 
Panel B: Firm Value 
       LNMV 1511 14.03 1.57 5.60 13.82 19.28 0.48a 0.93a 
NCFMV 1511 0.39 9.40 -2.05 0.10 365.19 38.77a 1505.84a 
TOBINQ 1511 1.37 2.28 0.00 0.85 40.46 10.16a 144.42a 
Panel C: Leverage 
      DEBTMV 1511 2.16 43.17 0.00 0.24 1359.20 28.42a 824.94a 
LIBASS 1389 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.26 1.94 0.98a 4.10a 
LNSTDEBTLTDEBT 1314 10.33 2.49 2.20 10.51 16.23 -0.31a 0.08 
LNTOTDEBT 1389 12.57 2.33 2.20 12.81 17.50 -1.01a 1.91a 
LTDEBTMV 1511 2.00 41.55 0.00 0.20 1359.09 29.20a 881.75a 
LTDEBTTOTASS 1389 0.22 0.18 0.00 0.19 1.13 1.05a 1.34a 
Panel D: Investment 
       DY 1522 3.14 2.46 0.00 2.92 38.29 4.56a 49.74a 
EPS 1522 0.41 1.06 -10.97 0.24 15.62 1.64a 66.85a 
Panel E: Taxation Cash Flow 
      LNTAXCF 1325 10.13 1.84 3.50 9.96 16.46 0.35a 1.26a 
Panel F: Corporate Governance 
      ACOMP 1325 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.64a -1.59a 
CEOCHAIR 1325 0.96 0.19 0.00 1.00 1.00 -4.84a 21.41a 
COMP 1325 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 1.00 -1.58a 0.50a 
DIROWN 1325 4.82 12.29 0.00 0.32 72.80 38.91a 1517.11a 
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Table 3.3 cont. 
 
 
     Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Med. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Panel F: Corporate Governance       
FEMALE 1325 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.57 1.27a 2.02a 
INDNEDS 1325 0.44 0.13 0.00 0.44 1.00 -0.40a 1.14a 
MEETING 1325 1.05 0.48 0.00 1.00 4.00 1.27a 3.54a 
NONINEDS 1325 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.79 1.85a 4.12a 
RCOMP 1325 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.63a -1.60a 
Notes:a denotes significance at 1% level. Obs stands for the total number of observations in the dataset. The 
distribution of each variable is presented by showing mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min.), median 
(Med.), maximum (Max.), skewness (Skew.) and kurtosis (Kurt.). Significance of skewness and kurtosis was 
determined using table of statistics provided in Snedecor and Cochran (1989). Please refer to Appendix A for the 
definition of each variable. 
 
3.7.2 Descriptive Statistics for Spain 
Please refer to Table 3.4 below for descriptive statistics for Spanish firms. 
Firstly, looking at the natural logarithm of total assets, mean value is 16.34. Perez-de-Toledo 
et al. (2013) for example carried out a study analysing Spanish listed firms for the period 
2003-2007, report this value to be slightly lower – 14.20. Therefore, it can be said that there is 
not a large difference between our study and previous published results.  
Descriptive statistics shows that Spanish firms have lower accounting ratios on average that 
UK firms apart from OPM, DY and EPS for our datasets. However, comparing to previous 
empirical studies for Spanish companies we observe some differences. For example, ROA 
mean and median differs substantially to the value reported in study by Crespi-Cladera and 
Gispert (2003). Authors report these values to be 0.0175 and 0.0249 respectively, whereas 
our values are 5.64 and 4.91. Such large difference can be attributed to the fact that their 
study has taken into account 1990-95 time period and accounting profits and value of assets 
would be lower on average. The mean value of ROE is also inconsistent with some previous 
published empirical work. For example, Lucas-Perez et al. (2015) reports a value of 0.156.  
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Leverage descriptive statistics can also be compared to some studies for Spanish 
companies. Our DEBTMV mean value to be 0.15, whereas Perez-de-Toledo et al. (2013) 
report this value to be 0.228 in their analysis.  
In terms of corporate governance variables, we also report interesting results. The mean 
fraction of independent and dependent non-executive directors is 35% and 47% which is 
similar to results reported by Core et al. (1999) for UK firms. Comparing our results to studies 
for Spanish firms, it can be confirmed that for example mean and standard deviation of 
INDNEDS is in line with descriptive statistics presented by Fernandez-Mendez et al. (2011) 
and Lucas-Perez et al. (2015). Our values are 0.35 and 0.16 for mean and standard 
deviation; authors’ values are 0.35 and 0.17 respectively (Fernandez-Mendez et al., 2011) 
and 0.32 and 0.18 (Lucas-Perez et al., 2015). We also report that on average there are 8% of 
female directors on the board which is 1% higher than in comparison to the UK firms, and 
2.9% higher reported by Lucas-Perez et al. (2015). Exactly one half of firms comply with the 
recommendations in terms of their board size for Spanish firms. This value is slightly higher 
(0.860) than in the study by Lucas-Perez et al. (2015), meaning that they found that more 
companies comply with recommendation regarding board size.  
Skewness and kurtosis indicate that there are slightly more variables which are closer to 
normal distribution. Significant coefficients of Jarque-Bera test confirmed non-normality of 
some variables, similar to reported coefficients for UK firms. Non-normality leads to 
inefficiency in the coefficients but the estimates are still unbiased as there they are still BLUE 
(Best Linear Unbiased Estimators).  
 
 
 
100 
 
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics for Spain 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Med. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Dependent Variables 
       LNTOTREM 90 9.83 7.11 0.00 14.14 17.39 -0.83a -1.24 
REMGP 90 0.80 4.29 0.00 0.10 39.33 9.12a 87.46a 
REMMV 90 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.12 4.84a 27.83a 
Independent Variables 
       FEES 90 0.48 0.86 0.00 0.27 6.05 4.91a 27.50a 
LNTOTASSETS 90 16.34 1.46 12.22 16.73 18.63 -0.48a -0.48a 
Panel A: Profitability 
       GPM 102 29.90 20.36 -6.36 23.72 73.54 0.77a -0.55a 
LNEBIT 102 13.71 1.50 9.00 13.51 16.61 -0.06 -0.34a 
OPM 102 16.14 15.13 -10.07 11.67 65.50 0.17a 7.20a 
REMUNNETINC 102 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.68a 12.61a 
ROA 102 5.64 5.49 -1.10 4.91 34.40 1.70a 13.13a 
ROCE 102 11.06 9.52 -1.27 8.63 67.47 2.79a 14.73a 
ROE 102 22.45 15.55 -4.79 20.19 89.52 0.73a 3.97a 
Panel B: Firm Value 
       LNMV 114 18.91 1.97 13.01 18.75 22.32 -0.06 0.01a 
NCFMV 114 0.04 0.21 -0.40 0.00 2.01 7.29a 65.13a 
TOBINQ 114 37.60 59.49 0.09 14.37 340.84 3.10a 11.38a 
Panel C: Leverage 
      DEBTMV 114 0.15 0.53 0.00 0.02 4.95 7.16a 60.46a 
LIBASS 114 0.33 0.23 0.00 0.26 1.63 2.04a 7.97a 
LNSTDEBTLTDEB
T 114 13.55 2.01 0.00 13.81 17.24 -2.99a 17.93a 
LNTOTDEBT 114 15.16 1.88 6.97 15.50 17.98 -1.16a 2.23a 
LTDEBTMV 114 0.12 0.47 0.00 0.01 4.50 7.83a 70.68a 
LTDEBTTOTASS 114 0.28 0.17 0.00 0.28 0.61 -0.04 -1.13 
Panel D: Investment 
       DY 114 4.40 3.17 0.00 4.12 20.62 1.56a 5.47a 
EPS 114 2.12 3.22 -0.28 1.24 21.84 4.30a 21.94a 
Panel E: Taxation Cash Flow 
      LNTAXCF 107 11.92 1.52 8.27 11.81 14.89 0.05 -0.58a 
Panel F: Corporate Governance 
      ACOMP 94 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.88a -1.25a 
CEOCHAIR 94 0.34 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.63a -1.63 
COMP 94 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 -0.80a -1.38 
DIROWN 94 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.53 2.22a 3.69 
FEMALE 94 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.36 1.34a 1.79b 
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Table 3.4 cont. 
 
     Variable Obs. Mean SD Min. Med. Max. Skew. Kurt. 
Panel F: Corporate Governance       
INDNEDS 94 0.35 0.16 0.00 0.36 0.87 0.21a 0.15a 
MEETING 94 0.74 0.38 0.00 0.70 2.70 1.99a 7.61a 
NONINEDS 94 0.47 0.18 0.06 0.45 0.85 -0.04a -0.44a 
RCOMP 94 0.43 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29a -1.95a 
SIZE 94 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 -0.11b -2.02a 
Notes:a, b denotes significance at 1% and 5% level respectively. Obs stands for the total number of observations in 
the dataset. The distribution of each variable is presented by showing mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum 
(Min.), median (Med.), maximum (Max.), skewness (Skew.) and kurtosis (Kurt.). Significance of skewness and 
kurtosis was determined using table of statistics provided in Snedecor and Cochran (1989). Please refer to 
Appendix A for the definition of each variable.  
 
3.7.3 Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
Last stage of the preliminary analysis involves calculation of correlations between variables. 
Descriptive statistics results for both countries have shown that most variables are far from 
normal distribution meaning that the use of non-parametric estimation methods will be more 
appropriate. This is because the power of non-parametric tests is not affected by the violated 
normality assumption (see Snedecor and Cochran, 1989; Field, 2005).As such; we use the 
non-parametric Spearman’s rank correlation as our bivariate test. The Spearman rank 
correlation takes on the following form (taken from Snedecor and Cochran, 1989, p.194): 
𝑟𝑠 = 1 − 6�𝑑2 [𝑛(𝑛2 − 1)] 
where𝑟𝑠 represents rank correlation coefficient and takes the value between -1 and +1, sign 
indicating negative or positive correlation respectively (Snedecor and Cochran, 
1989).Throughout, we test the null hypothesis of no correlation between any pair of variables 
using a two-tailed test. We use SPSS software to calculate correlation coefficients.  
Due to a large number of correlation coefficients between all variables in our dataset, we 
include correlation coefficient matrices in the appendices for both countries in order not to 
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disrupt the flow of the thesis. The results of the correlation tests will be discussed here but we 
will refer to Appendix B for the UK and Appendix C for Spanish companies’ correlation 
coefficients. 
We start by looking at correlation matrix for the UK (see Appendix B). Most of the correlation 
coefficients between LNTOTREM and other variables are small in absolute value, the largest 
correlation reported is equal to 0.682 (significant at 1% level) indicating a positive relationship 
between LNTOTASSETS and LNTOTREM; confirming what we expected; the larger the firm 
is the higher the expected directors’ pay. The coefficient is also quite high for LNEBIT (0.650). 
The correlations between LNTOTREM and variables which include the measurement of 
market value are significant and positive indicating that if firm’s market value increases, the 
executives’ compensation packages will go up as well. The relationship between LNTOTREM 
and corporate governance variables are not consistent in terms of their sign. We 
hypothesised that better corporate governance practices (usually referring to greater 
monitoring) will be associated with a reduction in total pay. We observe that this predicted 
relationship only holds for COMP, DIROWN, MEETING and NONINEDS. Sanchez-Marin et 
al. (2010) also highlight that in depth analysis of corporate governance and directors’ pay 
reveals certain contradictions and provides conflicting arguments. Taking into account for 
example previous findings, it can be reported that for example Zajac and Westphal (1994) 
find a positive association between the percentage of outside directors and executive 
directors’ pay, whereas Boyd (1994) reports the opposite. Another example Ozkan (2007a) 
reports a positive association between number of non-executive directors and executives’ 
pay. Therefore, it would be expected to see some difference in results. 
Appendix C reports correlation coefficients for Spain. We report strong positive correlation 
between LNTOTREM and LNTOTASSETS, holding the same relation as for UK firms. 
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Correlation coefficients between LNTOTREM and corporate governance variables are not 
significant.  
Correlation coefficients between our independent variables are high in small number of 
cases. For example, coefficient between LNEBIT and LNTOTASSETS is 0.846 for UK; 
between LNTOTDEBT and LNEBIT is 0.859 for Spanish firms. It is generally accepted that a 
value is high if it is around 0.8-0.9 in absolute value. Highly correlated independent variables 
indicate multicollinearity between them which might affect the estimates of individual 
predictors, i.e. they might be found to be statistically insignificant but without collinearity they 
are significant (but it does not affect the reliability of the whole model).  
There are ways to deal with multicollinearity, for example certain variables can be removed 
from the models. It is simply done by dropping one of the correlated variables in the model. 
However, the problem with this as described by Kennedy (2008) can be that omitting a 
variable might introduce a bias into remaining variables. It will also be difficult to use in our 
models as we aim to test the effect of all variables on our dependent variables.  
Another important aspect which needs to be considered is that in certain cases 
multicollinearity won’t cause too many issues in research. Example used by Kennedy (2008), 
the famous example of the Cobb-Douglas function where capital and labour are analysed 
being highly correlated. The rule of thumb which author presents is that researchers should 
not worry about multicollinearity of t statistics in models is greater than 2 and that is the case 
for almost all variables in our predicted models.  
Also, following general-to-specific methodology, a lot of variables will be removed from the 
initial model as long as we maximise R-squared and reduce SER. In the future research it 
can, however, be suggested that factor analysis can be considered or formation of a principal 
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component. Here, we just want to see the general relationship between certain variables and 
remuneration. 
 
Spearman’s Rank correlation coefficient analysis provided us with useful insights about 
relations between variables; however, we cannot entirely rely on it. Bearing this in mind we 
move on to analyse our estimations using OLS and GMM approach. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
It has been established what estimation methods will be adopted to analyse our data and test 
the predicted hypotheses. Using OLS and GMM estimation methods we plan to test static 
and dynamic relationship between executive directors’ remuneration, firm performance and 
corporate governance. Taking dynamic setting further, we adopt panel cointegration and 
panel error-correction models.   
Descriptive statistics helped to determine non-normality of most financial and corporate 
governance variables, meaning that we might experience some efficiency problems when 
estimating our regressions. However, the GMM estimation method should help us to 
overcome this problem.  
Preliminary analysis and Spearman’s correlation coefficient matrices have helped to test for 
relationships between variables but we cannot rely entirely on these results as they can only 
be used as an indication for sign allowing us to carry on with testing those using the OLS and 
GMM estimation methods.  
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We now take our empirical analysis to the next step and test the relationships between 
variables; next two chapters will cover the analysis and interpretation of the reported results 
in detail for both countries.  
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Chapter 4 UK Remuneration Levels and Corporate Governance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results for the relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and the performance of the largest 238 UK firms. The models also incorporate 
corporate governance measures. The models are estimated in static and dynamic context 
using both OLS and GMM methods. Three measures are used as dependent variables: 
natural logarithm of total remuneration (LNTOTREM), remuneration level over gross profit 
(REMGP) and remuneration level over market value of the firm (REMMV) – as described in 
Chapter 3. The different measures are used to potentially accommodate their varying 
impacts. For example, remuneration level scaled by market value of the firm (REMMV) seeks 
to relate remuneration to firm value. Firm value can be reduced if executives are excessively 
paid. 
The chapter contains two main sections: the first section covers the empirical results for the 
static models; the second section presents the dynamic versions of the models. Each section 
begins by addressing the results of diagnostic tests results. A list of all variables used in this 
analysis (both dependent and explanatory) is presented in the Appendix A together with the 
abbreviations which we refer to when we present the empirical results.  
Throughout the empirical chapters, we employ the general-to-specific methodology (see 
Pagan, 1987) which is well known in the econometric literature. This approach allows us to 
move from a general to a more parsimonious model that is more readily interpretable. The 
approach works under the assumption that the exact number of variables included in the 
model is not known a priori and that the inclusion of a smaller set of variables lead to omitted 
variable biased. Similarly, the inclusion of all variables may lead to over-parameterization. 
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Following the guidance of Pagan (1987), we include all potential variables in the model in the 
first instance. We sequentially remove each variable from the model starting in each 
sequence with the one with the largest p-value. This variable is removed as long as its 
removal reduces the standard error of the regression and minimises the Akaike Information 
criterion (AIC).The process is discontinued just the point before when both SER and AIC 
increase. The process can lead to different variable appearing in each model. We believe that 
is not a problem since ultimate variables that are removed would have been insignificant. This 
means that they would not have contributed to the explanatory power of the model. 
Our results suggest that capturing the time effect by introducing lagged variables in our 
models does not entirely solve the problem of autocorrelation. GMM models are also believed 
to play an important role in the analysis if there is a presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. Overall, our estimated results suggest that the dynamic GMM models 
provide better results for testing the relationships as it was expected.  
 
4.2 Static Models 
This section covers the estimated results for all 6 static models. We approach our analysis by 
discussing some of the diagnostic tests based on the static OLS and GMM estimation 
methods (see Table 4.1). These statistical tests are useful as they allow us to determine the 
degree of reliability of the estimated coefficients for the statistical relationships we wish to 
portray.  
4.2.1 Diagnostic tests for static models 
We start by looking at the number of observations included - N. Missing data have had an 
effect on the final number of observations in our estimated models. Based purely on the 
highest number of observations, we can conclude which model is more reliable due to the 
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larger sample size. The number of observations varies according to the model. This is 
because we estimated the full model with all of the variables in the first instance but 
sequentially eliminated the variable with that largest p-value as long as this process reduced 
the standard error (SER) of the regression and minimised the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). This process is undertaken to generate a parsimonious model similar in spirit to the 
general-to-specific approach used in time series estimation (see Pagan, 1987). 
𝐿2is used to assess the goodness of fit of the model as it shows the extent to which the 
model explains the variation in the data. A reasonable level for this and typically not close to 
1.0 suggests a better model fit (Granger and Newbold, 1974; Field, 2005) since we have to 
avoid the usual spurious regression problem. The 𝐿2 values range from 0.3271 to 0.5904 for 
the static models. The highest𝐿2 values are 0.5904 and 0.5468 for models 1 and 4(Table 
4.1).𝐿2values for the OLS models are in a similar range as under the GMM so the 
explanatory power of the models has not improved under the GMM. These results allow us to 
conclude that OLS static model where our dependent variable is LNTOTREM explain higher 
percentage of the variation in the data.  
Standard error is also an important indicator to consider as it shows the standard deviation of 
the random component in a given dataset meaning that the lower the standard error, the 
better estimate the model provides. The lowest standard errors reported are for models 3 and 
6 where standard error coefficients are 0.3759 and 0.3608 respectively. 
Akaike Information Criterion allows comparing models and choosing the one with the lowest 
AIC value; we accept the next best estimated model for each case by reducing one variable 
at a time (Pagan, 1987). The lowest AIC value is 0.8932 (model 3). 
The Q-statistic was performed to check for the second-order autocorrelation. We observe that 
coefficients are significant indicating that the Q-statistic rejects the null of residual correlation 
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for both the OLS and GMM estimates, meaning that the coefficients are inconsistently 
estimated, even under the GMM. So we should apply some caution when interpreting the 
coefficients. This test would in particular be important and interesting for dynamic models as 
lagged variables help solving the problem of autocorrelation. 
The F-test for the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity in the OLS residuals. The reported F-statistic is 
significant at 1-percent level for all three OLS static models (Table 4.1, OLS models 1, 2 and 
3).Thus it is no surprise that the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypotheses of normality too. 
As it was previously discussed in methodology, non-normality leads to inefficiency in the 
estimated coefficients but the estimates are still unbiased as there they are still BLUE. 
Diagnostic results for static models indicate that even when GMM estimation method is used 
we still experience autocorrelation problem. The inclusion of additional lags for the dynamic 
case does not eliminate the autocorrelation problem. This means that our results suggest 
should be interpreted with extra caution as the coefficient estimates are inconsistent. Sargan 
test coefficients are extremely small and their probabilities determine that we reject the null 
on no correlation between overidentifying instruments and errors. 
 
4.2.2 Empirical results for static models 
Chapter 2 has already covered the corporate governance implications and also outlined the 
hypotheses. Also, empirical work suggests that if compensation contracts are designed in an 
optimal way, usually based on good financial performance, this would increase directors’ 
motivation and decrease the agency problem (Ozkan, 2007; Doucouliagos et al., 2012b). In 
this chapter we solely concentrate on our predicted results whilst also drawing some 
comparisons with previous studies and also testing whether our hypotheses hold for this 
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particular dataset. We start our discussion with the main findings on financial performance 
and linking it to the theory as to why we observe certain results.  
Table 4.1 presents the coefficients of both estimation methods for each of the three 
dependent variables. The explanatory variables are grouped into the following broad 
categories: profitability, firm value, leverage, investment, corporate governance and year 
effect for ease of interpretation.  
Firm Size 
We start by looking at firm size, measured as a natural logarithm of total assets. Many studies 
(e.g., Haynes et al., 2007) outline the importance of the firm size as a significant variable 
impacting the level of remuneration. Executive remuneration is positively related with firm size 
- meaning that larger firms pay more than small firms. Table 4.1 shows a significant and 
positive relationship between LNTOTASSETS and all three dependent variables 
(LNTOTREM, REMGP and REMMV) for OLS estimation method. The magnitude of these 
coefficients is 0.2209, 0.2704 and 0.0926 respectively. These results indicate that for 
example 1% increase in natural logarithm of total assets leads to an increase in natural 
logarithm of total directors’ compensation by 22.09 percentage points. Only LNTOTASSETS 
explains LNTOTREM and the relationship here is positive. Our results capturing the link 
between size measured by LNTOTASSETS accounts for up to 27.07% of the variation in 
measures of compensation – depending on the model. These results are in line with previous 
studies (e.g. Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Ozkan, 2011).   
These results support theoretical prediction that the larger the firm is, the higher the levels of 
remuneration are. This can also be explained by the fact that large firms which have good 
financial performance tend to attract experienced talented workers who in turn demand higher 
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levels of compensation (Tervio, 2008). This argument can also be supported by competitive 
labour market theory (Hubbard and Palia, 1995). 
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Table 4.1: Determinants of executive directors’ compensation, UK firms (static), 2005-2011 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        C 3.3196a 7.3543a 2.1849a  3.1590a 8.3551a 2.5565a 
 
(0.1311) (0.3732) (0.1206)  (0.1959) (0.6674) (0.2635) 
FEES - - 0.0086  - - - 
 
  (0.0084)     
LNTOTASSETS 0.2209a 0.2704a 0.0926a  0.2707a - - 
 
(0.0154) (0.0669) (0.0197)  (0.0272)   
        Panel A: Profitability 
      
        GPM -0.0003 -0.0078a 0.0016a  - -0.0101a 0.0021b 
 
(0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0006)   (0.0036) (0.0009) 
LNEBIT - -0.2454a -  - -0.2141a 0.1351a 
 
 (0.0578)    (0.0726) (0.0373) 
OPM - 0.0263a -0.0016  - 0.0224a -0.0032b 
 
 (0.0034) (0.0010)   (0.0073) (0.0014) 
REMUNNETINC - 0.3457a -  0.0947b 0.3538a - 
 
 (0.0970)   (0.0434) (0.1056)  
ROA - 0.0134a -  - - - 
 
 (0.0051)      
ROCE 0.0013a 0.0018b -  0.0015a 0.0025a - 
 
(0.0003) (0.0009)   (0.0004) (0.0006)  
        Panel B: Firm Value 
      
        LNMV 0.1330a -0.4355a -0.2338a  0.0935a -0.2537a -0.2785a 
 
(0.0161) (0.0648) (0.0204)  (0.0274) (0.0751) (0.0456) 
NCFMV - -1.4904a 0.8227a  - -1.2420a 0.7525a 
 
 (0.2307) (0.0683)   (0.3056) (0.2433) 
TOBINQ - - 0.0160b  - -0.0354c - 
 
  (0.0069)   (0.0210)  
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Table 4.1 cont. 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Panel C: Leverage 
      
        DEBTMV - -0.1027a -  - -0.0711a - 
 
 (0.0336)    (0.0259)  
LIBASS - - -  - -0.9376a - 
 
     (0.3552)  
LTDEBTMV - - 0.0497a  -0.0005a - - 
 
  (0.0104)  (0.0001)   
LTDEBTTOTASS - - -0.4245a  - - -0.2742a 
 
  (0.0683)    (0.0949) 
        Panel D: Earnings and Distribution 
     
        DY - -0.0594a 0.0140a  - -0.0392b - 
 
 (0.0160) (0.0046)   (0.0187)  
EPS -0.0555a - -  -0.0532a 0.1386a - 
 
(0.0129)    (0.0199) (0.0489)  
        Panel E: Corporate Governance 
     
        ACOMP 0.0834a 0.2133b -  - - - 
 
(0.0308) (0.0959)      
CEOCHAIR - - 0.1755a  - - 0.1819b 
 
  (0.0553)    (0.0777) 
COMP - - -0.0739b  -0.1839a - - 
 
  (0.0299)  (0.0673)   
DIROWN -0.0058a -0.0063b -  0.0002a -0.0074c - 
 
(0.0011) (0.0027)   (0.0000) (0.0039)  
FEMALE 0.6901a 0.7670b -  0.5196b 0.8883b 0.1831 
 
(0.1484) (0.3806)   (0.2490) (0.4319) (0.1269) 
INDNEDS -1.2970a -1.7696a -0.2636b  -0.8362a -1.1274b -0.3447c 
 
(0.1370) (0.3456) (0.1067)  (0.2578) (0.4703) (0.1824) 
NONINEDS -0.9599a -0.7218b -  -0.8634a - - 
 
(0.1371) (0.3608)   (0.2612)   
RCOMP - -0.3210a -0.0479b  - -0.1625b -0.0485c 
 
 (0.0940) (0.0242)   (0.0794) (0.0251) 
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Table 4.1 cont.  
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel F: Year Effect 
      
        Y2005 -0.1664a - -  -0.1583a - - 
 
(0.0394)    (0.0422)   
Y2006 -0.1061a - -  -0.0870b -0.1301c - 
 
(0.0382)    (0.0361) (0.0689)  
Y2008 0.0833b - 0.0836a  0.0835a - 0.0854b 
 
(0.0379)  (0.0302)  (0.0302)  (0.0373) 
Y2011 0.1088a - -  0.0847a 0.0928 - 
 
(0.0368)    (0.0286) (0.0745)  
Diagnostic       
 
      
N 1318 1214 1338  1434 1214 1240 
 
0.5904 0.3271 0.4965  0.5468 0.3361 0.4922 
S.E.   0.4442 1.0895 0.3759  0.4880 1.0826 0.3608 
AIC 1.2262 3.0239 0.8932  - - - 
Q-Stat 351.45a 115.98a 132.17a  380.54a 129.79a 75.48a 
Auto LM(2) 233.2901a 192.7297a 203.8208a  - - - 
Auto LM(4) 119.2481a 100.607a 105.2453a  - - - 
F-statistic 12.7874a 3.0441a 13.7338a  - - - 
Sargan Test - - -  0.0000a 0.0000a 0.0000a 
Jarque-Bera 286.1068a 23444.86a 55845.78a   720.1532a 24651.95a 64525.64a 
Notes: Refer to Appendix A for definition of variables. Figures in round brackets are standard errors. a, b, c denotes 
that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N is number of observations. The S.E. 
stands for standard error. The AIC denotes Akaike Information criterion, measuring the goodness of fit of an 
estimated model. Q-Stat is checking for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Auto LM(2) and Auto LM(4) 
are Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation Lagrange multiplier tests using 2 and 4 lags respectively.F-statistic stands 
for heteroskedasticity which is tested using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics. Sargan test analyses whether 
overidentifying instruments are uncorrelated with the error.  
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Profitability 
Panel A shows the results for our profitability variables (Table 4.1). Some of the reported 
findings are consistent with the principal-agent considerations in the sense of a positive 
relation with the profit measures and directors’ remuneration. However, what really matters is 
relative pay to performance. Most of financial indicators in our models which are used to 
measure firm performance are positively related to executives’ compensation. For example 
ROA and ROCE are positively related to dependent variables and these results are 
consistent with previous findings summarised in Tosi et al. (2000). These results suggest that 
contracts may have been designed in a way to enable managers to benefit from 
improvements in profitability and perhaps mitigate the agency problem (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). Whether or not this works is not 100% certain. For example, the coefficients for GPM 
are often negative under both estimation methods.  Also, LNEBIT is negatively related 
(24.54%). While the other profitability measures are positive, the coefficients are no larger 
than 10%. Even so, it seems clear the profitability is positively related to remuneration. It has 
also been reported by Cybinski and Windsor (2013) that larger firms with good corporate 
governance tend to link levels of compensation with firm performance confirming our 
predicted results. These findings support our hypothesis (H1) which predicts positive 
relationship between remuneration and firm performance. This implies that despite 
controversial arguments regarding remuneration, we find that remuneration acts more as an 
incentive rather than creating more agency problems.  
It can be argued that incentive contracts designed by the firms which exist in a competitive 
environment can be viewed as a tool to evaluate relative financial performance in the 
industry. Therefore, we would expect UK firms to deliver financial performance that 
commensurate with total executives’ compensation.  
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Firm Value 
Firm value measures are also related to remuneration (see Panel B). Generally, the 
coefficients are positive but some coefficients are also reported to be negative depending on 
the model and the estimation method. Looking at the natural logarithm of market value 
(LNMV) it can be stated that 1% increase in LNMV will cause 13.30% and 9.35% increase in 
LNTOTREM for OLS and GMM models respectively, supporting our second hypothesis.  
TOBINQ has the least significant impact on compensation than other variables measuring 
firm value. Our mixed empirical evidence is supported by Tervio (2008) who finds a positive 
association between market value and CEO compensation. These results support our 
predicted hypothesis (H2) which states that increased market value will lead to higher levels 
of remuneration.  
 
Leverage 
Coefficients of ratios which are used to measure the leverage of firms are presented in Table 
4.1 Panel C. LIBASS is significantly and negatively associated with REMGP for GMM model: 
1% increase in this ratio (meaning higher financial risk) is associated with 93.76% decrease 
in remuneration over gross profit. 
It is unclear why DEBTMV is negatively related to REMGP unless DEBTMV captures the 
negative effects of underinvestment. Our results report that 1% increase in DEBTMV ratio will 
contribute towards 10.27% and 7.11% decrease in REMGP for models 2 and 7 respectively. 
That can be interpreted as higher proportion of debt in relation to market value decreases the 
proportion of total remuneration to gross profit. DEBTMV in contrast to LTDEBTMV also 
includes short-term debt. Previous research suggests that short-term debt improves the 
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monitoring of directors by lenders (Brockman et al., 2010) - meaning that our results can be 
explained by the fact that having short-term debt obligations will contribute towards creation 
of more optimal contracts for directors and if there is greater monitoring we will observe a 
decrease in the level of compensation. 
LTDEBTTOTASS variable is negatively related to REMMV. We report that 1% increase in 
long-term debt in relation to total assets will decrease the level of remuneration to total 
market value by 42.45% and by 27.42% for OLS and GMM models respectively. Estimated 
findings are in line with the theoretical explanation offered by Kabir et al. (2013) who propose 
that firms which use remuneration as a tool to align directors’ and shareholders’ interests 
usually borrow at a much higher cost, therefore, in order to decrease costs for firms they are 
forced to decrease executives’ compensation.   
 
Earnings and Distribution 
Panel D (Table 4.1) shows the results for DY and ESP. A 1% increase in DY contributes to 
a3.92% decrease in REMGP whereas a1% increase in EPS contributes to a 13.86% increase 
in executive directors’ level of compensation. The results for Model 5 are in line with those of 
Bhattacharyya et al. (2008) for US firms for both DY and EPS.  
 
Corporate Governance 
The theory predicts that the composition of the board of directors affects the level of directors’ 
remuneration (Guthrie et al., 2012). Boards which are considered to be more independent 
and undertake better monitoring improve corporate governance in firms making directors 
designing more optimal compensation arrangements (Bebchuk et al., 2002).  
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One of the most important monitoring mechanisms is the role of the non-executive board 
including the independent remuneration committee. This corporate governance variable is 
predicted to limit excessive levels of pay – as there is more monitoring imposed on the 
behaviour of directors. The separate roles of the CEO and Chairman also facilitate good 
corporate governance. The reported results indicate positive relationship between 
CEOCHAIR and REMMV for both OLS and GMM estimation methods. The coefficients are 
somewhat large at 17.55% (OLS) and 18.19% (GMM). Our results contradict findings by 
Conyon and Murphy (2000) who state that if the role is combined, it is easier for one person 
to exert power and thus increase directors’ compensation meaning that separate role and 
remuneration have negative relationship. If the role is separate, the compensation is higher 
for our dataset. Of course, this assumes no moderating effect of a remuneration committee. 
The roles of audit and remuneration committees are viewed to be an important factor in 
determining corporate governance standards. The UK Corporate Governance Code provides 
clear recommendations on how these committees should be set and governed (FRC, 
2012).The coefficient for RCOMP is negative indicating an inverse relationship between 
RCOMP under both estimation methods. The coefficients are also large reaching 32.10% for 
REMGP under the OLS method. Our results therefore suggest that increased monitoring will 
cause a decrease on the level of compensation. Our results differ from findings reported by 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) who find little evidence supporting the view that the presence of 
a remuneration committee reduces remuneration levels.  
Other important corporate governance variables which are essential to include in our model 
are proportion of non-executive and executive directors (NONINEDS and INDNEDS), which 
measure the composition of the board and thus independence. Our results indicate significant 
negative relationship between these two variables and dependent variables (see Table 4.1). 
Coefficients are very large under both estimation methods. The results contrast with those of 
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Ozkan (2007b) who establishes a positive association between non-executive directors and 
the level of compensation arguing that these directors lack efficiency in monitoring. 
The main theoretical explanation which could be provided for our estimated results is based 
on the entrenchment hypothesis outlined by Fahlenbrach (2009) who states contrasting view 
of designing compensation packages, viewing it as not being effective in terms of solving the 
agency problem, but in contrast, creating an opportunity for directors to take advantage and 
set higher level of compensation for themselves. Therefore, our negative relationship can be 
explained by the fact that these firms tend to have strong corporate governance 
characteristics meaning that firms do not seek to create high-level compensation packages in 
order to align shareholders’ interests with managers’ actions. Our reported coefficients are 
higher for INDNEDS than they are for NONINEDS, suggesting that outside directors tend to 
exert greater control over the board of directors. That can be supported by an argument that if 
there are independent directors on the board, inside directors are likely to feel that they are 
being monitored and evaluated by outside directors meaning that they might tighten their 
control too (Mizruchi, 1983). 
Board diversity is another extremely important factor which can be positively linked to 
shareholders’ value and firm performance. Carter et al. (2003) emphasise the importance of 
diversified board as it is believed that the more diverse it is in terms of gender and race, more 
people can add to the firm (i.e. skills, experience and knowledge) thus increasing its total 
value and contributing towards shareholder value creation. Erhardt et al. (2003) also support 
this view by reporting a positive association between board diversity and financial 
performance of the firm. We find a positive link between proportion of female on the board 
(FEMALE) and the level of remuneration (see model 1,2, 4 and 5). Possibly greater diversity 
in board membership increases firm performance which in turn positively increases directors’ 
compensation. The coefficients appear somewhat large for both estimation methods. Nielsen 
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and Huse (2010) find strong evidence that suggests that women generally have a positive 
effect on board effectiveness via mediators; they report that female directors reduce conflicts 
and increase developmental activities for the board in general. Farrell and Hersch (2005) also 
show that female board members tend to choose to serve on board of better-performing 
firms. However, they differ from those of Adams and Ferreira, (2009) who find insignificant 
results. 
Taking our estimated results into account we can confirm that hypothesis (H3) was supported 
by our findings. Most of the corporate governance variables which are used to measure the 
level of board monitoring act as a mean to control executives’ compensation. Therefore, 
stronger board control will be associated with lower pay.  
We also find a negative association between our dependent variables and percentage of 
directors’ ownership (DIROWN), confirming our prediction stated in hypothesis (H4). High 
block-holder ownership leads to a decrease in the level of compensation for most of our 
models. These results are in line with prior work (see Core et al., 1999; Ozkan, 2007; Ozkan, 
2007b). So directors have power in influencing the level of compensation. Once they become 
shareholders themselves they have a greater interest in active monitoring firms’ activities thus 
remuneration levels won’t be set at previously high level. Another explanation is that 
according to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), larger shareholdings will resolve free rider problem, 
i.e. directors are motivated to monitor and improve governance of the firms.  
Boyd (1994) finds that CEO compensation has an inverse relationship with board control. Our 
dependent variables involves not only total compensation for CEO but total pay for all 
executive directors and remuneration of top management is usually closely linked to each 
other therefore the effect of the strength of the board control on compensation for all 
executives’ is likely to be similar.  
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Taking into account all corporate governance coefficients together, it can be concluded that 
overall corporate governance performance is strong across firms and that can be linked to the 
legal system under which they operate. These findings support our predicted hypothesis (H3). 
As it was mentioned in the literature review, countries operating under common-law tend to 
have very strong protection of investors and thus have an impact on the level of corporate 
governance rules (see La Porta et al., 1998). Therefore, our findings can be supported by this 
theory and we would expect that directors of these firms are unlikely to benefit by extracting 
unreasonable compensation from the firm for themselves (Core et al., 1999).  
 
Year Effects 
The table also shows the importance of year effects. Our sample covered period of the global 
financial crisis and the coefficient for 2008 is also positive and significant. The results show 
that year effects are mostly significant where LNTOTREM is used as the dependent variable. 
The feature holds for both estimation methods.  The coefficients for 2005 and 2006 are 
negative whereas, the coefficients are positive for other years where significant. It is expected 
that after financial crisis, the governance of firms would likely improve leading to lower 
remuneration given the experience of the financial crisis. However, we observe the opposite. 
Our estimated results can be supported by explanation provided by Adams (2012) who states 
that total compensation increases as the level of risk goes up and that could be the case in 
these companies. 
That means that according to our results despite the fact that financial crisis caused a lot of 
negative effects on firms and corporate scandals revealed that some executives were paid 
large sumsof money, directors’ level of compensation has still increased after year 2008. That 
could be explained by the fact that our remuneration variable aggregates different 
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components of remuneration meaning that even if the base pay has decreased directors 
might still have been awarded bonuses and other payments based on the level of 
performance too. 
Overall, our results are generally in line with our predictions. To sum up our static findings, it 
can be said that we found strong and positive association between firm performance and 
directors’ remuneration.  In general, firm performance impact on the level of compensation 
(see also Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985) and good corporate governance would appear to 
have a moderating effect on pay. Stronger corporate governance mechanisms play an 
important role in reducing the agency problem in firms (Ozkan 2007b). What we are unable to 
show however, is whether the level of pay is too high or inadequate given the performance 
achieved by the firm. This is an area that can be explored in future work. 
 
4.3 Dynamic Models 
We extend our models by introducing lagged financial variables and two-lagged dependent 
variables as explanatory in order to investigate whether time effect has an impact on the 
relationship between total executives’ remuneration and financial variables. Corporate 
governance variables remain the same in our dynamic models. It should be noted that 
because our models were reduced from general to simplified form, some lagged variables 
were eliminated based on high p-values. All general models included t-1 and t-2 for 
dependent variables, but t-2 variables were eliminated in our simplified versions of the 
models.  
It is important to capture time effect as directors’ contracts are usually revised over a certain 
period of time (Dittmann et al., 2010). As it has previously been mentioned, extending our 
model in this way is also vital as not that many studies consider multiple periods in their 
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models and mostly concentrate on static effects; therefore, we expect to find better estimated 
results for our pay-performance relationship as according to a theory past financial 
performance of the firm tends to have an immense impact on CEO levels of compensation 
(Murphy, 1985). For this particular empirical analysis we will be able to observe whether this 
theory will support this prediction for this particular dataset.  
Edmans et al. (2012) indicate that lags of directors’ compensation are likely to capture pay 
dynamic given also the variation in firm performance over time. We use one lag dependant 
and explanatory variables to capture this effect. Lag variables are likely to capture the extent 
to which executives’ pay relates to long-term performance. Therefore, we believe that our 
dynamic models give us a better insight into analysis of the relationship between directors’ 
pay and firm performance. We will also see whether corporate governance indicators 
coefficients will change if we introduce lagged variables on financial performance indicators. 
Inclusion of lagged dependent variable should also help to solve the problem of 
autocorrelation (Granger and Newbold, 1974) which was present in our static models.  
 
4.3.1 Diagnostic tests for dynamic models 
Following the same approach as in previous section, we firstly draw our attention to the 
diagnostic tests (see Table 4.2). Missing data have also had an effect on the number of 
observations in final dynamic models. Final number of observations included is generally 
slightly lower for all dynamic models than for static ones and that can be attributed to missing 
observations. We interpret these results in the same way as previous static diagnostics – the 
more reliable model is the one with the highest number of observations.  
𝐿2values are considerably higher for all dynamic models, ranging from 0.5566 to 0.7160. The 
highest reported𝐿2 results are for the same models as for static results – 1 and 4, 0.7160 and 
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0.6728 respectively, allowing us to draw the same conclusion as before: better estimated 
models are those where the dependent variable is LNTOTREM. Reported standard errors are 
also the lowest for the same models when we run dynamic regressions as they are for static 
estimations; the values are 0.2922 and 0.2982 for models 3 and 6 respectively. The lowest 
AIC value is 0.3935 (model 3, same as static). 
The Q-statistics test was not expected to be significant as we included lagged dependent and 
explanatory variables (see Granger and Newbold, 1974).We find that Q-statistics is 
insignificant for OLS model 3 and GMM models 5 and 6 (Table 4.2) in line with our prediction. 
Thus the coefficient estimates are consistently estimated as we cannot reject the null of no 
serial correlation. Under the OLS, model 2 and 3 exhibit significant autocorrelation at lag 2 
but not at lag 4 according to Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test.  
The F-test for the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) provides the 
same results as for previous static models – it is significant for all OLS models. The Jarque-
Bera test also rejects the null hypothesis of normality. Models that exhibit non-normality in the 
residuals will likely also exhibit heteroscedasticity. So the rejection of the null in this cases is 
not surprising. Sargan test also rejects the null. 
Overall, we can suggest that diagnostic test results for dynamic models were better. 
However, we should still take into account that our diagnostic tests suggest some estimation 
problems particularly with residual correlation meaning that we should exercise some caution 
when interpreting the reported coefficients in our estimated results.  
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4.3.2 Empirical results of dynamic models 
Table 4.2 summarises reported coefficients of our estimated results for all dynamic models 
and this section will include detailed analysis of these results. The independent variables 
used in dynamic models were grouped in the same way in the table as they were for static 
coefficients: profitability, firm value, leverage, investment, corporate governance and year 
effect; however, dynamic models include two other extra sections - lagged dependent 
variables and taxation cash flow.  
Our dynamic models differ from static setting only by inclusion of lagged explanatory 
variables and two-lagged dependent variables; therefore, in our discussion we will solely 
concentrate on highlighting similarities and differences.  
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Table 4.2: Determinants of executive directors’ compensation, UK firms (dynamic), 2005-2011 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        C 1.5424a 3.9099a 0.9423a  1.3300a 3.2902a 1.1804a 
 
(0.1847) (0.3746) (0.1307)  (0.1655) (0.5034) (0.1755) 
FEES - - 0.0240a  - - - 
 
  (0.0073)     
LNTOTASSETS 0.3096a - 0.2402a  0.2645a - 0.3008a 
 
(0.0190)  (0.0292)  (0.0215)  (0.0574) 
LNTOTASSETS(-1) -0.1611a - -0.2478a  -0.1514a - -0.2577a 
 
(0.0138)  (0.0237)  (0.0184)  (0.0461) 
         
Panel A: Lagged Dependent Variables 
     
        LNTOTREM(-1) 0.5322a - -  0.5445a - - 
 
(0.0236)    (0.0376)   
REMGP(-1) - 0.5405a -  - 0.5396a - 
 
 (0.0245)    (0.0645)  
REMMV(-1) - - 0.5019a  - - 0.5145a 
 
  (0.0261)    (0.0679) 
        Panel B: Profitability 
      
        GPM - -0.0075a 0.0011b  - -0.0066a 0.0006 
 
 (0.0015) (0.0005)   (0.0020) (0.0004) 
LNEBIT - -0.2384a 0.0659a  - -0.1958a 0.0896a 
 
 (0.0461) (0.0142)   (0.0535) (0.0243) 
LNEBIT(-1) - 0.1678a -  - 0.2174a - 
 
 (0.0425)    (0.0484)  
OPM - 0.0188a -  - 0.0194a  
 
 (0.0029)    (0.0045)  
REMUNNETINC 0.0695b 0.4555a -  0.0957b 0.3248a  
 
(0.0319) (0.0776)   (0.0451) (0.0873)  
ROE - - -  - -0.0002a  
 
     (0.0000)  
ROE(-1) - - -  -0.0001a -0.0001a  
 
    (0.0000) (0.0000)  
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Table 4.2cont. 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        Panel F: Cash Flow 
      
        LNTAXCF(-1) - - -  - 0.0156 - 
 
     (0.0347)  
        Panel G: Corporate Governance 
     
        CEOCHAIR 0.1515b - 0.1229b  - 0.0953 0.1022b 
 
(0.0598)  (0.0490)   (0.1549) (0.0502) 
DIROWN -0.0046a - -  - - - 
 
(0.0010)       
FEMALE 0.2309c - -  0.3128b - - 
 
(0.1348)    (0.1579)   
INDNEDS -0.7777a -0.6668a -0.3378a  -0.7260a -0.5006c -0.2988b 
 
(0.1209) (0.2333) (0.0764)  (0.1639) (0.2863) (0.1409) 
MEETING -0.1796a -0.1779a -  - - - 
 
(0.0273) (0.0589)      
NONINEDS -0.4983a - -  -0.5170a - - 
 
(0.1220)    (0.1824)   
 
       
Panel H: Year Effect 
      
        Y2005 -0.0694c - -0.0388  -0.0693b - -0.0403c 
 
(0.0370)  (0.0262)  (0.0288)  (0.0243) 
Y2006 - - -  - -0.1443a - 
 
     (0.0539)  
Y2008 0.1758a - -  0.1482a - - 
 
(0.0359)    (0.0295)   
Y2009 0.0735b - -  - - - 
 
(0.0353)       
Y2010 0.0486 - -  - - - 
 
(0.0352)       
Y2011 0.1929a 0.1970b -  0.2215a - - 
 
(0.0396) (0.0799)   (0.0448)   
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Table 4.2 cont. 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Diagnostic       
 
      
N 1248 1072 1115  1376 1009 1120 
 
 
 
0.7160 0.5652 0.5962  0.6728 0.5566 0.5766 
S.E.   0.3861 0.8266 0.2922  0.4174 0.7697 0.2982 
AIC 0.9499a 2.4719 0.3935  - - - 
Q-Stat 62.2570a 72.2320a 7.8876  112.9600a 4.0658 5.5201 
Auto LM(2) 8.2184a 12.1646a 6.0663a  - - - 
Auto LM(4) 8.2527a 1.6574 0.0000  - - - 
F-statistic 6.4844a 6.7985a 9.5057a  - - - 
Sargan Test - - -  0.0000a 0.0000a 0.0000a 
Jarque-Bera 1309.023a 29986.14a 191454.80a   1946.625a 29694.84a 204277.20a 
Notes: Refer to Appendix A for definition of variables. Figures in round brackets are standard errors. a, b, c denotes 
that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N is number of observations. The S.E. 
stands for standard error. The AIC denotes Akaike Information criterion, measuring the goodness of fit of an 
estimated model. Q-Stat is checking for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Auto LM(2) and Auto LM(4) 
are Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation Lagrange multiplier tests using 2 and 4 lags respectively. F-statistic stands 
for heteroskedasticity which is tested using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics. Sargan test analyses whether 
overidentifying instruments are uncorrelated with the error.  
 
 
Firstly, we are going to concentrate on lagged dependent variables. It was hypothesised to 
find a positive association between current executive directors’ compensation and lagged pay 
and we report positive (at 1% significance level) relationship between lagged dependent 
variables and current ones for both OLS and GMM estimation methods (see Panel A, Table 
4.2). Coefficients, however, are quite high and indicate that 1% increase in our dependent 
variables in the previous period will contribute towards just above 50% increase in 
remuneration in current period for all OLS and GMM models. Our findings are consistent with 
previous research in an area; Doucouliagos et al. (2012a) also highlight the positive link 
between these two variables as it might take some time to adjust directors’ pay and previous 
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years are usually taken into account to observe dynamic effects. These results support H5, 
which proposed a positive relationship between current executives’ remuneration and lagged 
pay.  
By looking at LNTOTASSETS we also observe positive relationship between this variable and 
LNTOTREM and REMMV for both OLS and GMM estimation methods. The same results 
were observed in our static models and that was explained by the positive association 
between size of the firm and directors’ level of remuneration supported by previous findings 
(e.g. Haynes et al., 2007). Reported coefficients are higher than for static models – we 
observe that for example 1% increase in LNTOTASSETS will be associated with 30.96% 
increase in LNTOTREM for OLS model. However, our lagged LNTOTREM shows a negative 
relationship (see Table 4.2 models 1,3,4 and 6) and that could be explained by the fact that 
size of the firm is likely to have an effect in current period rather than the previous one. 
Profitability coefficients support our results reported in static findings. Both models are in line 
with our prediction stated in H1 that firm performance is positively related to the level of 
compensation. Coefficients for dynamic models lie in the same range as values for static 
results. We observe that lagged LNEBIT(-1)  is positively related to REMGP and we find that 
1% increase in LNEBIT causes 16.78% (for OLS) and 21.74% (for GMM) increase in the 
dependent ratio. Coefficients for ROE(-1) are negative which contradicts our prediction. The 
magnitude, however, is very small as we observe only 0.01% increase in LNTOTREM and 
REMGP for GMM models if there is a 1% increase in ROE(-1). These results suggest that 
lagged financial performance is positively related to current executive pay, supporting H6.  
LNMV(-1) is positively and significantly related to dependent variables which supports Gabaix 
and Landier (2008) prediction which stated that remuneration may increase as a results of an 
increase in market value; and we expected to find this relation. TOBINQ(-1) is, however, 
negatively related to compensation.  
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Focusing on LIBASS and lagged LIBASS coefficients reported in Table 4.2 Panel D we can 
see that our results differ from static model in terms of sign and magnitude. The relationship 
between LIBASS and dependent variables for all models is reported to be significantly 
positive. However, the relationship between LNTOTDEBT and dependent variables (Model 1, 
3 and 6 reported in Table 4.2) is negative and these estimated findings are consistent with 
theoretical literature regarding an association between debt and compensation. DEBTMV is 
also negative; however, DEBTMV(-1) has a positive association, even though we expected to 
find a negative relationship as short-term debt usually increases the quality of monitoring 
(Brockman et al., 2010). 
Panel E (Table 4.2) reports only two investment variables used in our dynamic models – EPS 
and EPS(-1). The positive relationship between EPS and REMGP for GMM model is similar 
to the one reported in static model in terms of sign and magnitude. Dynamic model finds that 
1% increase in EPS will cause 13.12% increase in remuneration over gross profit. Moreover, 
we find the same relationship for OLS model: REMGP increases by 14.64%. However, we 
observe a negative association between dependent variables and lagged EPS which 
contradicts theoretical background proposed by Bhattacharyya et al. (2008). However, the 
explanation for this could be that their empirical research takes into account retained 
earnings; however, we do not investigate whether these earnings are reinvested in the future 
or not.  
We report only one lagged variable in Panel F. The relationship between lagged LNTAXCF 
and REMGP for GMM model is positive; however, it is not reported to be significant in this 
particular model.  
Corporate governance variables in dynamic models are also associated with board 
composition, structure and monitoring and we will analyse each in turn. Starting with 
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CEOCHAIR we observe significant positive relationship with LNTOTREM and REMMV for 
OLS models and with REMMV for GMM model.   
The relationship between CEOCHAIR and remuneration remains significant and positive for 
all models except model 5. This can also be supported by the fact that corporate governance 
characteristics are quite strong. Other corporate governance variables such as FEMALE, 
DIROWN, NONINEDS and INDNEDS have the same association with our dependent 
variables as static models; however, the magnitude of coefficients differs. We estimate that 
1% increase in female directors on the board will contribute towards 23.09% and 31.28% 
increase in LNTOTREM for OLS and GMM models respectively, which is much lower than for 
static models. We also find that DIROWN variable is only significant for Model 1 and is also 
negatively related to LNTOTREM. Coefficients for NONINEDS and INDNEDS are also 
significant, negative and lower than the ones presented for static models. Our results indicate 
that for example 1% increase in NONINEDS and INDNEDS will cause 49.83% and 77.77% 
decrease in LNTOTREM for OLS model. These results can be explained using the same 
theoretical background which was proposed when we discussed static results. As Mizruchi 
(1983) reports higher monitoring will contribute towards a reduction in total compensation.  
Therefore, we can conclude that our dynamic models also show that corporate governance 
mechanisms are quite strong and firms do not use remuneration as a main tool to control 
directors to tie their objectives with shareholders’ interests. This can also be supported by the 
fact that following a few corporate scandals, many firms enhanced board monitoring by 
introducing stricter requirements and these have caused significant reductions in CEO 
compensation (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009); therefore, we should expect to see a 
negative association between corporate governance variables and directors’ remuneration. 
Our final reduced version of dynamic model (Table 4.2, Model 1) also reports MEETING to be 
significant. This variable is negatively associated with directors’ compensation for models 1 
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and 2. We report that 1% increase in this ratio will cause 17.96% decrease in LNTOTREM 
and 17.79% decrease in REMGP. As this variable includes both executive and non-executive 
directors showing that the higher the ratio, the better the level of monitoring in a firm providing 
a stronger corporate governance mechanism. Inside ownership (DIROWN) has also a 
negative significant coefficient for model 1 indicating stronger monitoring mechanism for the 
firm.  
Overall it can be said that dynamic models also confirm our previous findings when we 
described static models suggesting that corporate governance determinants indicate strong 
governance structure and it tends to have a negative effect on the total level of 
compensation, which support findings by Core et al. (1999) which found that firms with weak 
corporate governance performance tend to worsen the agency problem meaning that 
directors’ compensation tends to be much higher and not reflecting actual performance of the 
firm. We had also observed a link between firm performance and corporate governance in 
both sets of models (i.e. the better the financial performance of the firm, the higher CEO 
compensation is likely to be); this point could also be argued form another perspective: as 
Dittmann et al. (2010) outline that firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms (and 
that is what is observed regarding UK companies) tend to attract directors’ with better 
knowledge and skills who would potentially demand higher waged thus also, in turn, affect 
corporate governance characteristics in a positive way.  
Both static and dynamic estimated models have demonstrated that more compliant boards, 
increased director’s ownership will contribute towards greater and more active monitoring, 
however, some scholars have reported different results and argue that in most UK firms 
directors act more as advisors rather than active monitors (Franks et al., 2001). 
Year effect shows the same tendency in terms of relationship with directors’ compensation. 
Our estimated coefficients are negatively related to dependent variables before the financial 
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crisis took place and from 2008 onwards the relationship became positive. We therefore 
conclude that year effects for both, static and dynamic estimated models follow the same 
tendency. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This empirical chapter analysed the relationship between directors’ compensation and firm 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms. The main contribution of this empirical 
chapter is that we have introduced dynamic model and thus allowing us to compare these 
results with those produced by static estimation methods. It was observed that lagged 
variables play an important role in determining the level of compensation and managers are 
likely to be rewarded for their achievements after certain amount of time has elapsed.  
We have also observed the importance of legal system under which firms operate; combined 
together with our reported coefficients as well as being supported by previous empirical 
finding regarding the effect of legal rules on corporate governance structure we can conclude 
that corporate governance mechanisms employed by UK firms tend to align the interests 
between directors and shareholders; meaning that directors’ compensation is likely to be an 
incentive driven and reflect true performance of the firm. 
It can also be concluded that firms with strong corporate governance characteristics are likely 
to attract high paid executives who would increase financial performance of the firm as well 
as benefit from rewards as we consider multiple periods; meaning that factors work well 
together in combination.  
It is also important to consider the significance of our results and what potential implications 
these might have for various parties (i.e. policy-makers, practitioners, regulators, managers, 
etc.) Drawing a conclusion that remuneration is closely related to firm performance, it might 
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become clearer for practitioners should use remuneration as an incentive, link it with 
directors’ performance and develop more effective incentive schemes.  
These results can also serve as an example for other countries too. Of course, there is no 
one standard corporate governance practice for all countries and firms as we need to 
consider differences in culture, background, etc. but based on various cultural environments, 
other countries can improve their Code of Practice taking into account specific features of 
each country.  
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Chapter 5 Spanish Remuneration Levels and Corporate Governance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter concentrates on the analysis of executive directors’ pay and firm performance 
for Spanish companies. Having employed panel data for 31 firms for the period 2005-2011 
we examine our models and test this relationship, following exactly the same steps as in 
previous chapter when analysing the UK firms.   
The analysis of this chapter is split into two main sections. First, we look at the static model 
for both the OLS and GMM estimations. Whilst the OLS estimation may be insightful, the 
parameter estimates may be unreliable due to the presence of residual autocorrelation. The 
use of lagged variables may not eliminate this entirely. Non-normality in the residuals may 
also lead to estimation inefficiency. GMM estimator is particularly useful for an analysis if both 
heteroskedasticity and residual correlation are present (Baum et al., 2003). We use three 
dependent variables for each estimation method as discussed in Chapter 3 – LNTOTREM, 
REMGP and REMMV. Second, we capture lagged effects in our models such that we have a 
dynamic model. Both sections will begin with the discussion of the diagnostic tests results. A 
conclusion will summarise main findings. Please see Appendix A for variables explanation 
and abbreviations to which we will be referring.  
We find that dynamic adjustments play an essential role in determining executives’ pay. 
Overall our results suggest that once dynamic effect is captured, we tend to find stronger 
relationship between directors’ pay and firm performance and that is confirmed by diagnostic 
tests results which indicate that dynamic estimates resolve the problem of autocorrelation in 
the residuals. 
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As we use general to specific methodology and move from general to simplified models in our 
analysis, we end up with slightly different estimated models for UK and Spain. The objective 
of this research is to test set hypotheses for each country separately and then discuss 
whether there are similarities or differences in the findings given various backgrounds for 
these countries. It might seem that comparison is not possible as we end up with different 
models. However, the developed hypotheses to test for the relationship between 
remuneration and firm performance and corporate governance variables are set on a broader 
context and do not specify explicitly what particular variable we expect remuneration to be 
related to. That means that all static and dynamic models for both countries contain variables 
which are used to measure firm performance and corporate governance, which helps 
identifying the nature of the relationship and draw indicative conclusions regarding certain 
differences and similarities between these two countries used in this research. As earlier 
mentioned, previous studies have incorporated different variable to measure firm 
performance and corporate governance control mechanisms, our final results contain 
variables which can be used to measure both.  
 
5.2 Static Models 
We begin our empirical analysis by focusing on the relationship between total directors’ 
remuneration and firm performance and corporate governance variables using our static 
model. Firstly, looking at the diagnostic tests and then analysing the estimated coefficients.  
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5.2.1. Diagnostic tests for static models 
The diagnostic tests are shown in Table 5.1. These tests allow us to establish the level of 
confidence we can place in our parameter estimates. 
As our datasets contained a large number of variables with missing values, that had a 
considerable effect on final number of observations in models. We consider the most reliable 
model to be the one with the highest number of observations – model 3.  
𝐿2is used to test the goodness of fit of the model. 𝐿2value line within similar range for both 
OLS and GMM estimation methods; the highest value being 0.8033 for model 4, meaning that 
it explains higher percentage of variation in the data. As 𝐿2 values are not considerably 
higher for GMM models, it suggests that the explanatory power is relatively the same.  
We followed exactly the same approach (described in Chapter 3) regarding our final model 
estimation which was applied in previous empirical chapter when analysing the UK 
companies. The final model was specified using the same approach as described by Pagan 
(1987); therefore, we look to minimise the standard error (SER) and the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). The lower the standard error, the better the estimate is and for static models 
these would be model 3 (OLS) and model 6 (GMM) taking the values of 0.0010 and 0.0091 
respectively. Based on the AIC, model 2 with the value of -0.7751 can be considered to be 
the best one as it is the lowest.  
To check for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals the Q-statistics test is applied. 
Only one coefficient is found to be significant so that the null of residual correlation can be 
rejected for model 3. These results are supported by the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation 
Lagrange multiplier test using up to 2 and 4 lags.  
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The reported F-statistics (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) is significant at 1-percent level for 
models 2 and 3 (Table 5.1), in other words the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity can be 
rejected at 1-percent significance level. We find that Jarque-Bera test for non-normality also 
rejects the null (at 1-percent level) for OLS models 2 and 3 (and also for GMM models 5 and 
6). Sargan test accepts the null of no correlation between instruments and errors for models 4 
and 6.  
Overall, static models 1 and 4 perform best in terms of our diagnostic tests. However, we 
interpret the parameters of the remaining models with some caution since they have failed 
the diagnostic tests. It would be expected that dynamic models will perform better in terms of 
diagnostic tests as lagged variables help solving the problem of autocorrelation in the 
residuals.  
 
5.2.2 Empirical results for static models 
Once it was identified how reliable our estimates are we refer to Table 5.1 which summarises 
results for static OLS and GMM models. We follow the same format in our discussion as in 
previous Chapter 4 by grouping the coefficients into the same broad categories: profitability, 
firm value, leverage, investment, cash flow, corporate governance and year effect.  
Our results will be analysed and compared to previous empirical findings. It is important to 
note that various studies’ results differ substantially due to different methods of data 
collection, analysis techniques, samples, etc. (Tosi et al., 2000). It is also the case that most 
empirical studies concentrated on UK and US firms mainly. Therefore we are going to 
compare our results with ones reported earlier bearing in mind that findings also could have 
potentially be affected by the type of law adopted in a specific country. As it has previously 
been mentioned Spanish civil law is considered to be different from and UK and US 
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economies which have common law, we might observe difference in certain results reported. 
Also other broader aspects such as nation’s culture and social norms will have an effect on 
difference between these two countries. 
 
Firm Size 
Firm size expressed as natural logarithm of total assets can be an important determinant of 
executive directors’ level of remuneration. Many previous studies confirmed this relationship 
(Conyon and Murphy, 2000) and our study supported this positive relationship for the UK 
firms earlier. As it was stated, the larger the size of the firm, the higher the level of 
compensation for directors is likely to be. The reported coefficients suggest that 1% increase 
in LNTOTASSETS is associated with 0.57% and 0.99% increase in total executives’ 
remuneration (at 1-percent significance level) over market value for OLS and GMM models 
respectively. The relationship between LNTOTASSETS and REMGP for GMM model 5 is, 
however, negative at 10-percent level. This finding is not in line with previous research.  
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Table 5.1: Determinants of executive directors’ compensation, Spanish firms (static), 2005-2011 
        
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV   LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        C - - -  - 0.8824b - 
 
     (0.3972)  
FEES - 0.0199 -  - - 0.0017b 
 
 (0.0237)     (0.0007) 
LNTOTASSETS - - 0.0057a  - -0.1152c 0.0099a 
 
  (0.0017)   (0.0582) (0.0032) 
        Panel A: Profitability 
      
        GPM 0.0473b -0.0025b -  0.0497b -0.0041a - 
 
(0.0223) (0.0012)   (0.0190) (0.0012)  
LNEBIT 1.0977c - -  - 0.1255b - 
 
(0.6384)     (0.0504)  
OPM - - 0.0002b  - - - 
 
  (0.0001)     
REMUNNETINC 305.3020a 23.1311a 0.1049  311.0698a 23.0248a - 
 
(45.1850) (1.7345) (0.0704)  (38.3203) (2.9081)  
ROA -0.5255b - -0.0017a  -0.6340a -0.0087c - 
 
(0.2580)  (0.0006)  (0.2243) (0.0050)  
ROCE 0.3438b - 0.0010a  0.4674a - - 
 
(0.1567)  (0.0003)  (0.1438)   
ROE -0.1430a - -  -0.1187c - - 
 
(0.0448)    (0.0611)   
 
       
Panel B: Firm Value 
      
 
 
LNMV - 0.0375a -0.0102a  - 0.0323a -0.0131a 
 
 (0.0102) (0.0013)   (0.0106) (0.0037) 
NCFMV - - -0.0693a  - - -0.0838b 
 
  (0.0146)    (0.0323) 
TOBINQ - - 0.0001a  - - 0.0002a 
 
  (0.0000)    (0.0001) 
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Table 5.1 cont. 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV   LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        Panel C: Leverage 
      
        DEBTMV - - 0.0134b  - - 0.1990a 
 
  (0.0067)    (0.0611) 
LIBASS -6.5345b - -  -8.1865a - - 
 
(3.1801)    (3.0246)   
LNSTDEBTLTDEBT - -0.0265b -  - -0.0286a - 
 
 (0.0107)    (0.0087)  
LNTOTDEBT - - -  0.7593b - - 
 
    (0.3733)   
LTDEBTMV - - -  -1.8516b - -0.2583a 
 
    (0.8442)  (0.0964) 
LTDEBTTOTASS - - 0.0135  - - 0.0211b 
 
  (0.0072)    (0.0088) 
        Panel D: Earnings and Distribution 
     
        DY 0.5602a - -  0.5136b - - 
 
(0.1809)    (0.2313)   
EPS - 0.0261a -  - 0.0303a -0.0012a 
 
 (0.0059)    (0.0079) (0.0004) 
        Panel E: Cash Flow 
      
        LNTAXCF -0.2881 -0.0279c 0.0055a  0.0004 -0.0706a 0.0047a 
 
(0.7040) (0.0152) (0.0015)  (0.5451) (0.0249) (0.0016) 
        Panel F: Corporate Governance 
     
        ACOMP - 0.1086b -  - 0.1553a - 
 
 (0.0484)    (0.0586)  
CEOCHAIR - -0.1359a -  - -0.1082b - 
 
 (0.0424)    (0.0460)  
COMP - 0.1020b -  - 0.1299a - 
 
 (0.0456)    (0.0488)  
DIROWN - -0.4321a -  - -0.4475a -0.0069 
 
 (0.1234)    (0.1323) (0.0052) 
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Table 5.1 cont. 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV   LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        Panel F: Corporate Governance 
     
        FEMALE -18.0225a -0.4956b -0.0271c  -16.6050a -0.6582b - 
 
(6.4760) (0.2478) (0.0152)  (5.8292) (0.2765)  
INDNEDS - - 0.0242c  - - 0.0265b 
 
  (0.0135)    (0.0118) 
MEETING -3.0528b 0.0033 -  -2.7500b -0.0379 - 
 
(1.4866) (0.0465)   (1.2911) (0.0393)  
NONINEDS - - 0.0282a  - - 0.0233c 
 
  (0.0106)    (0.0120) 
SIZE 2.8758b - 0.0082a  2.8226b - 0.0096b 
 
(1.1910)  (0.0024)  (1.1689)  (0.0036) 
        Panel G: Year Effect 
      
        Y2005 5.3935a - 0.0076c  5.0899b - - 
 
(1.9807)  (0.0040)  (2.1151)   
Y2006 4.6939a - -  3.7012c - 0.0077c 
 
(1.5528)    (1.9121)  (0.0039) 
Y2008 -9.1076a - -  -9.6223a - - 
 
(1.3830)    (1.3116)   
Y2009 -5.4268a - -  -6.1400a - - 
 
(1.3426)    (1.7560)   
Y2010 2.9223b - 0.0080a  2.1364c - 0.0071a 
 
(1.3693)  (0.0027)  (1.1534)  (0.0023) 
Y2011 - - 0.0059c  - - 0.0037b 
 
  (0.0032)    (0.0018) 
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Table 5.1 cont. 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV   LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
Diagnostic       
 
      
 
N 
 
80 75 104  81 82 88 
 
0.7989 0.7801 0.6879  0.8033 0.7584 0.7161 
S.E.   3.6404 0.1519 0.0010  3.6197 0.1665 0.0091 
AIC 5.6082 -0.7751 -6.2259  - - - 
Q-Stat 0.0692 1.6643 32.9770a  1.6130 0.1426 1.6654 
Auto LM(2) 0.1395 1.3066 7.6445a  - - - 
Auto LM(4) 1.2471 1.2858 7.5345a  - - - 
F-statistic 0.9473 3.7110a 4.2342a  - - - 
Sargan Test - - -  2.0961 0.0000a 0.2847 
Jarque-Bera 0.9574 31.0254a 71.9015a   1.3578 108.1698a 132.5941a 
Notes: Refer to Appendix A for definition of variables. Figures in round brackets are standard errors. a, b, c denotes 
that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N is number of observations. The S.E. 
stands for standard error. The AIC denotes Akaike Information criterion, measuring the goodness of fit of an 
estimated model. Q-Stat is checking for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Auto LM(2) and Auto LM(4) 
are Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation Lagrange multiplier tests using 2 and 4 lags respectively. F-statistic stands 
for heteroskedasticity which is tested using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics. Sargan test analyses whether 
overidentifying instruments are uncorrelated with the error.  
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Profitability 
Panel A summarises the results between variables which measure profitability and directors’ 
pay. We find that executive directors’ compensation is sensitive to profitability of companies, 
especially accounting ratios, which supports previous findings (see Tosi et al., 2000) as well 
as our estimated results for the UK. This is in line with arguments regarding solutions for the 
agency problem meaning that contracts are designed in way to motivate directors and are 
based on the firm’s performance. Some coefficients, however, have a negative sign, although 
the magnitude is not very large (i.e. we find that if GPM increases by 1%, REMGP will 
decrease by 0.25% and 0.41% for OLS and GMM models respectively).  
Generally, these results are in line with our predicted hypothesis (H1) meaning that owners 
reward directors who provide positive returns on investments. Taking into account principal-
agent considerations, these results imply that the optimally designed contracts for directors 
(usually tied to firm performance) are likely to decrease the agency problem (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). Therefore, any alterations in executive directors’ compensation could 
potentially be explained by changes in shareholders wealth, i.e. positive changes in financial 
variables are likely to cause an increase in directors’ pay.    
 
Firm Value 
Positive and significant relationship is found between DEBTMV and REMMV for both OLS 
and GMM models. Also, LNMV is positively related to REMGP. It is reported that 1% increase 
in LNMV will contribute towards 3.75% and 3.23% in REMGP for OLS and GMM models 
respectively. Gabaix and Landier (2008) state in their research that it could be the case that 
increasing directors’ compensation contracts do not reflect the actual agency problem, but 
are affected by increasing firm value meaning that we would expect to find a positive 
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association between market value and compensation without directors’ extracting money for 
their own interest. It was predicted that market value of a firm is positively related to 
executives’ remuneration (H2) and our results confirm this. 
However, some coefficients have a negative significant value and that could be caused by 
capturing the effect of underinvestment.  
Smith and Watts (1992) emphasise that firms with larger growth opportunities are very likely 
to have higher compensation rates as it becomes more challenging to monitor actions of 
managers; which is also supported by Ozkan (2007) who states that a positive association 
between growth opportunity and directors’ compensation reflect a higher demand for 
managerial skills and higher compensation arrangements indicate a reward for those high 
skills. One of the measures which are used to indicate growth opportunity is Tobin’s Q and 
our reported findings suggest that there is a positive significant relationship at 1% significant 
level between REMMV and Tobin’s Q although the magnitude of these coefficients is very 
small – 0.01% and 0.02% increase in REMMV if Tobin’s Q goes up by 1% for models 3 and 
6. 
 
Leverage 
Panel E summarises the next set of results; coefficients are negative and significant for 
LIBASS and LNSTDEBTLTDEBT. This is in line with findings by Kabir et al. (2013) who 
reports that the higher the debt of a firm causes directors’ compensation to decrease so that 
firms have funds to meet their debt obligations. Positive and significant relationship is found 
between DEBTMV and REMMV for both OLS and GMM models. We also report that 
LNTOTDEBT and LTDEBTTOTASS are positively related to pay. Both of these variables 
include long-term debt and the presence of long-term debt does not lead to the creation of 
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optimal contracts as it is easier for creditors to monitor if there are short-term debt 
arrangements (Brockman et al., 2010).  
Earnings and Distribution 
Coefficients reported in Panel D for DY and EPS are significant and positive (apart from EPS 
model 6). The positive association between DY and remuneration indicates that management 
of firms can be described as “low-quality” as according to Bhattacharyya et al. (2008) high-
quality management will reinvest returns rather than increasing that payment of dividend. 
Therefore, this can be attributed to differences in corporate governance controls, the ability of 
managers to extract money from firms in their own self-interest and investor protection 
between countries which have different law origins. We observed the opposite association 
between these two variables for the UK firms. 
Some academic literature, however, examines this relationship and finds that larger firms 
tend to have higher dividend yield which in turn has a positive effect on compensation packs 
(Smith and Watts, 1992; Murphy, 1985).  
 
Corporate Governance 
Panel F summarises the results for corporate governance variables. It can be observed that 
there are quite a few differences in terms if signs and magnitudes of the coefficients between 
the UK and Spain. That can be attributed to the way corporate governance controls are being 
enforced in these two countries and the development if institutions.  
CEO and Chairman roles in a firm are of great importance for determining firm’s monitoring 
mechanisms. It is stated by Conyon and Murphy (2000) that combined role tends to increase 
directors’ compensation due to influence on the board and remuneration committee. Our 
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findings are consistent with this prediction and we observe negative significant relationship 
between separate role and REMGP for both OLS and GMM models indicating efficient 
monitoring. Coefficients are large and are 13.59% and 10.82% for OLS and GMM models 
respectively.  
An interesting result can be observed for ACOMP coefficient; we would expect to see 
negative association as more complied committees will exert greater monitoring; however, 
this is not the case for our dataset. This can be explained by an argument provided by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) who state that an increased monitoring may cause 
inconvenience for directors as it requires extra work so that they demand higher 
compensation.    
FEMALE is negatively associated with pay and this supports previous research which 
analysed the effect of diversified boards in terms of race, gender etc. (Carter et al., 2003). As 
it is well known in academia, the more diversified board can bring more in terms of adding 
value to a firm it can also be argued that monitoring increases. We find that if proportion of 
female directors goes up, the remuneration levels fall i.e. greater exerted monitoring. In 
contrast to these results, Adams and Ferreira (2009) have not found any significant results.  
Another corporate governance variable, which is significantly and negatively related to the 
level of compensation, is MEETING. A negative sign tends to be consistent with the mixed 
academic evidence regarding monitoring of firms (Core et al. 1999) implying that outside 
directors may monitor firm better than executive directors thus leading to a decrease in total 
pay (as this variable includes both inside and outside directors). The magnitude of the 
coefficient is higher for LNTOTREM indicating that greater monitoring has a direct impact on 
total pay rather than on the ratio.  
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Compliance of board size with recommendations (SIZE) is positively related to directors’ pay. 
Magnitudes of coefficients for LNTOTREM for both OLS and GMM models are quite high, 
suggesting that increase in board compliance still leads to an increase in directors’ 
remuneration.  
We also report positive relationship between remuneration and INDNEDS as well as 
NONINEDS. Our results are only significant for REMMV. These results suggest that the 
higher the number of members on the board, the monitoring process is likely to be less 
efficient. The same association was found by Ozkan (2007b). This finding contradicts the 
hypothesis that larger number of independent directors reduces the agency conflict by 
monitoring firm in an efficient way and improving corporate governance mechanism.  
We observe that increase in directors’ ownership (DIROWN) is associated with a decrease in 
remuneration and these results tend to be significant for OLS and GMM models at 5% and 
10% significance level accordingly where our dependent variable is REMGP. Our findings are 
consistent with results outlined by Core et al. (1999) and Ozkan (2007) which also report a 
decrease in the amount of compensation as ownership rises and explain this by the fact that 
as managerial ownership increases, their interests become aligned with shareholders’ 
objective, providing more monitoring thus partially reducing the agency problem. This finding 
is in line with the estimated results for UK firms and supports H4.  
Most corporate governance variables measuring board control and monitoring in our 
estimated model for Spain are positively associated with executive directors’ remuneration. 
These results are in line with those reported by Tosi et al.(1997) who also report a positive 
relationship. As it was discussed in the literature review, authors explain their result using an 
argument that just monitoring might not be enough to control directors’ remuneration. 
Hypothesis which states that compensation is inversely related to levels of board monitoring 
(H3) is not supported by this particular set of results.  
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This can also be explained by an argument that greater monitoring requires extra effort 
meaning that directors will demand higher wages (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). This is not 
what we predicted as we hypothesised that greater monitoring should lead to a decrease in 
pay. These differences are quite substantial between UK and Spanish firms. Our results imply 
that legal origin of the country is likely to have an effect on the way corporate governance 
mechanisms are structured.  
 
Year Effect 
Panel G displays results for year effects. It demonstrates that after the financial crisis took 
place in 2008, it had a negative effect on remuneration for two consecutive years. 
Coefficients are negative and significant at 1-percent level for models 1 and 4. It clearly 
shows that once corporate scandals have raised issues of directors possibly paying 
themselves large sum of money which are extracted from firm profits, the monitoring has 
increased which had a negative effect on the total level of pay. After the year 2009, year 
effects are positively related to remuneration. That could be explained by the fact that 
directors could receive large bonuses. We can also link it to the argument regarding the extra 
work needed to be done to increase control (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012).  
These results contradict our previous findings for the UK which showed that year effects had 
opposite effects on the level of remuneration.  
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5.3 Dynamic Models 
Now we move on to investigate dynamics in directors’ pay by looking at the association 
between executives’ pay and lagged firm performance. The main reason for capturing time 
effect is a theory suggesting that past performance of the firm has a crucial impact on efficient 
directors’ compensation (Murphy, 1985). Hence in this study we try to predict what effect 
lagged financial variables may have on remuneration for Spanish firms.   
As discussed in methodology we introduce lagged financial (t-1) and dependent variables (t-1 
and t-2) as explanatory in both models. It should also be noted that following general to 
specific methodology we end up with some lagged variables being removed, therefore in our 
simplified version of the models some variables as t-1 and some as t-2.  
 
5.3.1 Diagnostic tests for dynamic models 
Diagnostic tests results are summarised in Table 5.2. The total number of observations in 
estimated models has not improved showing that missing values affect our final estimates. 𝐿2 
values lie in the same range as for static models, the lowest value being 0.7333 (model 1) 
and highest value – 0.8116 (model 5). 
The lowest standard error coefficients are for the same models as for static one; however, 
they are slightly higher – 0.0098 and 0.0097 for models 3 and 6 respectively. The lowest AIC 
is -0.9317 for model 2 (same as static).  
It can be observed that all OLS dynamic models are free from second-order autocorrelation 
as coefficients are insignificant; it is also in line with those of the Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation Lagrange multiplier test using up to 2 and 4 lags. The F-test for the Breusch-
Pagan-Godfrey statistics is insignificant for all OLS estimates meaning that there is no 
heteroskedasticity. Sargan test accepts the null of no correlation for all three GMM models. 
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The Jarque-Bera test, however, fails for all models except model 1 as coefficients are 
significant meaning that we reject the null hypothesis of normality.  
It is, therefore, possible to conclude that dynamic estimate perform better in term of 
diagnostic tests results. We now move on to analyse the estimated coefficients reported in 
Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2: Determinants of executive directors’ compensation, Spanish firms (dynamic), 2005-
2011 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV   LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        LNTOTASSETS 1.4399a - 0.0121a 
 
- 0.1086b 0.0172a 
 
(0.3547) 
 
(0.0028) 
  
(0.0418) (0.0059) 
LNTOTASSETS(-1) - - - 
 
-0.8759a -0.2126a -0.0090b 
     
(0.3056) (0.0544) (0.0036) 
        Panel A: Lagged Dependent Variables 
     
        LNTOTREM(-2) 0.0078 - - 
 
- - - 
 
(0.0731) 
      REMGP(-2) - -0.0203a - 
 
- -0.0223a - 
  
(0.0045) 
   
(0.0022) 
 REMMV(-1) - 
 
- 
 
- - 0.3133a 
       
(0.0622) 
        Panel B: Profitability 
      
        GPM - -0.0029b - 
 
- - - 
  
(0.0012) 
     GPM(-1) -0.1294a -0.0043a -0.0003a 
 
- -0.0030a -0.0003a 
 
(0.0377) (0.0015) (0.0001) 
  
(0.0010) (0.0001) 
LNEBIT - - - 
 
2.9262a - - 
     
(0.6385) 
  LNEBIT(-1) - - 0.0035c 
 
- - 0.0051b 
   
(0.0020) 
   
(0.0020) 
OPM - - 0.0009a 
 
- 0.0035c 0.0007a 
   
(0.0001) 
  
(0.0019) (0.0002) 
OPM(-1) 0.1988a 0.0096a - 
 
- - - 
 
(0.0536) (0.0021) 
     REMUNNETINC 331.8813a 20.6755a 0.4655a 
 
317.8569a 22.6073a 0.4914a 
 
(43.2604) (1.8518) (0.1336) 
 
(42.6787) (2.1441) (0.1454) 
REMUNNETINC(-1) - - 0.2026b 
 
- - 0.2430a 
   
(0.0840) 
   
(0.0828) 
ROA -0.5126a -0.0111c -0.0017a 
 
-0.3454a -0.0223b -0.0025a 
 
(0.0966) (0.0056) (0.0006) 
 
(0.1119) (0.0098) (0.0008) 
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Table 5.2 cont. 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV   LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        Panel B: Profitability 
      
        ROCE(-1) 0.3609a 0.0255a - 
 
- 0.0189b - 
 
(0.0986) (0.0060) 
   
(0.0078) 
 ROE - 0.0073a 0.0003c 
 
- 0.0082a 0.0005b 
  
(0.0019) (0.0002) 
  
(0.0024) (0.0002) 
ROE(-1) - -0.0190a - 
 
- -0.0176a - 
  
(0.0028) 
   
(0.0034) 
 
        Panel C: Firm Value 
      
        LNMV - 0.0286a -0.0061a 
 
- - -0.0057a 
  
(0.0076) (0.0014) 
   
(0.0018) 
NCFMV - - -0.0629a 
 
- - - 
   
(0.0177) 
    NCFMV(-1) - 0.2495a - 
 
-3.8360a - - 
  
(0.0793) 
  
(1.4050) 
  TOBINQ -0.0244b - - 
 
- 0.0012a - 
 
(0.0098) 
    
(0.0004) 
 TOBINQ(-1) 0.0278a - - 
 
0.0168b - 0.0001a 
 
(0.0090) 
   
(0.0077) 
 
(0.0000) 
        Panel D: Leverage 
      
        DEBTMV 0.0356 - 0.1500a 
 
- - 0.1875a 
 
(0.8250) 
 
(0.0425) 
   
(0.0381) 
DEBTMV(-1) - - -0.1407a 
 
- -1.0185a -0.1935a 
   
(0.0388) 
  
(0.2959) (0.0516) 
LIBASS(-1) - - - 
 
- 0.2370b - 
      
(0.0904) 
 LNSTDEBTLTDEBT(-1)          - - 0.0035a 
 
- - 0.0047a 
   
(0.0012) 
   
(0.0016) 
LNTOTDEBT - - -0.0108a 
 
-1.0834a -0.0826b -0.0159a 
   
(0.0025) 
 
(0.3872) (0.0366) (0.0049) 
LNTOTDEBT(-1) -1.4049a - -0.0066a 
 
- 0.1761a - 
 
(0.3644) 
 
(0.0019) 
  
(0.0514) 
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Table 5.2 cont. 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV   LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        Panel D: Leverage 
      
        LTDEBTMV - - -0.1496a 
 
- - -0.2175a 
   
(0.0508) 
   
(0.0419) 
LTDEBTMV(-1) - - 0.1602a 
 
- 1.2787a 0.2187a 
   
(0.0438) 
  
(0.3548) (0.0574) 
LTDEBTTOTASS(-1) - 0.2477c - 
 
- - - 
  
(0.1469) 
     
        Panel E: Earnings and Distribution 
      
        DY - - -0.0014a 
 
- - -0.0013a 
   
(0.0004) 
   
(0.0005) 
EPS(-1) - 0.0518a - 
 
- 0.0538a - 
  
(0.0071) 
   
(0.0050) 
 
        Panel F: Cash Flow 
       
        LNTAXCF - -0.0465a 0.0077a 
 
- 0.0144 0.0065a 
  
(0.0112) (0.0020) 
  
(0.0280) (0.0022) 
        Panel G: Corporate Governance 
     
        ACOMP 3.4456a - - 
 
2.2866b - - 
 
(1.1995) 
   
(0.8846) 
  COMP - - -0.0094a 
 
- 0.1305a - 
   
(0.0030) 
  
(0.0364) 
 DIROWN - - - 
 
- -0.3115a - 
      
(0.0790) 
 FEMALE - - - 
 
-8.2649b - - 
     
(3.4715) 
  MEETING -0.3340 -0.0957c 0.0063c 
 
0.1225 0.0079 0.0071b 
 
(1.2854) (0.0511) (0.0034) 
 
(0.7599) (0.0354) (0.0029) 
RCOMP -2.1163c 0.0734c - 
 
-1.7610c - -0.0051c 
 
(1.1705) (0.0373) 
  
(0.9309) 
 
(0.0027) 
SIZE - 0.0776c - 
 
- - - 
  
(0.0424) 
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Table 5.2 cont. 
 
OLS Estimation 
 
GMM Estimation 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV   LNTOTREM REMGP REMMV 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        Panel H: Year Effect 
      
        Y2005 10.4752a - - 
 
5.1185a - - 
 
(2.1767) 
   
(1.5710) 
  Y2006 10.5526a - - 
 
4.1567a - - 
 
(1.3949) 
   
(1.4179) 
  Y2008 - - - 
 
-8.4242a - 0.0047c 
     
(1.3239) 
 
(0.0027) 
Y2009 - - - 
 
-4.4012b - - 
     
(1.7211) 
  Y2010 9.2161a - 0.0148a 
 
3.6895a - 0.0143a 
 
(1.3658) 
 
(0.0036) 
 
(1.3576) 
 
(0.0041) 
Diagnostic       
 
      
 
N 
 
83 78 81 
 
86 78 80 
 
0.7333 0.7932 0.7825 
 
0.8009 0.8116 0.7953 
S.E.   4.1310 0.1381 0.0098 
 
3.5115 0.1364 0.0097 
AIC 5.8554 -0.9317 -6.1873 
 
- - - 
Q-Stat 2.0508 0.3267 6.3794 
 
3.0685 0.4483 14.3900a 
Auto LM(2) 1.7659 0.9434 1.1315 
 
- - - 
Auto LM(4) 1.1635 0.6238 1.0037 
 
- - - 
F-statistic 1.3588 1.0089 1.4931 
 
- - - 
Sargan Test - - - 
 
1.0887 0.0455 0.0402 
Jarque-Bera 1.6022 13.0260a 37.7818a   14.9776a 16.6694a 49.7844a 
 
Notes: Refer to Appendix A for definition of variables. Figures in round brackets are standard errors. a, b, c denotes 
that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. N is number of observations. The S.E. 
stands for standard error. The AIC denotes Akaike Information Criterion, measuring the goodness of fit of an 
estimated model. Q-Stat is checking for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Auto LM(2) and Auto LM(4) 
are Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation Lagrange multiplier tests using 2 and 4 lags respectively.  F-statistic stands 
for heteroskedasticity which is tested using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics. Sargan test analyses whether 
overidentifying instruments are uncorrelated with the error.  
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5.3.2 Empirical results for dynamic models 
This section will concentrate on highlighting main differences and similarities between static 
and dynamic models.  
Firstly, we will draw our attention to lagged dependent variables. We predicted (H5) that 
lagged executive directors’ pay will have a positive relationship with remuneration. It is 
reported that this relationship holds for LNTOTREM(-2) and REMMV(-1) supporting the 
hypothesis and being consistent with previous empirical results reported by Doucouliagos et 
al. (2012a).  
Size of the firm expressed an LNTOTASSETS is only significantly and positively related in 
current period. Variables measuring profitability of the firm are on average positively related 
to remuneration. We also observe that lagged variables (LNEBIT(-1), OPM(-1), ROCE(-1) 
and REMUNNETINC(-1)) are positively related to remuneration. The largest coefficient is for 
ROCE(-1) (model 1) which shows that 1% increase in ROCE in previous period will contribute 
towards 36.09% increase in LNTOTREM. This suggests that the same conclusion can be 
drawn regarding lagged financial performance as in previous chapter. In other words, 
directors are remunerated for good firm performance in the past as it takes time to make 
adjustments for their effort. Our reported results support H6 and confirm that lagged financial 
performance is positively related to current executive directors’ compensation.   
LNMV is found to be positively related to REMGP for OLS model. We report that 1% increase 
in LNMV will lead to 2.86% increase in REMGP which also supports our hypothesis (H2) as 
previous static results and the UK firms. It is, however, negatively related to REMMV but 
magnitude of these coefficients is very small (-0.61% for OLS and -0.57% for GMM 
estimation method). DEBTMV(-1) has a negative sign implying that increase in debt in 
previous period will decrease remuneration in current period. This finding can be supported 
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by Brockman et al. (2010) who reports negative association and relating it to the fact that debt 
increases monitoring. 
One of the main differences is that DY is now negatively related to pay confirming previous 
findings reported by Bhattacharyya et al. (2008). Our results report that 1% increase in DY 
will reduce REMMV by -0.14% and -0.13% for OLS and GMM regressions respectively. Of 
course, the magnitude is very small, but this still implies that increase in payouts to 
shareholders will decrease directors’ pay. That could be due to the fact that new projects 
require more investment and in order to avoid expensive finance from outside, firms opt for 
decreasing directors’ pay. EPS(-1) is positively related to REMGP for both estimation 
methods.  
Another corporate governance variable which is present in dynamic setting which was not 
included in static models is RCOMP. We report that 1% increase in remuneration committee 
compliance will cause LNTOTREM to decrease by 211.63% and 176.10% for OLS and GMM 
models respectively. The magnitude of these coefficients is extremely very large; however, it 
provides us with evidence to conclude that greater monitoring of remuneration committee will 
cause remuneration to decrease. We observed the same relationship for static models for UK 
firms. Other corporate governance variables have the same association with remuneration as 
reported findings for static models, which also contradict our third hypothesis.  
Year effects hold the same relationship as reported results for static models. It can be seen 
(Panel H), before the financial crisis took place in 2008, remuneration was increasing; 
however, in years 2008 and 2009 the relationship is reported to be significant (for GMM 
model 4). This implies that it might be the case that straight after financial crisis, firms were 
very cautious regarding directors’ compensation packs in order to avoid criticism. However, in 
year 2010 the relationship is positive again and that could be explained by the fact that 
remuneration is tied to good financial performance.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
Substantial interest in continuously increasing executives’ compensation packages placed 
greater attention on factors which could potentially solve the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders thus emphasising incentive plans and analysing pay 
performance relationship.  
We can generally conclude that most corporate governance variables measuring monitoring 
and board control do not contribute significantly to decrease in executives’ pay as it was 
predicted, in some cases we even observe positive relationship. This suggests that 
increasing board control in Spanish firms does not have the same effect as we reported for 
UK firms.  
Overall, having tested these models we observe that dynamic models can be considered 
more robust (based on diagnostic tests results) for this dataset as they capture time effect.  
The significance of these results indicates that the level of control in firms is important. This 
leads to one of the main implications for policy-makers and that is to increase monitoring on 
the board level which can be achieved by referring recommendations provided in the Code of 
Best Practice. This can also serve as a recommendation for board size.  
Apart from increasing the level of monitoring within companies, it is also extremely important 
for regulators to manage the stability of financial institutions which will safeguard the interests 
of other stakeholders. Bearing in mind that shareholders’ wealth is at stake, it might be of 
their interest to increase shareholders’ activism. After financial crisis, all corporations are 
under pressure from society to use available resources to maximise the value of firms. If 
shareholders are more engaged and are active to express their views, it would be easier to 
achieve well-being in the company and work towards firms’ objectives. 
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Our results are also significant for academics. As it was highlighted in the literature review, 
there are not that many studies providing detailed analysis for Spain and our results (both 
static and dynamic) should provide interesting results which can be used in future research.  
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Chapter 6 Remuneration and Long-Term Performance 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the long-run relation between executives’ total remuneration and 
the financial and governance performance of the UK and Spain. Our analysis employs the 
same panel data for the 238 UK and 31 Spanish firms as in previous empirical chapters.  
The analysis consists of three important econometric tests: i)tests for panel unit root in the 
variables; ii) tests for panel cointegration; and, iii) tests for error-correction mechanism based 
on the results of i) and ii). These three steps will follow methodology described in Chapter 3 
for both countries. This is an entirely new but unexplored area for remuneration and firm 
performance studies. Our evidence suggests that there is a long-run relation between 
remuneration and several of the financial variables as determined by our cointegration tests. 
However, the results differ slightly across the two countries possibly due to differences in their 
legal arrangements. These findings add new unique insights to dynamic effects of long-term 
co-movement between observed variables.  
Long-run remuneration is an extremely important area to study. Some previous empirical 
findings reported that pay is positively related to lagged firm performance (Doucouliagos et 
al., 2012a) suggesting that it takes time for remuneration packages to adjust to changes 
happening in the firm.  It is essential to analyse dynamics in this area. Boschen et al. (2003) 
also highlight in their research the importance of studying long-term effects on remuneration 
as previous empirical pay-performance models are restricted. Having tested our dynamic 
models in previous two chapters, it is interesting to take this research question further and 
investigate what happens to relationship between remuneration and firm performance in the 
long-run in terms of cointegration between variables. Applying panel cointegration and error 
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correction models technique which was not used in this area before will provide some unique 
results.  
The chapter comprises two main large sections and a conclusion. The first one covers the 
long-term performance analysis for the UK followed by the discussion of the same analysis 
for Spain. Last section will conclude this chapter.  
A list of variables and their abbreviations which are used in this analysis can be found in 
Appendix A to which we will be referring during the discussion.  
 
6.2 Remuneration and Long-Term Performance in the UK 
This section concentrates on the analysis of co-movement and cointegration between 
variables for the UK firms and long-term equilibrium. We will follow methodology which was 
described in Chapter 3. Firstly, panel unit root tests will be analysed. 
 
6.2.1 Panel unit root results 
All three panel unit root tests were performed (see equations 3.7 and 3.8) and results for the 
level, first difference and second difference can be found in Appendix D. Table 6.1 below 
shows summarised results for the LLC unit root test. Our results show at what level of 
integration the variables become stationary. As it can be observed for the following variables 
in level form DY, GPM, INDNEDS, LIBASS, LNEBIT, NONINENDS, REMUNNETINC and 
ROCE we accept the null hypothesis meaning that there is non-stationarity in these variables. 
Whereas for other variables we reject the null at 1% significance level (at 5% significance 
level for FEMALE). 
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Table 6.1: Panel unit root results (UK) 
 
    
Variables Level 1st Difference 2nd Difference 
 
DEBTMV - 0.5735 -10.7666 a 
 
DIROWN - 1.0707 -5.3873 a 
 
DY 0.1553 -10.1451 a - 
 
EPS - 1.4551 -7.3270a 
 
FEES - 1.2221 -14.7600 a 
 
FEMALE - -0.2274 -5.8685 a 
 
GPM -1.1836 -8.8598 a - 
 
INDNEDS -1.2317 -7.8918 a - 
 
LIBASS -1.1128 -3.9182 a - 
 
LNEBIT -0.2377 -2.2405b - 
 
LNMV - 0.5689 -10.4070 a 
 
LNTOTASSETS - 1.3375 -12.2937 a 
 
LNTOTREM - -0.2855 -18.3948 a 
 
LTDEBTMV - 0.1359 -10.9697 a 
 
LTDEBTTOTASS - 1.3597 -13.7575 a 
 
NCFMV - -1.0438 -8.6515 a 
 
NONINEDS -1.2341 -2.8512 a - 
 
OPM - 2.6930 -12.7205 a 
 
REMUNNETINC -0.8693 -3.3009 a - 
 
ROA - 0.9840 -1.4603b 
 
ROCE -0.3200 -3.5698 a - 
  TOBINQ  - 1.1761 -8.9603 a 
Notes: a denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
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The table shows that some of the variables need to be second differenced to achieve 
stationarity where the first differences are non-stationary. This has an important econometric 
implication for our results in Chapter 5 meaning that those results may be based on non-
stationary variables unless there is some rebalancing in the variables. 
 
6.2.2 Panel Cointegration 
Since we find that variables contain a unit root at various levels of integration, we can now 
perform the panel cointegration tests (see equations 3.9 and 3.10). Panel cointegration 
results (i.e. unit root tests on residuals from individual regressions) are shown in Table 6.2. 
That means names of variables in this table represent pair-wise residuals calculated by 
running OLS regression with LNTOTREM being dependent variable (please refer to 
Methodology section 3.4.5). For example, the following equation was used to calculate our 
residual for the first variable in the table: ΔDEBTMV: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀 =  𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑉 + 𝜀𝑡 
The same principle was applied to calculate other residuals in this table. 
All three tests indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at 1% 
significance level. That means there is a clear indication of long-run relationship between our 
dependent variable – LNTOTREM and financial and corporate governance variables.  
As it was proposed by Granger (1981), if we find cointegration between pairs of variables that 
means these two variables move together in the same direction in the long-run ignoring lags 
even if it might not the case in the short-run. Various market and economic conditions are 
having an effect on achieving this equilibrium. This can also be interpreted further by stating 
that if there is any shock affecting any of the variables; it would have a long-term effect on it. 
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This implies that ECMs can be modeled in order to determine the dynamic relationship and 
whether equilibrium will be restored in the next time period.  
As our main objective is to check whether remuneration is cointegrated with firm 
performance, these coefficients provide interesting results. Cointegration in other words 
means that two variables move in the same direction, i.e. they are in line and one variable will 
adjust of other changes. This implies that if for example directors get overpaid in one year in 
relation to firm performance; their level of remuneration is likely to be adjusted in the next few 
periods to match financial variables. In other words, directors do not necessarily 
misappropriate firm’s funds as the long-run relationship between pay and firm performance is 
cointegrated. Similar conclusion may be drawn for corporate governance variables. Increase 
in board control will also move in the same trajectory as directors’ remuneration.   
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Table 6.2: Cointegration test of LNTOTREM for UK firms 
 
 
Methods 
    
ADF-Fisher  
Corresponding Variable LLC IPS Chi-square 
Level ΔDEBTMV -3.4365a -17.9948 a 177.0940 a 
 
ΔDIROWN -3.4624 a -18.1190 a 178.4050 a 
 
DY -3.9521 a -18.0373 a 177.7130 a 
 
ΔEPS -3.6151 a -17.9049 a 176.6970 a 
 
ΔFEES -3.2355 a -18.2317 a 179.4070 a 
 
ΔFEMALE -3.0643 a -18.1693 a 178.9240 a 
 
GPM -2.0372b -17.7017 a 170.3850 a 
 
INDNEDS -3.3012a -17.4692 a 173.1100 a 
 
LIBASS -3.7864 a -18.1632 a 178.7490 a 
 
LNEBIT -2.4140 a -20.3747 a 184.8950 a 
 
ΔLNMV -2.7574 a -16.9514 a 168.4830 a 
 
ΔLNTOTASSETS -12.5170 a -21.1684 a 196.2100 a 
 
ΔLTDEBTMV -3.5391 a -17.9254 a 176.4000 a 
 
ΔLTDEBTTOTASS -3.8053 a -18.1223 a 178.4180 a 
 
ΔNCFMV -3.4384 a -17.9943 a 177.0900 a 
 
NONINEDS -3.4032 a -17.9549 a 177.1100 a 
 
ΔOPM -3.6140 a -17.8490 a 175.9830 a 
 
REMUNNETINC -3.3623 a -18.1606 a 178.6250 a 
 
ΔROA -3.7364 a -18.1587 a 178.7010 a 
 
ROCE -3.0548 a -17.2705 a 169.2360 a 
 
ΔTOBINQ -4.1340 a -18.1351 a 178.5180 a 
  RESID -5.6242 a -26.3148 a 190.0490 a 
Notes:a denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. Δ represents the first difference operator. RESID 
denotes a captured residual determined by running an OLS regression with all independent variables. Variables 
represent residuals of individual pair-wise regressions on LNTOTREM with corresponding variables.  
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6.2.3 Error-correction Models 
Given that our variables are cointegrated, we now follow the next step by analysing ECMs 
results. Final estimated error correction models (see equations 3.13-3.15) are summarised in 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4.  
Table 6.3 below reports the results of the ECM with lagged error correction term for all 
variables as well as diagnostic tests results. As LNTOTREM for the UK firms is stationary at 
1st difference, for the ECMs we will use second difference of this variable, therefore it 
becomes ΔΔLNTOTREM. 
Table 6.3: The error-correction model for the UK firms (ECTTOTAL), 2005-2011 
 
 
  OLS Estimation GMM Estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: LNTOTREM 
 
Model (1) (2) 
    
 
C -0.0915a -0.0910a 
  
(0.0196) (0.0143) 
 
ΔΔDIROWN(-1) -0.0026c -0.0028c 
  
(0.0014) (0.0015) 
 
ΔΔFEMALE(-1) -0.4559a -0.4438a 
  
(0.1578) (0.1336) 
 
ΔGPM(-1) 0.0020 0.0021 
  
(0.0014) (0.0013) 
 
ΔLNEBIT(-1) -0.1674a -0.1676a 
  
(0.0177) (0.0194) 
 
ΔΔLNTOTASSETS(-1) -0.1329a -0.1338a 
  
(0.0180) (0.0173) 
 
ΔΔLNTOTREM(-1) 0.1857a 0.1825a 
  
(0.0358) (0.0303) 
 
ΔΔLTDEBTMV(-1) 0.0111c 0.0104c 
  
(0.0066) (0.0062) 
 
ΔΔLTDEBTTOTASS(-1) 0.1596c 0.1540c 
  
(0.0909) (0.0790) 
 
ΔΔNCFMV(-1) -0.0903 - 
  
(0.0567) 
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Table 6.3 cont. 
 
 
  OLS Estimation GMM Estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: LNTOTREM 
 
Model (1) (2) 
 
ΔΔOPM(-1) -0.0024c -0.0025b 
  
(0.0014) (0.0012) 
 
ΔΔROA(-1) 0.0061a 0.0060a 
  
(0.0013) (0.0012) 
 
ΔΔTOBINQ(-1) -0.0242a -0.0232a 
  
(0.0049) (0.0034) 
 
ECTTOTAL(-1) -1.5150a -1.5132a 
  
(0.0595) (0.0668) 
 
Y2008 0.1271a 0.1220a 
  
(0.0483) (0.0343) 
 
Y2011 0.4361a 0.4350a 
    (0.0466) (0.0810) 
Diagnostic Tests     
 
N 1044 1044 
 𝐿
2 0.6284 0.6275 
 
S.E. 0.5239 0.5243 
 
AIC 1.5604 - 
 
Q-Stat 2.0607 2.4158 
 
Auto LM(2) 23.4704 - 
 
Auto LM(4) 11.9634 - 
 
F-statistic 9.9885 - 
  Jarque-Bera 1376.2530 1444.4160 
Notes: a, b, c denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Figures in round 
brackets are standard errors. The lag length is one. ECT represents the error correction term of the variable. Δ is 
the first difference operator of the variable and ΔΔ is the second difference operator. N indicates the total number 
of observations. S.E. stands for standard error and AIC denotes Akaike Information Criterion. Q-Stat is checking 
for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Auto LM(2) and Auto LM(4) are Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation Lagrange multiplier tests using 2 and 4 lags respectively. F-statistic stands for heteroskedasticity which 
is tested using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics.   
 
Firstly, we concentrate on diagnostics which are used to test the adequacy of the estimated 
coefficients. 𝐿2and standard error values are similar for OLS and GMM models. Q-statistics is 
insignificant for both estimation methods meaning that the null of no autocorrelation in the 
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residuals cannot be rejected. Other diagnostic tests are significant indicating that there is a 
presence of heteroskedasticity and non-normal distribution (the Jarque-Bera test).  
Table 6.3 shows that the ECTTOTAL(-1) coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level. 
This implies that there is a long-term relationship between LNTOTREM and the financial 
variable and corporate governance variables. This can be explained by previous research 
findings which report that directors with different talents and skills are competitively matched 
to firms with certain characteristics (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Hubbard, 2005).  Therefore 
competitive firms with high market value for example will employ managers with scarce skills 
and experience meaning that firms with similar financial and corporate governance 
characteristics will employ directors paying them similar wages so that in the long-run this pay 
is likely to converge. The same explanation can be applied using our estimated results. If all 
attributes of the firm are in line, then if there is any deviation from the equilibrium, this will be 
corrected in the next time period due to competitive market forces. 
It was also reported by Faulkender and Yang (2013) in their dynamic model that after 
introduced regulation in 2006 which required all firms disclosing their remuneration peer 
group members, those with low inside ownership have selected firms with higher pay in order 
to justify their increased compensation packages. This implies that firms with similar financial 
performance will set directors’ remuneration in line with peer group members. It means that in 
the long-run there is likely to be convergence in levels of remuneration amongst similar firms, 
meaning that remuneration will move in line with firm performance.  
Table 6.4 below contains estimated results for ECM with individual error correction terms 
(based on equation 3.15) and now we will shift our attention to the analysis of this model, 
starting with discussion of diagnostic tests which are not different from the ones performed 
when we used the error ECTTOTAL. Even though that Q-statistics is significant, other 
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coefficients are significant implying that we exert some caution when interpreting the 
estimated coefficients.  
Table 6.4: The error-correction model for the UK firms, 2005-2011 
 
 
  OLS Estimation GMM Estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: ΔΔLNTOTREM 
 
Model (1) (2) 
    
 
C -0.0789a -0.1100a 
  
(0.0181) (0.0180) 
 
ΔΔDIROWN(-1) -0.0042a -0.0043a 
  
(0.0013) (0.0015) 
 
ΔDY(-1) 0.0127b 0.0127b 
  
(0.0058) (0.0049) 
 
ΔΔFEES(-1) 0.0082 0.0087 
  
(0.0059) (0.0058) 
 
ΔGPM(-1) 0.0016 0.0015 
  
(0.0012) (0.0011) 
 
ΔLIBASS(-1) 0.2209c 0.2136b 
  
(0.1161) (0.1006) 
 
ΔΔLNTOTASSETS(-1) -0.0571a -0.0549a 
  
(0.0177) (0.0156) 
 
ΔΔLNTOTREM(-1) 0.1809a 0.1873a 
  
(0.0324) (0.0296) 
 
ΔΔLTDEBTMV(-1) 0.0101c 0.0106a 
  
(0.0061) (0.0036) 
 
ECTΔDEBTMV(-1) 12.2842a 12.2650a 
  
(4.4860) (3.6795) 
 
ECTΔLNMV(-1) -0.4343a -0.4566a 
  
(0.1261) (0.1181) 
 
ECTΔLNTOTASSETS(-1) -0.2660b -0.2380b 
  
(0.1199) (0.0967) 
 
ECTROCE(-1) -10.5119b -10.4708a 
  
(4.4147) (3.6889) 
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Table 6.4 cont. 
 
  OLS Estimation GMM Estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: ΔΔLNTOTREM 
 
Model (1) (2) 
 
ECTΔTOBINQ(-1) -2.5816a -2.6245a 
  
(0.6809) (0.4600) 
 
Y2008 0.1402a 0.1710a 
  
(0.0421) (0.0326) 
 
Y2009 - 0.0694c 
   
(0.0369) 
 
Y2010 - 0.0774c 
   
(0.0417) 
 
Y2011 0.4491a 0.4780a 
    (0.0427) (0.0797) 
Diagnostic Tests     
 
N 1199 1199 
 
𝐿2 0.6615 0.6626 
 
S.E. 0.5035 0.5030 
 
AIC 1.4786 - 
 
Q-Stat 0.6319 0.5598 
 
Auto LM(2) 9.7878a - 
 
Auto LM(4) 7.8808a - 
 
F-statistic 12.7572a - 
  Jarque-Bera 3356.4350a 3410.4690a 
Notes: a, b, c denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Figures in round 
brackets are standard errors. The lag length is one. ECT represents the error correction term of the variable. Δ is 
the first difference operator of the variable and ΔΔ is the second difference operator. N indicates the total number 
of observations. S.E. stands for standard error and AIC denotes Akaike Information Criterion. Q-Stat is checking 
for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Auto LM(2) and Auto LM(4) are Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation Lagrange multiplier tests using 2 and 4 lags respectively. F-statistics stands for heteroskedasticity 
which is tested using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics.   
 
As it can be seen from Table 6.4 there are five individual error correction terms and 
coefficients of all these variables are significant. Reported coefficients are negative for four of 
these variables as expected. Magnitudes and sign of coefficients for error terms in ECMs are 
similar for both OLS and GMM estimation methods. We also observe that standard error and  
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𝐿2are better by a small margin for GMM model meaning that Model 2 provides slightly better 
results than OLS method of estimation.  
The relationship between pair-wise error correction terms and LNTOTREM can provide 
interesting results as the relationship between dependent variables and these variables 
(which were used to calculate error correction terms) were significant in previous empirical 
chapters too and the importance of these variables on total remuneration was discussed.  
These significant results reported in Table 6.4 imply that if there is a shock affecting 
DEBTMV, LNMV, LNTOTASSETS, ROCE and TOBINQ which has an effect on LNTOTREM, 
this disequilibrium will be adjusted in the long run. In other words, an “error” by which a 
variable will differ from the equilibrium will be corrected for in the next period. The speed of 
adjustment, however, differs and we use the size of the coefficients to predict that – the larger 
the coefficient, the faster is the adjustment. Thus DEBTMV will be adjusted quicker in the 
long-run than other variables – 12.28 and 12.27 for OLS and GMM models respectively. 
These results imply that the level of remuneration will be quicker adjusted to changes in firm’s 
debt. Previously discussed the relationship between DEBTMV and LNTOTREM in previous 
chapters, the rapid convergence between variables can be explained by the fact that short-
term debt usually implies greater monitoring, meaning that if the amount of debt increases, 
directors are likely to decrease their wages in order to be able to finance investments of their 
companies.  
As it was discussed there are not that many previous studies concentrating on the dynamic 
effects between pay and performance and especially testing for long-run relationship between 
variables; however, Boschen et al. (2003) have tested a model by including three lags of their 
firm performance variables and found that if there is “unexpected” good accounting 
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performance in a firm, CEO’s compensation tends to increase a lot in short period of time as 
a response to good performance. This finding supports our predictions.  
Another interesting relationship can be observed between ECTΔLNMV(-1) and LNTOTREM. 
We would expect these two variables to converge in the long-run and the main theoretical 
explanation for this could be as discussed in literature review that a rise in executive 
directors’ compensation packs could be a result of increase in market value of the firm rather 
than managers expropriating from firms which is linked to agency issues (Gabaix and 
Landier, 2008). Therefore, if we use this explanation, we would expect remuneration and 
market value to move in the same direction in the long-run.  
To summarise, given the estimated results it is clear that there is a long-run cointegration 
relationship between selected variables; we also conclude that if there is a shock taking place 
affecting any of the variables, equilibrium will be restored in the next period and this “error” 
will be corrected. 
 
6.3 Remuneration and Long-Term Performance in Spain 
In this section, we will present and analyse the long-term relationship for Spanish firms using 
methodology describe in section 6.2. Please refer to Appendix A for the explanation of 
variables which are used in this analysis. 
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6.3.1 Panel unit root results 
We start by looking at panel unit root tests (equations 3.7 and 3.8). Table 6.5 contains 
summary of the LLC panel unit root test results for Spanish companies. Appendix E contains 
detailed results for all three panel unit root tests which were conducted. All variables contain 
unit root at the level form (i.e. probabilities are significant), therefore we only check for 
stationarity at the 1st difference to prove that. There is no need to carry out 2nd difference 
checks. 
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Table 6.5: Panel unit root results (Spain) 
 
  
 
Variables Level 1st Difference 2nd Difference 
 
DEBTMV -1.1047 -9.9209a - 
 
DIROWN -1.0332 -24.8326 a - 
 
DY -1.2197 -1.7905b - 
 
EPS -1.1979 -8.4405 a - 
 
FEES -1.2067 -5.5652 a - 
 
FEMALE -0.5545 -6.9311 a - 
 
GPM -1.1801 -11.7182 a - 
 
INDNEDS -0.6293 -13.2049 a - 
 
LIBASS -1.1591 -15.9581 a - 
 
LNEBIT -0.8184 -13.4773 a - 
 
LNMV -0.9962 -12.5573 a - 
 
LNSTDEBTLTDEBT -0.3956 -6.9263 a - 
 
LNTAXCF -0.0861 -12.8409 a - 
 
LNTOTASSETS -1.1261 -9.2809 a - 
 
LNTOTDEBT -1.1169 -15.2933 a - 
 
LNTOTREM -0.9594 -7.5926 a - 
 
LTDEBTMV -1.1374 -9.9197 a - 
 
LTDEBTTOTASS -0.7153 -16.0733 a - 
 
MEETING -0.7062 -4.8010 a - 
 
NCFMV -1.0613 -13.4662 a - 
 
NONINEDS -1.1038 -15.8042 a - 
 
OPM -1.0881 -8.5261 a - 
 
REMUNNETINC -1.1963 -4.1664 a - 
 
ROA -0.1991 -4.8773 a - 
 
ROCE -0.5046 -2.7443 a - 
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Table 6.5 cont. 
 
  
 
Variables Level 1st Difference 2nd Difference 
 
ROE -1.1436 -6.2134 a - 
  TOBINQ -1.0914 -10.6841 a - 
Notes: a denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
 
6.3.2 Panel Cointegration 
Table 6.6 below provides results for cointegration for Spain, i.e. panel unit root tests 
performed on pair-wise residuals. All variables were used at the level form.  
Statistical significance of the coefficients allows us to draw the same conclusion as we did in 
section 6.3 for UK firms and conclude that there is a long-term relationship between 
LNTOTREM and corresponding variables; therefore, we can model ECMs using the same 
method as for the UK companies.  
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Table 6.6: Cointegration test of LNTOTREM for Spanish firms 
 
 
Methods 
    
ADF-Fisher  
Corresponding Variable LLC IPS Chi-square 
Level  DEBTMV -8.5939a -7.1220 a 41.8535 a 
 
DIROWN -7.8873 a -6.8744 a 35.8848 a 
 
DY -8.0711 a -6.7391 a 39.0144 a 
 
EPS -8.1213 a -6.7963 a 39.4397 a 
 
FEES -6.3338 a -6.0465 a 30.5335 a 
 
FEMALE -6.5483 a -5.9976 a 31.6335 a 
 
GPM -7.0191 a -6.3755 a 33.3747 a 
 
INDNEDS -5.4908 a -6.0440 a 31.8738 a 
 
LIBASS -8.1625 a -6.8733 a 40.0111 a 
 
LNEBIT -7.2617 a -6.5341 a 34.2093 a 
 
LNMV -8.2245 a -6.8957 a 40.1779 a 
 
LNSTDEBTLTDEBT -8.0457 a -6.7128 a 38.8187 a 
 
LNTAXCF -6.8367 a -6.1545 a 32.2071 a 
 
LNTOTASSETS -7.8700 a -6.6750 a 38.5379 a 
 
LNTOTDEBT -7.9667 a -6.7331 a 38.9698 a 
 
LTDEBTMV -8.7468 a -7.1564 a 42.1072 a 
 
LTDEBTTOTASS -8.1198 a -6.7728 a 39.2648 a 
 
MEETING -5.0550 a -5.6119 a 28.1999 a 
 
NCFMV -8.9277 a -7.2441 a 42.7533 a 
 
NONINEDS -5.1467 a -6.0332 a 31.8180 a 
 
OPM -7.9929 a -6.7447 a 39.0564 a 
 
REMUNNETINC -8.4105 a -7.0929 a 41.6381 a 
 
ROA -8.1848 a -6.8623 a 39.9300 a 
 
ROCE -8.2066 a -6.8692 a 39.9810 a 
 
ROE -8.4457 a -6.9885 a 40.8658 a 
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Table 6.6 cont. 
 
 
Methods 
    
ADF-Fisher  
Corresponding Variable LLC IPS Chi-square 
 
TOBINQ -8.4100 a -6.8251 a 39.6537 a 
  RESID -2.0825 a -4.8374 a 22.6999 a 
Notes: a denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. RESID denotes a captured residual determined 
by running an OLS regression with all independent variables. Variables represent residuals of individual pair-wise 
regressions on LNTOTREM with corresponding variables.  
 
6.3.3 Error-correction Models 
Given the existence of cointegration between variables, this brings us to the next and final 
step of the analysis for Spanish firms – the estimation of ECMs. Table 6.7 and 6.8 report 
estimated findings.  
Firstly, we will look at diagnostic tests for these models. 𝐿2is slightly higher for GMM 
estimation method (74.99%) and it also has lower standard error. The Q-Statistic coefficient is 
insignificant indicating that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals. Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation test also confirms that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
F-statistics shows that there no heteroskedasticity. The Jarque-Bera test is also insignificant 
for both models. These diagnostic tests results imply that these estimation methods are 
reliable.  
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Table 6.7: The error-correction model for Spanish firms (ECTTOTAL) 
 
 
  OLS Estimation GMM Estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: ΔLNTOTREM 
 
Model (1) (2) 
    
 
ΔDIROWN(-1) - -7.2790b 
   
(2.9742) 
 
ΔDY(-1) -0.3876c -0.5080a 
  
(0.2157) (0.1383) 
 
ΔFEES(-1) -0.4893 -0.7856a 
  
(0.6714) (0.2116) 
 
ΔGPM(-1) 0.2765b 0.4542a 
  
(0.1050) (0.1603) 
 
ΔINDNEDS(-1) -34.3076b -58.9337a 
  
(12.9820) (15.4940) 
 
ΔLIBASS(-1) 53.7837a 73.9972a 
  
(10.1156) (13.8860) 
 
ΔLNEBIT(-1) - -3.8699b 
   
(1.6822) 
 
ΔLNMV(-1) 1.8388a 3.7131a 
  
(0.6047) (0.9417) 
 
ΔLNTOTASSETS(-1) 4.0144a 8.7205a 
  
(1.4254) (2.8141) 
 
ΔLNTOTREM(-1) -0.3370b -0.3824b 
  
(0.1367) (0.1409) 
 
ΔLTDEBTMV(-1) - -16.4752b 
   
(6.8782) 
 
ΔLTDEBTTOTASS(-1) 20.9230c 39.0915a 
  
(11.0434) (10.2732) 
 
ΔNCMFMV(-1) - -44.5262a 
   
(15.9935) 
 
ΔNONINEDS(-1) -36.3567a -60.1894a 
  
(12.8477) (17.2411) 
 
ΔREMUNNETINC(-1) -119.8213a -98.8708a 
  
(40.9083) (26.1546) 
 
ΔROA(-1) - 0.3360b 
   
(0.1355) 
 
ECTTOTAL(-1) -0.7555a -0.5454b 
  
(0.1738) (0.2105) 
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Table 6.7 cont. 
 
 
  OLS Estimation GMM Estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: ΔLNTOTREM 
 
Model (1) (2) 
 
Y2006 5.7460a 6.4417a 
  
(1.7590) (1.0331) 
 
Y2008 -9.8089a -9.2649a 
  
(2.0636) (2.2196) 
 
Y2011 6.0655a 6.2315a 
    (2.1167) (2.2535) 
Diagnostic Tests     
 
N 58 55 
 
𝐿2 0.7063 0.7499 
 
S.E. 5.1500 5.0034 
 
AIC 6.3339 - 
 
Q-Stat 0.5232 0.7749 
 
Auto LM(2) 0.3408 - 
 
Auto LM(4) 0.6347 - 
 
F-statistic 1.0374 - 
  Jarque-Bera 0.4411 1.5531 
Notes: a, b, c denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Figures in round 
brackets are standard errors. The lag length is one. ECT represents the error correction term of the variable. Δ is 
the first difference operator of the variable and ΔΔ is the second difference operator. N indicates the total number 
of observations. S.E. stands for standard error and AIC denotes Akaike Information Criterion. Q-Stat is checking 
for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Auto LM(2) and Auto LM(4) are Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation Lagrange multiplier tests using 2 and 4 lags respectively. F-statistic stands for heteroskedasticity which 
is tested using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics.   
 
As Table 6.7 demonstrates, ECTTOTAL(-1) has a negative and significant coefficient as 
expected. It is much lower for Spanish firms for OLS and GMM models than for the UK 
indicating a slower rate of adjustment. As it was discussed in previous chapters, due to 
differences in legal systems, such as the ability to participate in corporate voting, quality of 
accounting systems and protection of investors which affect the way firms are structured (La 
Porta et al., 1998). It is in particular important how the law is enforced in these two countries 
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and UK firms having greater monitoring of their directors, it can be argued that it will take 
quicker for financial and corporate governance variables to achieve long-term equilibrium. 
Therefore the rate of adjustment in the long-run for Spanish firms is expected to be lower.  
Final ECM model results are summarised in Table 6.8 on the next page. Firstly, we will draw 
our attention to diagnostic tests which show reliability of this estimation method. 𝐿2is quite 
high for both models – 88.84% for OLS and 89.89% for GMM. Q-Statistic and F-statistic also 
confirm no autocorrelation in the residuals and no heteroskedasticity as it was for previous 
model (Table 6.6). These results indicate that both ECMs for Spanish firms are reliable 
estimation methods.   
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Table6.8: The error-correction model for Spanish firms, 2005-2011 
 
 
  OLS Estimation GMM Estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: ∆LNTOTREM 
 
Model (1) (2) 
    
 
C -12.5505a -10.5902a 
  
(2.3836) (1.5559) 
 
ΔDEBTMV(-1) -147.6538b - 
  
(66.3266)  
 
ΔDIROWN(-1) -21.9424a -42.8310a 
  
(6.4349) (8.2246) 
 
ΔDY(-1) -0.6591a -0.5174a 
  
(0.1977) (0.1380) 
 
ΔFEMALE(-1) - -32.2281b 
  
 (12.5536) 
 
ΔGPM(-1) - 0.2769a 
  
 (0.0563) 
 
ΔLNEBIT(-1) - -4.9696b 
  
 (2.1297) 
 
ΔLNMV(-1) 6.6653a 6.9730a 
  
(1.1296) 90.9419) 
 
ΔLNSTDEBTLTDEBT(-1) 12.0799a 13.0272a 
  
(2.3170) (2.0134) 
 
ΔLNTAXCF(-1) 3.8002b 2.0950 
  
(1.6013) (1.5928) 
 
ΔLNTOTASSETS(-1) -14.2458a - 
  
(3.7344)  
 
ΔLNTOTDEBT(-1) -7.8057c -14.7786a 
  
(3.9421) (4.2812) 
 
ΔLNTOTREM(-1) -0.2061 -0.2634b 
  
(0.1259) (0.0964) 
 
ΔLTDEBTMV(-1) 190.1633b - 
  
(85.2464)  
 
ΔLTDEBTTOTASS(-1) 48.8666a 76.0749a 
  
(15.5636) (16.4377) 
 
ΔMEETING(-1) 3.7954c 4.6288a 
  
(2.2018) (1.5903) 
 
ΔOPM(-1) -0.5816a -0.7588a 
  
(0.1447) (0.1410) 
 
ΔROA(-1) -3.1943a -1.8995a 
  
(0.6389) (0.3259) 
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Table 6.8 cont. 
 
 
  OLS Estimation GMM Estimation 
  
Dependent Variable: ∆LNTOTREM 
 
Model (1) (2) 
 
ΔROCE(-1) 2.6744a 2.2928a 
  
(0.4792) (0.2331) 
 
ECTDEBTMV(-1) -8.0403a -5.0152a 
  
(2.1623) (1.4885) 
 
ECTFEES(-1) 2.8713a 4.3410a 
  
(0.8703) (0.7921) 
 
ECTGPM(-1) 12.5637a 8.4110a 
  
(3.6034) (2.5592) 
 
ECTLNMV(-1) 3.2780b 2.6625b 
  
(1.3890) (1.1767) 
 
ECTLNTOTASSETS(-1) -9.0631a -5.2560b 
  
(3.2268) (2.3596) 
 
ECTROA(-1) 18.3749a 16.1502a 
  
(4.9567) (4.2262) 
 
ECTROCE(-1) -20.8973a -21.9765a 
  
(4.3316) (2.9370) 
 
Y2005 7.8712a 7.5596a 
  
(2.1529) (2.3405) 
 
Y2006 9.7808a 12.9141a 
  
(1.9223) (2.4248) 
 
Y2008 -8.7105a -8.8251a 
  
(2.3565) (2.3708) 
 
Y2010 11.8174a 11.1088a 
    (2.2854) (2.6315) 
Diagnostic Tests     
 
N 56 53 
 
𝐿2 0.8884 0.8989 
 
S.E. 4.0355 3.9009 
 
AIC 5.9344 - 
 
Q-Stat 0.6064 1.7912 
 
Auto LM(2) 1.2069 - 
 
Auto LM(4) 0.0000 - 
 
F-statistic 1.1168 - 
  Jarque-Bera 1.7196 2.8578 
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Notes: a, b, c denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Figures in round 
brackets are standard errors. The lag length is one. ECT represents the error correction term of the variable. Δ is 
the first difference operator of the variable and ΔΔ is the second difference operator. N indicates the total number 
of observations. S.E. stands for standard error and AIC denotes Akaike Information Criterion. Q-Stat is checking 
for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. Auto LM(2) and Auto LM(4) are Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation Lagrange multiplier tests using 2 and 4 lags respectively. F-statistic stands for heteroskedasticity which 
is tested using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey statistics.   
 
Significance of error-correction terms coefficients suggests that these variables respond to 
changes to achieve long-run equilibrium and adjust in the next time period. However, the 
negative sign as expected is only present for ECTDEBTMV(-1), ECTLNTOTASSETS(-1) and 
ECTROCE(-1), we observe positive sign for other four variables: ECTFEES(-1), ECTGPM(-
1), ECTLNMV(-1) and ECTROA(-1). According to Engle and Granger (1987), the ECM 
coefficients in error-correction representation should be negative, if they are insignificant or 
positive this indicates that coefficients are positively “biased” (Antzoulatos, 1996). The 
implication of these results is that they are not converging in the long-run; which is not what 
we have expected, considering the fact that in our previous model ECTTOTAL(-1) and some 
variables in this model have a negative coefficient sign. There are, however, other 
explanations (apart from the divergence) which can justify what we observe. It is likely that 
there were some problems with the model specification. As it is suggested by Antzoulatos 
(1996), when error-correction coefficient have opposite-than-expected sign it could mean that 
variables were estimated inefficiently, this bias can be reduced by including more stationary 
variables in the model and this can be done in our future research. These positive results can 
also be attributed to the presence of autocorrelation (Q-statistics accepts the null of residual 
correlation). It is also important to note that our sample size for Spain is quite small given the 
unavailability of data, so results are quite different to UK firms where sample size is much 
bigger.  
Rates of adjustment to equilibrium are also different. As estimated coefficients suggest the 
fastest rates of adjustment is for the profitability variable – ROCE for both OLS and GMM 
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models. For other variables (DEBTMV and ROA) return to equilibrium takes place at a much 
lower rate. This can be explained by the fact that directors in Spanish firms might increase 
their remuneration based on an increase in profitability figures for the firm only and adjust to 
equilibrium quicker.  
The long-term rate of adjustment between LNTOTREM and DEBTMV is much slower in 
Spain rather than in the UK for both OLS and GMM models. The difference in rates of 
adjustment is highly dependent on the legal rules (quality of enforcement in particular) of 
countries in which firms operate (La Porta et al., 1998). As it was discussed in the literature 
review legal rules of countries also determine how well investors and shareholders are 
protected from directors expropriating from firms usually taking the form of paying higher 
wages for themselves, meaning that return for investors is lower making it more difficult for 
firms to raise their investment leading to an increase in debt (La Porta et al., 2000a). It has 
also been established that countries’ legal systems which originate from common law (i.e. the 
UK) have better investors’ protection than countries with French-origin law (i.e. Spain). The 
speed of adjustment is quicker for the UK because there is greater monitoring making 
directors decrease their remuneration packages and respond to it quicker if the debt goes up 
(this relationship supports our previous estimated findings in Chapter 4). 
When two different countries are analysed, it is also important to consider the broad cultural 
framework which has an effect on development of corporate behaviour. As it has been 
mentioned in the literature review, we cannot only consider institutional framework when 
discussing differences between countries, there are also broader factors which influence the 
formulation of social norms, values and beliefs and these are generally influenced by the 
nation’s culture (Bae et al., 2012). Stulz and Williamson (2003) also refer to religion as being 
one of the important factors which influences the development of legal systems. Using 
religion as a proxy for culture, authors report that Catholic countries (the majority of Spanish 
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population are Catholics) tend to have weaker creditor rights that Protestants and Protestant 
countries have better enforcement of rights. Linking this to the formation of laws and to 
remuneration, it can probably be suggested that it is more difficult for executive directors to 
set excessive levels of remuneration given strict corporate governance controls without 
justifying it; therefore, we would expect to find quicker adjustment between remuneration and 
firm performance in the long-run than in Spanish firms. Another interesting factor Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) mention is language. English speaking countries are found to have some 
form of mechanism to address corporate issues shareholders are not happy with. This again 
can explain the fact of rapid adjustment. If we consider that remuneration is linked to firm 
performance, we would expect that any disequilibrium will be noticed sooner and 
remuneration would be more used as an incentive rather than directors having extremely high 
pay. Taking all of these issues into account it is not surprising that we would find differences 
in results for both countries. Of course, there are various number of issues which are 
interlinked with each other and all have effects on differences between UK and Spain. It is not 
possible to consider and test all of these factors in just one study, but these results we 
provide here using unique methodology in an area shows that there is a large scope for 
further investigation and research.   
Apart from all the reasons discussed above, we can also attribute mixed evidence between 
these two countries to the fact that our dataset differs dramatically, which can have an effect 
on the estimated results. We have previously highlighted in Chapter 5 that dataset for Spain 
had a lot of missing observations due to the lack of disclosed data in Manifest reports and 
Datastream.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
As it has been stated by Doucouliagos et al. (2012a), the literature on remuneration 
convergence is still relatively limited due to the fact that not many previous studies have 
taken into account dynamic effects capturing what happens over time. However, we present 
new results on the long-run relation between remuneration and firm performance using 
cointegration and error-correction methodologies. Taking into account various differences 
between these countries previously discussed, such as legal origins, culture, institutional 
framework, etc.   – we still observe interesting similar results. Even if for example we 
expected Spain to have weaker regulations which means that it might be difficult to achieve 
equilibrium (i.e. slower adjustment of certain variables for example) if there are any 
instantaneous shocks occurring in an economy, it is still the case that in both countries total 
directors’ remuneration adjusts with other independent variables in the long-run. In other 
words, the estimates for both countries indicate the directors’ remuneration levels adjust in 
line with the financial performance of the firms for each country; however, this adjustment is 
taking place quicker in the UK as the coefficient for ECTTOTAL is higher than it is for Spain. 
These results imply that if directors over- or under-pay themselves, their levels of 
remuneration will be adjusted in the long-run as it will move in line with firm performance and 
market value. 
This chapter has also provided extended evidence for the importance of legal rules and laws 
of enforcement in various countries. Supporting our previous conclusions, it was found that 
countries with better enforcement and legal rights, originating from common law legal 
arrangements have greater monitoring and protection of shareholders and investors; 
therefore, they also experience more close long-run relationship between variables, i.e. 
achieving the convergence faster. 
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Our results have a significant contribution to academia. Using a completely new method in 
this area to analyse the link between long-run firm performance and remuneration, we 
provide new insights for future research. After the financial crisis took place in 2008, many 
researchers have concentrated on the analysis of past events to draw conclusions regarding 
what was the main cause of the crisis; however, from the point of view of many practitioners it 
is time to concentrate more on the future, i.e. what policies should be adopted to avoid similar 
problems. One of the most important implications for practitioners is to concentrate more on 
the long-run goals for the firm and identify clear objectives for directors, for example clear 
effective incentive contracts in order to resolve the agency problem and make sure that 
remuneration does not contribute towards more agency costs, but actually serves as an 
incentive.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The question of directors’ remuneration continues to attract a lot of attention in the media, 
amongst regulators and academics. Especially after the financial crisis in 2008 many 
academic researchers have focused on the level of monitoring provided by boards of 
directors, the structure of corporate governance mechanisms and the way the compensation 
is designed for directors (Essen et al., 2013; Dowell et al., 2011). However, despite this huge 
interest and large amount of research carried out in the area in the last few years, it still 
remains uncertain as to what types of governance mechanisms adequately impact the level 
of monitoring, firm performance and compensation. In other words, it is a very complex area 
to investigate as many factors, such as industry performance, economic environment, legal 
origin have an effect on governance and thus compensation.  This thesis was meant to 
provide insights on those issues. 
In the next section, we outline the main findings of the study. We also shed some light on the 
main similarities and differences between UK and Spanish firms in terms of the effects of their 
legal origin on corporate governance. The main contributions of this thesis to the existing 
academic research will also be discussed. We conclude by stating the limitations of the study 
and also provide suggestions for future research.  
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7.2 Summary of Findings 
The following objectives were set at the beginning of this study: 
• To examine whether executive directors’ remuneration is associated with the financial 
performance of firms. 
• Given the difference in legal origins of countries, to investigate the relationship 
between firm performance and board monitoring and remuneration for the two 
countries.  
• To test for the relation between executive compensation and corporate governance 
arrangements of both countries. 
• To examine the long-term relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance. This consideration allows us to test whether directors’ compensation 
have a long-run relation with the performance of firms. 
 
This study looked at the relationship between executive directors’ compensation levels, firm 
performance and corporate governance. We found that financial performance of firms and 
market value positively associated with executives’ pay in both countries. These results 
confirm that first two hypotheses (H1 and H2) are supported for both countries. This suggests 
that compensation moves in line with good performance meaning that directors do not reward 
themselves entirely “excessively”. This conclusion may appear controversial in the light of the 
media outcry regarding excessive pay. The positive relation does not suggest that the pay 
may not be excessive. It simply means that the executive pay is in line or positively correlated 
with firm performance supporting the view that remuneration acts more as an incentive rather 
than creating more agency costs. The dynamic setting has also confirmed our predicted 
hypotheses. Our results have shown that in both countries remuneration is positively linked 
with lagged performance and lagged dependent variables supporting H5 and H6. It was also 
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found that the size of the firm matters, reporting positive and significant relationship between 
LNTOTASSETS and remuneration.  
Some researchers, of course, report in their study that inefficient accounting, management 
misconduct, unethical behaviour have contributed to the failure of some firms (Soltani, 2014). 
Examples of a few corporate scandals due to fraudulent behaviour in firms have caused a 
general mistrust in our current economic environment. These scandals should be viewed as 
anecdotal. That is, all firms do not appear to behave that way. However, if all firms were 
acting in the same way and if all directors were expropriating funds and benefiting themselves 
by increasing compensation that would have a detrimental effect on the economy as a whole, 
i.e. extreme unemployment, falling standards of living, etc. It is highly unlikely that directors of 
all firms will behave in the same way. That is what our results prove. Having taken into 
account a large number of firms we do not observe unexpected movements in remuneration 
as it is generally in line with firm performance and market value. These results are supported 
by our long-run results that focus on long-run pay. 
Corporate governance variables were also incorporated into our static and dynamic models. 
As La Porta et al. (1998) suggest, legal aspects such as efficiency of the judicial system, rule 
of law, quality of accounting systems will have an effect on monitoring mechanisms and thus 
on compensation as broad cultural context will have an effect how laws are enforced and on 
general behaviour of people. We find strong negative association between board control and 
remuneration for the UK companies and this confirms our third hypothesis, indicating that 
compensation is inversely related to levels of board monitoring. However, these results differ 
for Spanish companies. We observe that despite board control mechanisms, remuneration in 
firms still goes up, rejecting H3. These differences largely depend on the law practices in 
those countries (Barros and Nunes, 2007). 
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Directors’ ownership also is an important factor influencing firm performance and 
remuneration and as it has been discussed in literature review these links are often 
complicated and mixed evidence exists. Our results support predicted hypotheses (H5) which 
states that directors’ ownership is negatively related to directors’ pay, meaning that once 
directors become owners of the company they are unlikely to overpay themselves as they 
have a personal interest in increasing firm’s value.  
Individual analysis of each country has helped to identify interesting relationships between 
some explanatory variables and total executives’ remuneration in both countries and this has 
shed some light on the differences between UK and Spanish firms given the fact that various 
factors have played an important role in determining the sets of rules these countries adopt.  
 
7.3 Contribution of the Research 
This research provides a unique comparative study for the UK and Spanish firms. One of the 
main contributions is that we provide a comparison between firms whose corporate 
governance arrangements are affected by their legal origins. That is, UK firms are affected by 
common-law whereas, Spain firms are affected by civil law. In our research we have not used 
explanatory variables which measure legal arrangements in countries as described by La 
Porta et al. (1998); however, taking into account previous knowledge about law origin we can 
attribute differences in corporate governance practices which in turn have an effect on firm 
performance and remuneration to the difference in origin of the country.  
The study has a great contribution to a growing literature on dynamic setting when 
investigating the relationship between firm performance and remuneration. As it was 
highlighted by Doucouliagos et al. (2012) dynamic effects have not been analysed in as much 
detail as static models were. We have extended both of our OLS and GMM models and 
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introduced lagged dependent and financial variables in the estimation. In addition, we analyse 
total executive directors’ compensation rather than just CEO remuneration. Zalewska (2014) 
indicates that there is a limited amount of research which tests all executives.  
The study provides an extension to corporate governance literature by adopting panel 
cointegration and panel error correction models technique. This is a substantial contribution 
to the research as it models the data generating process of each variable to ensure that the 
appropriate transformation is applied prior to incorporating each variable in the model. We are 
also able to estimate long-run relations in this framework using both the panel cointegration 
and panel error-correction. That way, we can show the long-run behaviour of executive 
remuneration. This modelling approach provided a major advantage over the Arellano and 
Bond (1991) two-step GMM (see also Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) by 
capturing an appropriate data transformation variable-by-variable and facilitation of long-run 
estimation. In other words, we avoid over-differencing which is possible under the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) approach. 
 
7.4 Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study has contributed towards the existing knowledge in the area and has extended our 
understanding of the role of corporate governance mechanisms for executive pay. However, 
despite all contributions, the research is subject to certain weaknesses and limitations which 
provide a good background for future research where these issues can be addressed. It 
should be noted that some limitations of the research could not have been avoided due to 
certain characteristics of the databases used for collecting details for UK and Spanish firms. 
As the datasets were created by manually collecting variables from Manifest reports, these 
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could have been subjected to human error. The data was checked carefully; however, we 
should take this issue into account anyway.  
There are other limitations that we need to address. For example, as Coles et al. (2001) 
outlines that most studies only focused on a few corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. 
each study taking into account only one or two variables at a time); however, firms rely on 
different monitoring mechanisms and some variables may not have a significant effect in 
some firms, whereas they would be important factors in other firms. Therefore, it is important 
to include as many corporate governance variables as possible to measure monitoring and 
board control. Our study has incorporated nine corporate governance variables and 
examined the effect of each in turn. It could, however, be improved by constructing an index 
to understand the role of each corporate governance variable.  
We have analysed and discussed how firm performance factors and corporate governance 
affect executive directors’ compensation. Previously, some evidence was found that 
managerial turnover also has an impact on the level of directors’ compensation (Coughlan 
and Schmidt, 1985; Evans et al. 2014); therefore, taking into account executive directors’ 
tenure might give a better insight for the future research results. In terms of measuring board 
diversity, we have only taken into account the percentage of women on the board; however, 
some studies (e.g. Carter et al., 2003) outline the importance of including racial and cultural 
composition of the board as it has an effect on how diverse workforce is and thus increasing 
the value of the firm as people from different background could potentially bring in new 
experience and skills; therefore, this study could be improved by looking closer at minority 
groups and investigating how these can affect firm’s performance and thus directors’ 
remuneration levels.  
Both non-executive directors’ remuneration and CEO remuneration could also have been 
used in the analysis as in Lin and Lin (2014). O’Reilly et al. (1988) for example outline the 
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importance of comparing compensation committee directors’ salary with CEO compensation, 
they argue that people naturally make comparisons which affect their decision making 
process. Therefore, if non-executive directors have an increase in their pay, CEO 
compensation will go up as well. This argument can also apply to executive directors other 
than CEOs. Therefore, future research could incorporate these variables into their 
remuneration models separately as an explanatory variables and also test long-term 
relationship between these variables using panel cointegration approach. The justification for 
our approach was that we assumed that executive directors have shared interests with CEOs 
and this in turn will cause them to desire higher pay. 
Another important factor worth considering for future research is dividing firms into broad 
industry groups rather than analysing all of them together. It has been discussed before that 
economic conditions of an industry have an impact on firm performance as well meaning that 
good financial performance of a firm may not solely be attributed to managerial skills. Conyon 
and Murphy (2000) distinguish difference industry categories in their analysis and find that 
this has an impact on reported results, especially if differentiating between financial and non-
financial sector. Coles et al. (2001) also support this view by providing strong evidence of 
industry performance having an effect on individual firms.  
Also, as well as other numerous studies on corporate governance, our analysis concentrates 
on total directors’ compensation package not distinguishing between cash compensation and 
equity-based components. This criticism was outlined by Ozkan (2011) who identified the 
importance of employing a much broader measure of remuneration. However, for this 
particular research differentiating compensation in this way would have been impossible 
because of the difficulty of collecting our data.  
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This research can also be extended by introducing extra explanatory variables that relate to 
the legal origins of firms. We have provided evidence that results differ for the UK and 
Spanish firms. For example, we find differences in relationship between corporate 
governance variables and remuneration, i.e. greater monitoring in Spanish firms does not 
lead to a reduction in executive’s pay. Since La Porta et al. (1998) distinguishes between the 
effects of different legal origins it would be useful to incorporate legal variables in future work 
to assess their impacts. For example measures such as, corruption, the risk of expropriation, 
rule of law may contribute to differences in the effects of remuneration on firm performance. 
Future research should also consider splitting regressions and analyse the results before 
2008 (when the financial crisis took place) and after 2008. Also, it would be interesting to 
include more countries in future research rather than just two. These factors call for analysis 
that includes listed firms from more countries. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Dictionary of variables 
Variable  Definition 
Dependent Variables   
LNTOTREM Natural Logarithm of Total Remuneration 
REMGP Total Remuneration over Gross Profit 
REMMV Total Remuneration over Market Value 
Independent 
Variables   
Financial Variables    
FEES Non-audit Fees as % of Audit Fees 
LNTOTASSETS Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
Profitability    
GPM Gross Profit Margin 
LNEBIT Natural Logarithm of EBIT 
OPM Operating Profit Margin 
REMUNNETINC Remuneration Over Income 
ROA Return on Assets  
ROCE Return on Capital Employed 
ROE Return on Equity 
Firm Value   
LNMV Natural Logarithm of Market Value 
NCFMV Net Cash Flow over Market Value 
TOBINQ Market Value over Total Assets  
Leverage    
DEBTMV Total Debt over Market Value 
LIBASS Liabilities over Total Assets 
LNSTDEBTLTDEBT Natural logarithm of Short-term Debt over Long-term Debt 
LNTOTDEBT Natural logarithm of Total Debt 
LTDEBTMV Long-term Debt over Market Value 
LTDEBTTOTASS Long-term Debt over Total Assets 
Investment    
DY Dividend Yield 
EPS Earnings Per Share 
Taxation Cash Flow   
LNTAXCF Natural logarithm of Taxation Cash Flow 
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Appendix A cont. 
Variable  Definition 
Corporate Governance 
ACOMP Audit Committee Compliance (Dummy Variable) 
CEOCHAIR CEO and Chair combined (Dummy Variable) 
COMP Board Composition Compliance (Dummy Variable) 
DIROWN Directors' Ownership 
FEMALE Ratio of female on the board 
INDNEDS Ratio of Independent NEDs  
MEETING Number of Meetings over Number of Directors on the Board 
NONINEDS Ratio of Non-independent NEDs  
RCOMP Remuneration Committee Compliance (Dummy Variable) 
SIZE Board Size Compliance (Dummy Variable) 
Year Effect   
Y2005 Year effect of 2005 
Y2006 Year effect of 2006 
Y2008 Year effect of 2008 
Y2009 Year effect of 2009 
Y2010 Year effect of 2010 
Y2011 Year effect of 2011 
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Appendix B: Correlation coefficients for UK firms 
               
1 LNTOTREM 
             2 REMGP -.276a             
3 REMMV -.207a .695a            
4 FEES -.092a .190a .141a           
5 LNTOTASSETS .682a -.623a -.549a -.111a          
6 GPM -.042 -.107a -.086a .078a -.080a         
7 LNEBIT .650a -.670a -.688a -.107a .846a .045        
8 OPM .144a -.051 -.207a .060b .104a .659a .266a       
9 REMUNNETINC -.196a .524a .564a .104a -.463a -.037 -.604a -.051b      
10 ROA -.049 -.053 -.218a -.054b -.269a .281a .132a .380a .055b     
11 ROCE -0.02 -.031 -.160a -.075a -.236a .146a .092a .274a .096a .859a    
12 ROE .027 -.122a -.228a -.082a -.111a .096a .205a .262a .027 .770a .905a   
13 DEBTMV .154a -.094a .111a .054b .435a -.153a .217a -.072a -.188a -.519a -.514a -.283a  
14 LNMV .633a -.642a -.861a -.146a .763a .043 .847a .239a -.426a .150a .123a .193a -.026 
15 LTDEBTMV .132a -.082a .080a .053b .428a -.147a .221a -.061b -.203a -.498a -.497a -.270a .963a 
16 NCFMV .110a -.204a .180a -.103a .177a -.195a .109a -.050 -.012 -.114a -.066b -.009 .328a 
17 TOBINQ -.133a -.007 -.383a -.043 -.384a .234a -.058b .199a .073a .640a .556a .476a -.710a 
18 LIBASS -.066b -.085a -.018 -.145a -.207a -.366a -.100a -.388a .081a .215a .348a .322a -.241a 
19 LNSTDEBTLTDEBT .541a -.565a -.475a -.126a .720a -.062b .653a .076a -.376a -.108a -.126a -0.01 .303a 
20 LNTOTDEBT .549a -.574a -.524a -.079a .874a .036 .763a .164a -.448a -.192a -.242a -.065b .586a 
21 LTDEBTTOTASS .083a -.116a -.146a .050b .331a -.007 .272a .076a -.211a -.260a -.288a -.048 .771a 
22 DY .177a -.232a .050 -.124a .175a -.076a .147a -.048 -.005 -.022 .025 .074a .206a 
23 EPS .251a -.271a -.344a -.143a .290a .109a .528a .322a -.086a .513a .480a .521a -.096a 
24 LNTAXCF .604a -.670a -.577a -.129a .704a -.027 .792a .209a -.423a .100a .083a .154a .080a 
25 ACOMP .108a -.138a -.081a .016 .124a -.095a .154a -.065b -.074a .005 .019 .029 .030 
26 CEOCHAIR .007 -.026 -.001 -.004 .015 -.087a .003 -.094a -.027 -.041 -.008 .012 .026 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
27 COMP -.036 -.208a -.136a -.010 .125a -.066b .110a -.116a -.151a -.044 -.048 .002 .097a 
28 DIROWN -.346a .478a .436a .103a -.490a .051 -.506a .031 .340a .032 .029 -.029 -.180a 
29 FEMALE .297a -.270a -.249a -.067a .265a -.050 .301a -.028 -.160a .045 .054b .083a -0.02 
30 INDNEDS .263a -.421a -.367a -.045 .386a -.048 .394a -.064b -.264a -.023 -.030 .022 .076a 
31 MEETING -.446a .132a .164a .093a -.367a -.145a -.325a -.259a .104a -.056b -.036 -.057b -.042 
32 NONINEDS -.067b .040 .028 -.051b -.004 .119a -.043 .137a -.043 .010 -.012 -.006 .053b 
33 RCOMP .027 -.098a -.029 .010 .046 -.130a .064b -.085a -.030 -.015 -.007 .021 -.005 
34 Y2005 -.114a .028 -.007 .108a -.060b -.046 -.066b -.026 .079a -.019 .001 -.012 -.039 
35 Y2006 -.072a .001 -.071a .068a -.044 .012 .002 .001 -.008 .063b .094a .093a -.066b 
36 Y2007 .003 -.013 -.061b .037 -.024 .023 -.002 .031 -.052b .089a .127a .118a -.049 
37 Y2008 .054b .018 .140a -.016 .019 .002 .019 -.005 -.025 -.061b -.022 -.004 .119a 
38 Y2009 -.003 -.001 .061b -.049 .020 -.033 -.035 -.064b -.039 -.150a -.175a -.172a .077a 
39 Y2010 .036 -.024 -.051b -.071a .033 .008 .014 .023 .029 .026 -.021 -.006 -.023 
40 Y2011 .082a -.008 -.016 -.065b .050 .031 .061b .039 .019 .054b .002 -.010 -.025 
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  14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
15 LTDEBTMV -.012             
16 NCFMV -.111a .291a            
17 TOBINQ .235a -.672a -.459a           
18 LIBASS -.027 -.307a .103a .277a          
19 LNSTDEBTLTDEBT .618a .192a .149a -.183a .045         
20 LNTOTDEBT .666a .569a .178a -.303a -.238a .727a        
21 LTDEBTTOTASS .141a .832a .103a -.281a -.265a .100a .558a       
22 DY .052b .188a .248a -.208a .089a .156a .208a .114a      
23 EPS .405a -.086a .007 .159a -.032 .244a .212a .002 .074a     
24 LNTAXCF .737a .068b .109a .015 .041 .601a .595a .092a .153a .356a    
25 ACOMP .125a .016 .027 -.012 .083a .123a .116a .018 .131a .021 .123a   
26 CEOCHAIR -.008 .021 .014 -.019 .091a -0.01 .023 0.04 .015 -.094a .069a .071a  
27 COMP .078a .097a .060b -.049 0.05 .155a .173a .074a .089a -.047 .068b .150a .078a 
28 DIROWN -.492a -.195a -.068a .045 -.080a -.357a -.454a -.214a -.209a -.101a -.418a -.184a -.100a 
29 FEMALE .327a -.027 .046 .064b .121a .255a .272a .019 .120a .092a .286a .094a -.005 
30 INDNEDS .408a .073a .036 .013 .109a .341a .353a .086a .127a .032 .355a .459a .077a 
31 MEETING -.352a -.031 -.014 .029 .163a -.320a -.281a -.035 -.003 -.199a -.328a .032 .083a 
32 NONINEDS -.062b .049 .031 -.063b -.114a .021 -.011 .009 -.092a .056b -.063b -.461a -.088a 
33 RCOMP .045 -.018 .029 .006 .084a .076a .060b -.021 .069a -.041 .061b .693a .092a 
34 Y2005 -.053b -.025 -.047 .034 -.003 -.058b -.062b .004 -.078a -.060b -.034 -.091a .004 
35 Y2006 .021 -.056b -.126a .096a .006 -0.02 -.046 .003 -.114a .029 -.042 -.037 -.002 
36 Y2007 .037 -.045 -.103a .091a .014 .005 -.011 .010 -.071a .059b .005 .020 .001 
37 Y2008 -.095a .097a .108a -.154a .019 .053 .046 .028 .170a -.027 .037 .003 -.006 
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  14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
38 Y2009 -.046 .065b .119a -.098a -.013 .009 .026 .017 0.05 -.145a .004 .039 -.013 
39 Y2010 .064b -.023 .034 .028 -.011 .006 .029 -.022 -.022 .047 -.008 .033 .007 
40 Y2011 .068a -.018 .004 .011 -.012 .002 .013 -.039 .056b .093a .032 .024 .010 
 
 
 
  27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
28 DIROWN -.241a             
29 FEMALE .066a -.202a            
30 INDNEDS .450a -.469a .302a           
31 MEETING .135a .006 -.138a -.003          
32 NONINEDS -.117a .241a -.133a -.477a -.248a         
33 RCOMP .081a -.142a .089a .378a .107a -.512a        
34 Y2005 -.027 .017 -.107a -.150a -.042 .064b -.069a       
35 Y2006 -.006 .000 -.042 -.089a -.024 .037 -.080a -.150a      
36 Y2007 -.001 -.011 -.031 -.054b .011 .035 -.015 -.154a -.159a     
37 Y2008 -.005 -.002 -.002 -.015 .002 .021 .036 -.157a -.162a -.166a    
38 Y2009 .005 .006 .026 .027 .043 .025 .040 -.159a -.164a -.169a -.172a   
39 Y2010 .003 .006 .041 .052b .033 -.022 .042 -.160a -.165a -.170a -.173a -.176a  
40 Y2011 .028 -.016 .104a .211a -.029 -.149a .037 -.163a -.169a -.173a -.177a -.179a -.180a 
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Appendix C: Correlation coefficients for Spanish firms 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 LNTOTREM              
2 REMGP .732a             
3 REMMV .751a .855a            
4 FEES .080 .294a .203b           
5 LNTOTASSETS .334a -.090 -.060 -.264a          
6 GPM -.140 -.070 -.150 -.080 -.333a         
7 LNEBIT .314a -.110 -.030 -.226b .907a -.227b        
8 OPM .010 -.030 -.180 -.130 .000 .709a .070       
9 REMUNNETINC .675a .839a .771a .160 -.070 -.090 -.150 .010      
10 ROA -.090 -.180 -.090 -.060 -.140 .256a .110 .402a -.120     
11 ROCE -.050 -.170 -.050 -.040 -.110 .170 .110 .251a -.100 .870a    
12 ROE -.060 -.190 -.110 .040 .060 .306a .216b .400a -.140 .692a .759a   
13 DEBTMV .040 .020 .270a .020 .244a -.452a .170 -.424a .020 -.215b -.180 .000  
14 LNMV .170 -.040 -.298a -.100 .513a .190 .473a .443a -.020 -.030 -.080 .100 -.554a 
15 LTDEBTMV .080 -.010 .233b -.010 .326a -.478a .300a -.415a -.010 -.160 -.140 -.020 .908a 
16 NCFMV -.020 -.140 .090 -.080 .160 -.467a .130 -.461a -.090 -.030 .070 .020 .692a 
17 TOBINQ -.030 .000 -.287a .030 -.170 .495a -.040 .562a -.020 .196b .050 .040 -.899a 
18 LIBASS -.140 .050 .150 .201b -.399a -.100 -.377a -.332a .110 .120 .197b .180 .130 
19 LNSTDEBTLTDEBT .293a -.020 .030 -.130 .825a -.360a .749a -.090 .030 -.190b -.203b .060 .395a 
20 LNTOTDEBT .316a -.050 -.060 -.150 .914a -.239b .859a .120 -.040 -.150 -.201b .110 .262a 
21 LTDEBTTOTASS .080 .030 -.070 .030 .323a .080 .392a .287a -.030 -.090 -.220b .070 .180 
22 DY .100 -.180 -.150 -.256b .418a .100 .384a .218b -.050 .150 .120 .257a -.060 
23 EPS .020 -.060 .080 .080 .297a -.196b .451a -.060 -.030 .319a .266a .496a .455a 
24 LNTAXCF .258a -.190 -.090 -.279a .801a -.274a .838a .050 -.190 .150 .150 .150 .120 
25 ACOMP -.030 -.080 -.100 -.110 .010 .354a .050 .382a -.020 .170 .050 .040 -.110 
26 CEOCHAIR .010 .000 -.080 .110 -.060 .100 .070 .170 -.140 .349a .296a .160 -.314a 
27 COMP .110 .090 .120 -.170 .090 .160 .160 .236b .130 .322a .184b .186b .120 
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Appendix C cont. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
28 DIROWN -.030 .080 .070 .100 -.360a .130 -.359a -.187b .060 -.060 -.040 -.090 .010 
29 FEMALE -.030 .160 .150 -.160 -.110 .110 -.160 -.080 .100 -.080 -.180 -.130 .170 
30 INDNEDS .090 .010 -.030 -.274a .180 .180 .245b .326a .000 .268a .140 .090 -.140 
31 MEETING -.050 -.100 -.030 -.010 -.010 .140 .110 .130 -.160 .304a .201b .190 .050 
32 NONINEDS -.100 -.040 -.020 .259b -.110 -.100 -.120 -.259a -.030 -.297a -.268a -.160 .100 
33 RCOMP .020 -.040 -.060 .010 .196b .198b .347a .227b -.110 .266a .216b .244a -.030 
34 SIZE -.040 .070 .070 .020 -.380a .250b -.361a .060 -.030 .180 .090 .080 -.040 
35 Y2005 .160 .000 .020 .100 .080 -.090 .150 -.070 -.010 .060 .070 .030 -.020 
36 Y2006 .140 .253a .235b .293a -.120 .110 .090 .090 .110 .210b .250a .201b -.130 
37 Y2007 .010 -.040 -.010 -.020 .160 -.060 .170 .020 .000 .030 .100 .050 .090 
38 Y2008 -.375a -.429a -.384a -.070 -.060 -.050 -.050 -.080 -.339a .060 .120 .020 -.050 
39 Y2009 -.291a -.269a -.313a -.140 .010 .080 -.060 .050 -.205b -.010 -.090 .030 .020 
40 Y2010 .227b .288a .291a -.010 -.040 -.050 -.110 -.010 .197b -.110 -.120 -.070 .040 
41 Y2011 .140 .150 .110 -.110 .050 .020 -.060 -.020 .203b -.200b -.251a -.223b .060 
 
  14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
15 LTDEBTMV -.444a             
16 NCFMV -.553a .732a            
17 TOBINQ .681a -.817a -.764a           
18 LIBASS -.395a -.070 .090 -.160          
19 LNSTDEBTLTDEBT .378a .343a .160 -.223b -.030         
20 LNTOTDEBT .568a .324a .050 -.050 -.326a .875a        
21 LTDEBTTOTASS .336a .390a .030 .090 -.440a .280a .547a       
22 DY .382a -.080 -.100 .100 -.080 .391a .373a -.040      
23 EPS -.030 .430a .274a -.352a .192b .408a .371a .196b .320a     
24 LNTAXCF .363a .214b .160 -.090 -.417a .604a .680a .180 .349a .267a    
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Appendix C cont. 
 
  14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
25 ACOMP .070 -.080 -.070 .188b -.194b -.070 .050 .150 -.110 -.080 .080   
26 CEOCHAIR .180 -.251a -.223b .296a .030 -.150 -.020 -.040 .060 .050 .090 .120  
27 COMP -.060 .080 .070 -.060 -.010 .120 .110 .070 -.020 .150 .150 .338a .020 
28 DIROWN -.231b -.020 -.040 -.050 .311a -.170 -.293a -.010 -.170 -.150 -.393a -.130 -.150 
29 FEMALE -.245a .130 .080 -.170 .050 -.020 -.060 .030 .050 -.010 -.190 .090 -.100 
30 INDNEDS .201b -.060 -.100 .191b -.238b .050 .196b .180 .060 .070 .211b .402a .212b 
31 MEETING -.080 .070 .030 -.030 .090 -.060 .050 .020 -.030 .219b -.030 .212b .200 
32 NONINEDS -.110 .040 .010 -.100 .160 .040 -.080 -.110 .010 -.030 -.150 -.271a -.274a 
33 RCOMP .130 -.040 -.080 .130 .020 .170 .248a .090 .020 .160 .303a .415a .314a 
34 SIZE -.266a -.120 -.100 .040 .230b -.339a -.325a -.223b -.150 .040 -.338a .110 .110 
35 Y2005 .060 -.040 .060 .030 .090 .140 .060 -.070 -.100 .090 .199b .030 .090 
36 Y2006 -.060 -.110 -.090 .100 -.040 -.140 -.100 .000 -.300a .020 .130 .070 .140 
37 Y2007 .000 .110 .170 -.090 -.040 .080 .100 .020 -.100 .020 .140 .090 -.060 
38 Y2008 -.020 -.030 .090 .030 .070 -.030 -.070 -.080 .110 -.020 -.040 -.140 -.020 
39 Y2009 .020 .020 -.040 .000 -.040 .030 .050 .100 .010 .020 -.010 .060 -.100 
40 Y2010 -.010 .000 -.070 -.030 .050 -.020 -.010 -.030 .130 .040 -.222b -.150 -.010 
41 Y2011 .020 .080 -.030 -.040 -.080 .020 .030 .050 .160 -.140 -.050 .090 -.030 
 
 
 
 
 
233 
 
Appendix C cont. 
 
  27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 
28 DIROWN -.050              
29 FEMALE .110 .080             
30 INDNEDS .610a -.337a .207b            
31 MEETING .373a -.140 .170 .456a           
32 NONINEDS -.544a .269a -.100 -.850a -.302a          
33 RCOMP .389a -.269a .000 .486a .352a -.313a         
34 SIZE .187b .110 .306a .207b .605a -.208b .030        
35 Y2005 .040 -.070 -.216b .090 -.080 -.100 .250a .050       
36 Y2006 .191b -.080 -.209b .050 .060 -.040 .211b -.070 -.120      
37 Y2007 .187b -.020 -.090 .090 .010 -.170 .070 -.080 -.080 -.120     
38 Y2008 -.223b .090 -.140 -.199b .070 .120 -.130 .030 -.120 -.188b -.120    
39 Y2009 -.030 -.050 .110 -.010 -.080 .040 -.040 -.050 -.120 -.180 -.120 -.180   
40 Y2010 -.080 .000 .186b .020 .050 .010 -.130 .100 -.150 -.235b -.150 -.235b -.228b  
41 Y2011 .000 .110 .230b .010 -.070 .060 -.100 .000 -.120 -.194b -.120 -.194b -.187b -.243a 
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Appendix D:  Panel unit root results for UK firms 
Null: Unit root             
Variables Methods 
       
ADF-Fisher  
    Lag LLC Lag IPS Lag Chi-square 
Level DEBTMV 20 -7.5454a 20 -7.5689 a 20 59.5934 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
DIROWN 20 -7.5467 a 20 -7.7499 a 20 61.8194 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
DY 13 0.1553 13 -8.2777 a 13 68.2780 a 
   
(0.5617) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
EPS 20 -4.0183 a 20 -7.0501 a 20 53.4886 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
FEES 20 -3.2378 a 20 -7.7776 a 20 62.1720 a 
   
(0.0006) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
FEMALE 20 -1.6196b 20 -6.6407 a 20 48.7417 a 
   
(0.0527) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
GPM 12 -1.1836 12 -5.5712 a 12 36.9405 a 
   
(0.1183) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
INDNEDS 16 -1.2317 16 -8.7355 a 16 73.9253 a 
   
(0.1090) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
LIBASS 20 -1.1128 20 -7.6189 a 20 60.2379 a 
   
(0.1329) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
LNEBIT 10 -0.2377 10 -5.5646 a 10 36.5611 a 
   
(0.4061) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
LNMV 20 -9.6538 a 20 -7.7106 a 20 61.3209 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
LNTOTASSETS 20 -6.3086 a 20 -7.3536 a 20 57.0647 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
LNTOTREM 20 -2.6956 a 20 -6.1766 a 20 43.2161 a 
   
(0.0035) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
LTDEBTMV 20 -7.5195 a 20 -7.4931 a 20 58.6684 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
LTDEBTTOTASS 20 -4.9992 a 20 -7.1070 a 20 54.1542 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
NCFMV 20 -7.1724 a 20 -7.5024 a 20 58.7968 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
NONINEDS 18 -1.2341 18 -8.1162 a 18 66.2375 a 
   
(0.1086) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
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OPM 20 -5.1949 a 20 -7.3305 a 20 56.7465 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
 
REMUNNETINC 17 -0.8693 17 -8.2736 a 17 68.2206 a 
   
(0.1924) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
        
 
ROA 20 -4.9136 a 20 -7.4782 a 20 58.5497 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ROCE 12 -0.3200 12 -9.8744 a 12 87.9506 a 
   
(0.3745) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
TOBINQ 20 -5.2676 a 20 -7.6301 a 20 60.3722 a 
      (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
First  ΔDEBTMV 13 0.5735 13 -17.7098 a 13 177.8020 a 
Difference 
  
(0.7168) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔDIROWN 14 1.0707 14 -17.3817 a 14 175.2360 a 
   
(0.8579) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔDY 3 -10.1451 a 3 -31.0831 a 3 191.7650 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔEPS 10 1.4551 10 -19.7337 a 10 193.5400 a 
   
(0.9272) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔFEES 7 1.2221 7 -22.3044 a 7 205.7690 a 
   
(0.8892) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔFEMALE 11 -0.2274 11 -16.1524 a 11 163.3340 a 
   
(0.4101) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔGPM 7 -8.8598 a 7 -18.2100 a 7 178.4870 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔINDNEDS 4 -7.8918 a 4 -25.6121 a 4 209.8350 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLIBASS 12 -3.9182 a 12 -16.3937 a 12 165.9130 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLNEBIT 2 -2.2405b 2 -21.8416 a 2 194.2510 a 
   
(0.0125) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLNMV 10 0.5689 10 -16.8076 a 10 169.8410 a 
   
(0.7153) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLNTOTASSETS 11 1.3375 11 -16.8704 a 11 170.5520 a 
   
(0.9095) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLNTOTREM 9 -0.2855 9 -16.9928 a 9 168.7760 a 
   
(0.3876) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLTDEBTMV 13 0.1359 13 -17.5926 a 13 176.6560 a 
   
(0.5540) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
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ΔLTDEBTTOTASS 10 1.3597 10 -18.1776 a 10 182.1360 a 
   
(0.9130) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
        
 
ΔNCFMV 12 -1.0438 12 -18.5569 a 12 184.7600 a 
   
(0.1483) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔNONINEDS 11 -2.8512 a 11 -18.7348 a 11 186.1360 a 
   
(0.0022) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔOPM 11 2.6930 11 -19.3847 a 11 190.7520 a 
   
(0.9965) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔREMUNNETINC 6 -3.3009 a 6 -26.1665 a 6 209.2080 a 
   
(0.0005) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔROA 16 0.9840 16 -15.2528 a 16 154.0040 a 
   
(0.8374) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔROCE 7 -3.5698 a 7 -22.0021 a 7 201.8820 a 
   
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔTOBINQ 13 1.1761 13 -16.9782 a 13 171.5430 a 
      (0.8802)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
Second  ΔΔDEBTMV 7 -10.7666 a 7 -31.8218 a 7 178.8310 a 
Difference 
  
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔDIROWN 8 -5.3873 a 8 -30.1955 a 8 190.5750 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔDY 2 2.2099 2 -51.3027 a 2 18.4207 a 
   
(0.9864) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
ΔΔEPS 7 -7.3270 a 7 -30.9969 a 7 186.2960 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔFEES 4 -14.7600 a 4 -41.8471 a 4 75.4023 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔFEMALE 5 -5.8685 a 5 -31.0331 a 5 189.0940 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔGPM 5 11.4749 5 -23.2553 a 5 202.7200 a 
   
(1.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔINDNEDS 3 3.4578 3 -40.4885 a 3 94.4773 a 
   
(0.9997) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔLIBASS 7 4.8931 7 -24.2235 a 7 209.7610 a 
   
(1.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔLNEBIT 3 12.7315 3 -30.6880 a 3 175.4120 a 
   
(1.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔLNMV 4 -10.4070 a 4 -32.3704 a 4 180.6520 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔLNTOTASSETS 4 -12.2937 a 4 -32.5542 a 4 179.4910 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
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ΔΔLNTOTREM 3 -18.3948 a 3 -37.0364 a 3 129.8560 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
        
 
ΔΔLTDEBTMV 7 -10.9697 a 7 -31.6876 a 7 179.6740 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔLTDEBTTOTASS 4 -13.7575 a 4 -34.8499 a 4 158.0880 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔNCFMV 7 -8.6515 a 7 -32.0156 a 7 177.1700 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔNONINEDS 6 4.7270 6 -29.1304 a 6 198.8870 a 
   
(1.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔOPM 6 -12.7205 a 6 -34.2430 a 6 157.9980 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔREMUNNETINC 5 4.0741 5 -38.8382 a 5 109.0360 a 
   
(1.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔROA 6 -1.4603b 6 -31.7707 a 6 181.9500 a 
   
(0.0721) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔROCE 3 -0.2777 3 -42.7753 a 3 63.3637 a 
   
(0.3906) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔΔTOBINQ 6 -8.9603 a 6 -30.7046 a 6 189.9920 a 
      (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000 
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Appendix E: Panel unit root results for Spanish firms 
Null: Unit root             
Variables Methods 
       
ADF-Fisher  
    Lag LLC Lag IPS Lag Chi-square 
Level DEBTMV 8 -1.1047 13 -1.2532 13 4.6352c 
   
(0.1347) 
 
(0.1051) 
 
(0.0985) 
 
DIROWN 1 -1.0332 9 -1.2028 9 4.3959 
   
(0.1508) 
 
(0.1145) 
 
(0.1110) 
 
DY 5 -1.2197 12 -1.2261 12 4.5327 
   
(0.1113) 
 
(0.1101) 
 
(0.1037) 
 
EPS 14 -1.1979 16 -1.0927 16 4.0385 
   
(0.1155) 
 
(0.1373) 
 
(0.1328) 
 
FEES 5 -1.2067 7 -1.2324 7 4.5283 
   
(0.1138) 
 
(0.1089) 
 
(0.1039) 
 
FEMALE 5 -0.5545 13 -1.1055 13 4.0348 
   
(0.2896) 
 
(0.1345) 
 
(0.1330) 
 
GPM 1 -1.1801 7 -0.7740 7 3.0051 
   
(0.1190) 
 
(0.2195) 
 
(0.2226) 
 
INDNEDS 3 -0.6293 8 -1.2743 8 4.7024 
   
(0.2646) 
 
(0.1013) 
 
(0.0953) 
 
LIBASS 3 -1.1591 15 -1.1978 15 4.4233 
   
(0.1232) 
 
(0.1155) 
 
(0.1095) 
 
LNEBIT 2 -0.8184 5 -1.2125 5 4.5097 
   
(0.2066) 
 
(0.1127) 
 
(0.1049) 
 
LNMV 5 -0.9962 17 -1.1691 17 4.3137 
   
(0.1596) 
 
(0.1212) 
 
(0.1157) 
 
LNSTDEBTLTDEBT 5 -0.3956 8 -1.2380 8 4.5804 
   
(0.3462) 
 
(0.1079) 
 
(0.1012) 
 
LNTAXCF 1 -0.0861 6 -0.5246 6 2.2731 
   
(0.4657) 
 
(0.2999) 
 
(0.3209) 
 
LNTOTASSETS 4 -1.1261 11 -1.0175 11 3.7810 
   
(0.1301) 
 
(0.1545) 
 
(0.1510) 
 
LNTOTDEBT 4 -1.1169 8 -1.1380 8 4.2082 
   
(0.1320) 
 
(0.1276) 
 
(0.1220) 
 
LNTOTREM 7 -0.9594 11 -1.0731 11 3.9036 
   
(0.1687) 
 
(0.1416) 
 
(0.1420) 
 
LTDEBTMV 9 -1.1374 14 -1.2147 14 4.4878 
   
(0.1277) 
 
(0.1122) 
 
(0.1060) 
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LTDEBTTOTASS 1 -0.7153 1 -2.6670 1 11.3083 
   
(0.2372) 
 
(0.0038) 
 
(0.0035) 
 
MEETING 1 -0.7062 2 -0.5978 2 2.5652 
   
(0.2400) 
 
(0.2750) 
 
(0.2773) 
 
NCFMV 12 -1.0613 15 -1.1973 15 4.4212 
   
(0.1443) 
 
(0.1156) 
 
(0.1096) 
 
NONINEDS 6 -1.1038 9 -1.2310 9 4.5332 
   
(0.1348) 
 
(0.1092) 
 
(0.1037) 
 
OPM 0 -1.0881 5 -1.2076 5 4.5213 
   
(0.1383) 
 
(0.1136) 
 
(0.1043) 
 
REMUNNETINC 4 -1.1963 10 -1.2388 10 4.5821 
   
(0.1158) 
 
(0.1077) 
 
(0.1012) 
 
ROA 2 -0.1991 16 -1.1693 16 4.3159 
   
(0.4211) 
 
(0.1211) 
 
(0.1156) 
 
ROCE 3 -0.5046 3 -3.5367a 3 16.5969* 
   
(0.3069) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.0002) 
 
ROE 2 -1.1436 14 -1.0932 14 4.0433 
   
(0.1264) 
 
(0.1372) 
 
(0.1324) 
 
TOBINQ 8 -1.0914 17 -1.2779 17 4.7245*** 
      (0.1376)   (0.1006)   (0.0942) 
First ΔDEBTMV 2 -9.9209a 2 -9.5163 a 2 60.1142 
Difference 
  
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔDIROWN 0 -24.8326 a 0 -23.9638 a 0 42.0915 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔDY 3 -1.7905b 3 -8.5624 a 3 53.6890 a 
   
(0.0367) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔEPS 1 -8.4405 a 1 -8.8314 a 1 55.3312 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔFEES 2 -5.5652 a 2 -7.8207 a 2 41.8986 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔFEMALE 1 -6.9311 a 1 -10.4343 a 1 64.2037 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔGPM 0 -11.7182 a 0 -11.1629 a 0 23.6293 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔINDNEDS 0 -13.2049 a 0 -13.4781 a 0 77.4781 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLIBASS 0 -15.9581 a 0 -15.5410 a 0 83.2555 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLNEBIT 0 -13.4773 a 0 -13.5125 a 0 18.4207 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0001) 
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ΔLNMV 0 -12.5573 a 0 -12.6364 a 0 76.6104 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLNSTDEBTLTDEBT 1 -6.9263 a 1 -9.4357 a 1 59.4742 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLNTAXCF 0 -12.8409 a 0 -11.9274 a 0 18.4207 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0001) 
 
ΔLNTOTASSETS 0 -9.2809 a 0 -10.3041 a 0 64.7760 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLNTOTDEBT 0 -15.2933 a 0 -13.7565 a 0 80.3305 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLNTOTREM 3 -7.5926 a 3 -7.5558 a 3 35.6295 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLTDEBTMV 2 -9.9197 a 2 -9.4992 a 2 60.0014 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔLTDEBTTOTASS 0 -16.0733 a 0 -13.6347 a 0 79.9941 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔMEETING 1 -4.8010 a 1 -6.9636 a 1 37.2636 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔNCFMV 1 -13.4662 a 1 -12.4338 a 1 75.8463 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔNONINEDS 0 -15.8042 a 0 -13.8517 a 0 78.3966 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔOPM 0 -8.5261 a 0 -10.4488 a 0 65.6503 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔREMUNNETINC 2 -4.1664 a 2 -10.2866 a 2 64.9779 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔROA 1 -4.8773 a 1 -9.3246 a 1 58.7289 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔROCE 2 -2.7443 a 2 -8.5945 a 2 53.7712 a 
   
(0.0030) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔROE 1 -6.2134 a 1 -9.6636 a 1 60.9774 a 
   
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
ΔTOBINQ 1 -10.6841 a 1 -11.3661 a 1 70.9471 a 
      (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
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